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CHAPTER I 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 In everyday life, people must frequently make intertemporal choices, which 
involve selecting between options that lead to costs or benefits at different points in time.  
Examples of such choices range from deciding whether to eat a healthy meal or a tastier, 
unhealthy meal to deciding whether to save money for retirement or spend it on 
something sooner.  In both of these cases, an individual must decide whether they would 
prefer an option that has larger long-term benefits, but fewer short-term or immediate 
benefits than the alternative.     
Many choices also involve another element: risk.  Any option that leads to an 
outcome with less than 100% probability is risky, and it becomes more risky as the 
probability that it leads to a beneficial outcome decreases and as the probability that it 
leads to a non-beneficial or negative outcome increases.  In situations involving risk, 
people often are confronted with a choice between a risky option that could lead to a 
better outcome than a safer alternative, but that also has a higher probability of leading to 
a worse outcome.  Examples of such situations range from deciding whether or not to a 
buy a stock or a bond to deciding whether to have one of two medical procedures. 
This dissertation examines the neural mechanisms of intertemporal choice and 
choice involving risk.  In particular, it focuses on the role of the Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
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Cortex (DLPFC) in both types of choices, and on the role of the Posterior Parietal Cortex 
(PPC) in intertemporal choice.  While both Experiments 1 and 2 examine the neural 
mechanisms of economic choice, Experiment 3 has a different focus.  This third 
experiment examines the relationships between preferences on intertemporal and risky 
choice tasks, and between these preferences and impulsivity. 
 Evidence reveals that the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) has an 
important role in intertemporal choice.  Disruption of this region with low frequency 
repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) leads to greater selection of an 
option for monetary gain that has a better immediate, but a worse long-term value than 
the alternative (Figner et al., 2010).  Experiment 1 of this dissertation examines the neural 
mechanisms of intertemporal choice and addresses the following main questions:  
1. Does the Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC) have a similar role in intertemporal choice 
as the DLPFC? 
2. Do the DLPFC and PPC have a similar role in intertemporal choices involving gains 
and in intertemporal choices involving losses? 
 The DLPFC also has an important role in choices involving risk.  Disruption of 
the DLPFC with low frequency rTMS leads to greater selection of a potentially larger 
risky option that has a lower probability of reward, and a higher probability of loss, than 
the alternative (Knoch et al., 2006).  Experiment 2 of this dissertation examines the role 
of the DLPFC in risky choice and addresses the following main questions: 
1. Does the role of the DLPFC in risky choice depend on the level of risk? 
2. Does the DLPFC have a similar role in risky choices that are limited to the gain 
domain (i.e. that do not contain the possibility of a loss)? 
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People tend to discount the value of delayed monetary incentives relative to 
immediate incentives (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2004; Murphy, 
Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001), and tend to discount the value of risky incentives with 
respect to certain incentives (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).  People, however, differ 
in these tendencies.  Experiment 3 focuses on these individual differences and addresses 
the following main questions: 
1. Are there associations between types of monetary discounting (i.e. delayed gains, 
delayed losses, risky gains) and impulsivity? 
2. Are the tendencies to discount the value of different types of incentives related? 
 This dissertation is organized into five chapters with the following content: 
 Chapter I reviews important background information for the experiments 
performed in later chapters.  The next sections of Chapter I focus on the following topics: 
o Economic theories of intertemporal and risky choice, and behavioral economics 
findings of how individuals value delayed and risky incentives 
o The brain processes involved in the prediction of positive value, in the prediction 
of negative value, and  in the components of predicted value (i.e. probability, 
magnitude, and expected value) 
o The brain processes involved in intertemporal and risky choice.  This section 
describes the key experiments that led to the research questions for Experiments 1 
and 2. 
o The functions of the DLPFC and of the lateral Prefrontal Cortex more generally 
(with a focus on specific functions relevant to economic choice) 
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o The functions of the PPC (with a focus on specific functions relevant to economic 
choice)  
o Potential Roles of the DLPFC and PPC in intertemporal and risky choice 
o Summary of the Research Plan of the experiments 
 Chapters II, III, and IV each focus on one experiment (i.e. Experiments 1, 2, and 
3, respectively).  Each of these chapters contains a full research report, including an 
introduction, methods, results, and discussion.  While the background for Experiments 2 
and 3 is presented in Chapter I, much of the background for Experiment 3 is presented in 
Chapter IV.   
Chapter V concludes the dissertation with a broad discussion of some of the key 
findings of the experiments and of other important questions related to intertemporal and 
risky choice. 
  
Economic Theory and Behavioral Economics Research 
 
Choice involving Risk 
 In standard economic theory, each good in the marketplace is said to have a 
specific utility (i.e. subjective value) for an individual (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2006).  A 
rational individual who is a utility maximizer makes choices in order to attain the bundle 
of goods that maximizes their own utility.  It is traditionally thought that when making 
decisions amongst monetary options, the utility of each choice option is calculated as a 
function of the probability and magnitude of each potential monetary outcome associated 
with that option.  This idea that both the probability and magnitude of reward influence 
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decisions is a central idea in economics that goes back to work done in the 17
th
 century 
by Blaise Pascal, Antoine Arnauld, and Pierre Nicole (Glimcher, 2003).  Their insights 
led to the creation of Expected Value Theory, which held that individuals should make 
choices for options that offer the highest expected value.  The expected value of a choice 
option is calculated as the sum of the product of the probability (p) and magnitude (v) of 
each possible monetary outcome of that choice option (i.e. Expected Value = ∑i pi * vi).   
  Later, Expected Value Theory was modified by Daniel Bernoulli in the 
eighteenth century (Bernoulli, 1738; 1954) who asserted that individuals choose options 
with the highest expected utility rather than with the highest expected value.  It can be 
mathematically stated: Expected Utility = ∑i pi * ui, meaning that the expected utility of 
any option is equal to the sum across outcomes of the option of the utility of each 
outcome (u) multiplied by its probability (p).  Although the utility of an option is a 
function of its magnitude (e.g. as the magnitude of a potential monetary gain increases, 
its utility increases as well) the two terms are not synonymous.  Unlike magnitude, utility 
was designed to be a function of an individual’s total level of wealth.  
The utility function designed by Bernoulli was concave, indicating that as the 
level of a person’s wealth increases, the increase in utility from obtaining the same 
magnitude of monetary gain diminishes.  The concave curvature of the utility function 
also assumes that individuals are risk averse.   A risky choice option can be defined as an 
option available with a less than certain probability that is known to the individual 
making the choice.  A risk-averse individual is someone who prefers a certain option to a 
risky option of equal expected value (http://www.econport.org/content/handbook.html).  
For example, suppose a risk-averse individual were to make a choice between $x for sure 
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and $2x with a probability of 50%.   Since their utility function of money is concave, this 
individual is presumed to get more utility from an increase from 0 to $x than from $x to 
$2x.  Because of this, the individual is more likely to choose the certain option, since the 
expected utility is greater than that of the risky option, even though they both have the 
same expected value. In contrast to this prediction of Expected Utility Theory, Expected 
Value Theory would hold that because both of the options have the same expected value, 
this individual would be indifferent between the two options. 
 Expected Utility Theory has been an extremely useful theory in economics and 
was an improvement over the older Expected Value Theory, but it still does not 
adequately describe a great deal of human behavior.  In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky 
developed an alternative to Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory, in an attempt to 
provide a more realistic picture of how individuals make decisions and account for 
behavioral deviations from Expected Utility Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Prospect theory holds that there are two phases in the process of making choices between 
two different options for monetary gambles: an editing phase and an evaluation phase.  In 
the editing phase, individuals simplify and organize the information associated with each 
choice option, such as by cancelling out similarities between the two options and by 
rounding values.  These editing operations are a departure from the assumption of 
Expected Utility Theory that individuals consider options exactly as they are presented.  
Because of editing operations, a person’s preferences over the same choice set may 
change if they use different editing operations in different situations.  During the second 
phase, evaluation, individuals compare the value of the two options, and then choose the 
one with the highest value.  The value of a prospect (i.e. an option offering chances of 
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winning and/or losing money) is computed as a function of a value function and of a 
probability weighting function. 
 The value function in Prospect Theory is concave for gains and convex for losses 
and steeper for losses than gains.  The differential curvature of the gain and loss functions 
indicates that people tend to be risk averse in choices involving sure gains, but risk 
seeking in choices involving sure losses, while the differential steepness accounts for loss 
aversion.  Another concept in Prospect Theory is that the value of each outcome is 
multiplied by a decision weight.  These weights are a function of the probability of the 
outcome, but are not identical to it.  Decision weights represent the impact that 
probability has on the desirability of an option, and are able to capture findings that 
people tend to underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to those 
that are certain, and tend to overweight outcomes of very low probability.    
  While the original formulations of Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory 
both assumed that individuals are risk averse when monetary gains are involved, not all 
individuals have similar risk preferences.  As stated earlier, in Expected Utility Theory, 
utility functions are concave to reflect risk-aversion.  However, those with different 
relationships to risk have utility functions with different forms of curvature (Weber & 
Johnson, 2009; http://www.econport.org/content/handbook.html).  For a risk-seeking 
individual, that is someone who prefers a risky option over a certain option of equal 
expected value, the utility curve is convex, rather than concave.  In contrast, a risk-neutral 
individual who does not strictly prefer either of the two options has a linear utility 
function that exhibits no curvature.  While there are three categorically different 
relationships to risk, the degree of risk aversion or risk seeking differs among individuals.  
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The level of a person’s risk preference can be assessed by calculating that individual’s 
certainty equivalent for a risky option (http://www.econport.org/content/handbook.html), 
which is the amount of money available for certain that a person values subjectively 
equally to a risky amount of money.  The difference between the certainty equivalent of a 
risky option and the expected value of the risky option indicates how far that individual’s 
preferences are from risk-neutrality.       
Not all risky options are risky to the same degree, and this is reflected in terms 
that measure the level of riskiness of a monetary option.  In finance, the level of risk of an 
option is taken to be a function of the spread of outcomes associated with it (Rothschild 
& Stiglitz, 1970), and is often defined specifically as the variance or standard deviation of 
the  different outcomes (Glimcher, 2008; Weber & Johnson, 2009).  By this definition, an 
option that offers $20 with 50% probability and $30 with 50% probability is riskier than 
an option of equal expected value that offers $22.50 with 50% probability and $27.50 
with 50% probability, because the variance of the outcomes of the first option is larger 
than that of the second.  
Another definition of the level of risk, however, will be used throughout the rest 
of this dissertation.  Unless stated otherwise, the level of risk will be taken as a direct 
function of the probability of a negative outcome or non-rewarding outcome on a task.  In 
choices involving monetary gains, the choice that offers a gain with a smaller probability 
(i.e. greater probability of no gain) will be termed riskier.  In choices involving monetary 
losses, the choice that offers a loss with a higher probability will be termed riskier.  Thus, 
greater risk will be taken as lesser probability of gain or greater probability of a loss.  
This definition can only easily be applied to choice options that have two possible 
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outcomes, and for which one possibility is either a monetary loss or no monetary reward.  
Although risk level is not typically defined this way, I will use this definition because it 
can be used to help make sense of much of the findings in neuroeconomics and because it 
provides a parsimonious definition of risk level for choice scenarios it applies to.  
Importantly, it can easily be applied to the two experiments of this dissertation that 
investigated risky choice, which both employed tasks that involved choices between a 
certain option and a risky option with known probability.  
 
Intertemporal Choice: Discounted Utility Theory and Anomalies 
 Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory apply to choices for monetary 
incentives available immediately.  However, there is another type of choice problem, 
called intertemporal choices, in which choice options lead to outcomes available at 
different points in time.  While the dominant economic model for choices involving risk 
has been Expected Utility Theory, the dominant economic model for intertemporal 
choices has been the Discounted Utility Theory articulated by Samuelson (1937).  Like 
Expected Utility Theory, Discounted Utility Theory holds that individuals make 
decisions to maximize their utility, which is a function of the magnitudes of monetary 
gains and losses. 
 According to Discounted Utility Theory, the utility associated with future 
consumption is discounted by a constant value as an exponential function of time.  It can 
be mathematically stated that the utility (U) obtained from choosing a specific 
consumption profile is: U(co,…, cT) = 
T
t 0
δt  * u(ct), where t is time, u(ct) is the utility of 
an item of consumption at time t, and δ is the person’s discount rate.  In other words, the 
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amount of utility obtained from choosing a consumption bundle is equal to a sum of the 
utilities from all the options with one caveat: future consumption is discounted as an 
exponential function of the discount rate, δ, and the delay to consumption, t.  The appeal 
of this model is in its simplicity and that it models an important observation.  Individuals 
do tend to discount the value of money that could be received in the future compared to 
money available immediately, and tend to discount the value of money more as the time 
of receiving it becomes more delayed (Frederick et al., 2004).  
Despite the appeal of Discounted Utility Theory, there is an important pattern of 
behavior that it does not adequately capture.  It has been observed that individuals’ 
preferences for monetary rewards often reverse when delays to both rewards are 
incremented by a constant amount (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).  For example an 
individual may prefer receiving $1 today to $2 tomorrow, but prefer receiving $2 in 8 
days to $1 in 7 days.  This behavioral pattern violates Discounted Utility Theory, which 
holds that the preference between two options is dependent only on the amount of time 
between them and thus should not switch at any time point (Koopmans, 1960).  
Preference reversals reveal that individuals do not treat all similar intervals between 
rewards equally, and that an exponential model of discounting is not the best fit to actual 
behavior.  Rather, discounting tends to be greater between the present and a future time 
point than it is between two future time points separated by the same temporal interval.  
Individuals are thus more impatient than the standard model of discounted utility 
predicts.   
 By identifying how individuals value money available at different time points, 
many studies have been able to assess individuals’ actual levels of delay discounting 
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(Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Murphy et al., 
2001; Myerson & Green, 1995; Rachlin et al., 1991; Thaler, 1991).  One way to assess 
this is to ask individuals to make several choices between amounts of money available 
immediately and amounts available in the future, until one uncovers the specific 
immediate monetary values (i.e. immediate equivalents) that the individual values equally 
to specific delayed monetary values.  These specific delayed and immediate values that 
are subjectively valued equivalently can be used to construct indifference curves which 
map out amounts of money available at particular points in the future that are subjectively 
valued equally (i.e. have a similar level of expected utility) to specific amounts of money 
available now.  A number of studies show that intertemporal indifference curves are 
better modeled by hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic functions than exponential ones (Kirby 
& Marakovic, 1995; Madden et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2001; Myerson & Green, 1995; 
Rachlin et al., 1991), which are steeper than exponential functions in short time frames, 
but shallower than exponential functions between time points far in the future (see Figure 
1).  Critically, the shape of hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic functions allows these 
models to account for preference reversals, which are not accounted for by the 
exponential discounting model of Discounted Utility Theory.   
Just as individuals differ in their risk preferences, individuals differ in their time 
preferences.  Since individuals tend to discount delayed rewards (i.e. are delay aversive), 
as mentioned earlier, these differences tend to be differences in levels of discounting 
rather than qualitatively different time preferences (i.e. delay averse vs. delay seeking).  
The steepness of an individual’s indifference curve is a function of that person’s delay 
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discount rate.  Steeper decreasing curves reflect a higher discount rate (i.e. greater 
preference for incentives available sooner) than do shallower decreasing curves.   
 
 
Figure 1: Intertemporal Choice Indifference Curves.  Discount functions showing the 
present value of money that is subjectively equivalent to a constant amount of money 
available at various points in the future.  Exponential discounting assumes constant 
discounting over time while hyperbolic discounting assumes faster discounting at shorter 
time scales than at longer time scales.  Here, exponential discounting is described by a 
function of this form: Present Value = Ve^(-KD).  In contrast, hyperbolic discounting is 
described by a function of this form: Present Value =  V/(1+KD).  K is the discount rate, 
and is individual specific since different people discount the value of delayed incentives 
by varying degrees.  Larger values of K indicate greater value placed on immediate 
relative to delayed incentives.  V is the objective value of money, and here V = 1.  D is 
the Delay until payment, and is usually expressed in days.  Figure modified from Berns, 
Laibson, & Loewenstein (2007).    
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Although the model of Discounted Utility Theory does not specify that there 
should be different discount rates for different types of delayed outcomes, the level of 
delay discounting is a function of both the valence and magnitude of a monetary outcome 
(Frederick et al., 2004).  As with gains, individuals tend to discount the value of losses in 
the future relative to immediate losses.  They typically prefer losing an equivalent amount 
of money in the future to losing the same amount immediately.  Additionally, like gain 
discounting, loss discounting is well modeled by hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting functions  (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Murphy et al., 2001), and 
an individual’s levels of delay discounting for monetary gains and losses are positively 
correlated, suggesting common underlying mechanisms (Murphy et al., 2001).  However, 
numerous studies have reported that individuals discount delayed losses to a lesser extent 
than delayed gains (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; 
Estle et al., 2006; Frederick et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2001).  Furthermore, it has been 
shown that some individuals actually prefer to suffer a monetary loss or experience other 
aversive events sooner rather than later (Frederick et al., 2004). 
 The level of delay discounting also depends on the magnitude of the outcome.  A 
large amount of data indicates that the rate of delay discounting is greater for smaller than 
larger monetary rewards (Benzion et al., 1989; Estle et al., 2006; Green, Myerson, & 
McFadden, 1997; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Kirby, 1997; Kirby, Petry, & 
Bickel, 1999; Thaler, 1991).  However, the results of several studies suggest that the 
magnitude of an outcome may have less of an effect on the level of delay discounting for 
monetary losses (Baker et al., 2003; Estle et al., 2006).   
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Similarities and Differences between Intertemporal Choice and Choice involving Risk 
While intertemporal choice and choices involving risk have typically been treated 
separately in economics, there are similarities between these two types of choices 
suggesting that both types of choices may rely on similar underlying processes.  Across 
individuals, preferences for certainty and immediacy are positively correlated (Mitchell, 
1999; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de 
Wit, 1999).  Additionally, just as individuals tend to discount delayed rewards relative to 
immediate rewards of the same magnitude, individuals tend to discount the maximum 
value of risky rewards relative to certain rewards of the same magnitude.  Furthermore, 
like delay discounting, probability discounting (i.e. discounting of risky rewards) is well 
fit by a hyperbolic discount functions.  More specifically, when probability is converted 
to odds against reward (Odds Against Reward = (1/probability of reward) – 1), the value 
of a risky reward decreases as the odds against reward increases, and this decrement in 
value can be modeled by a hyperbolic curve (Myerson et al., 2003; Rachlin et al., 1991) 
(see Figure 1 for example of a hyperbolic indifference curve).  The steepness of this 
indifference curve reflects the level of an individual’s probability discounting: a steeper 
curve corresponds to greater probability discounting.   
These findings reveal a striking parallel.  In choices involving time, individuals 
tend to place increased value on immediate relative to delayed rewards, while in choices 
involving risk they tend to place increased value on certain relative to risky rewards.  And 
in both types of choices, preference reversals can occur.  In intertemporal choices, an 
initial preference for a small immediate monetary gain over a larger delayed monetary 
gain will change to a preference for the larger delayed gain if a common delay is added to 
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both options, (Frederick et al., 2004).  Similarly, an initial preference for a small certain 
monetary gain over a larger risky monetary gain will shift to a preference for the larger 
riskier gain if the probabilities of both options are reduced by a common ratio (Allais, 
1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
It has in fact been theorized that individuals may discount the future precisely 
because it is risky (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995).  Delayed rewards are always somewhat 
ambiguous, an individual never knows with certainty what the future will bring, and does 
not know whether or not they will be able to receive a reward in the future.  If people 
discount rewards available in the future because they are less certain than immediate 
rewards, then the special weight given to immediacy could be due to a preference for 
certainty.   
 Despite the similarities between choices involving risk and intertemporal choices, 
there are also differences between both types of discounting, which have led others to 
argue against a single process account of probability and delay discounting (Christensen, 
Parker, Silberberg, & Hursh, 1998; Green & Myerson, 2004).  Different magnitudes of 
monetary gain have divergent effects on each type of discounting.  While levels of delay 
discounting become lower as the amount of the monetary gains increase, levels of 
probability discounting become higher (Christensen et al., 1998; Estle et al., 2006; 
Myerson et al., 2003).  Additionally, there is some evidence that impulsivity, which can 
be defined as the tendencies to give into urges and to respond quickly without planning 
(Buss & Plomin, 1975), may have divergent relationships with each type of discounting.  
Many studies have found positive correlations between impulsivity and levels of delay 
discounting of monetary gains (Kirby et al., 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 
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1997; Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Petry, 2001, 2002; Reynolds, 
Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  In contrast, a study that has investigated the relationship 
between impulsivity and probability discounting of monetary gains found a negative 
correlation (Mitchell, 1999).  The relationships between each type of discounting and 
impulsivity will be more fully explained in Chapter IV. 
 
Brain Regions involved in Value Prediction 
 
Discussion of Neuroeconomics 
 The interdisciplinary field of neuroeconomics, located at the crossroads of 
psychology, economics, and neuroscience, is broadly concerned with uncovering how 
individuals make value-based decisions.  The answer provided by standard economic 
theory is straightforward; people make choices that maximize their level of utility.  
According to this view, utility is not seen as something that can be directly measured, but 
is rather something that can only be inferred by the choices that someone makes.  A very 
different view taken by those studying neuroeconomics is that it should be possible to 
measure the predicted level of utility associated with different options by recording the 
activity of brain regions that respond to the subjective value of the options.  Knowing 
how the brain codes for subjective value should help predict what choices individuals 
will make, if the assumption holds that options that are valued highly will be chosen.   
 The search for the neural substrates of utility is not only concerned with how the 
brain codes for the subjective value of monetary options, but is also concerned with how 
the brain codes for the value of other types of rewards and aversive events, such as 
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receiving food and being attacked by a predator.  Humans and other animals make 
choices to approach objects that are positively valued, and make choices to avoid objects 
that are negatively valued.  Brain regions that represent subjective value probably 
developed to represent the value of rewards and aversive events broadly in order for an 
organism to make choices that increased their inclusive fitness.    
 In this section, I will discuss which brain regions have been associated with 
positive and negative valuation generally, by focusing on which regions are associated 
with coding for the prediction of rewards, such as money and food, and which are 
associated with coding for the prediction of aversive events, such as losing money or 
being exposed to an electric shock.  I will largely limit the discussion in this section to the 
neural correlates of value prediction in non choice situations; how subjective value is 
represented in the brain in choice situations will be covered in the section entitled 
“Neuroeconomics of Choice”.  
 
Predicted Positive Value 
 Research has demonstrated that midbrain dopamine neurons have an essential role 
in the prediction of positive value.  Midbrain dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra 
and ventral tegmental area in nonhuman primates phasically fire upon exposure to 
conditioned stimuli (i.e. sensory cues) that predict rewards (Schultz, 2006; Schultz, 
Dayan, & Montague, 1997).  One interesting property of these neurons is that in addition 
to coding for reward prediction, they also code for whether or not the prediction was 
accurate (i.e. prediction errors), consistent with computational models of temporal 
difference learning (Schultz et al., 1997).  Initially, before an animal has learned that a 
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particular conditioned stimulus (CS) leads to reward, midbrain dopamine neurons 
respond to the unexpected reward as it occurs.  The initial firing to delivery of an 
unexpected reward appears to reflect a large positive prediction error, since this is a 
neural response in an environmental state that has a higher value than was predicted (i.e. 
there was a reward, but no reward was predicted).  If the reward is repeatedly paired with 
a CS preceding it, over time the dopamine neurons will shift their phasic firing from the 
time of the unconditioned stimulus (US) to the time of the CS.  This neural firing at the 
time of the CS appears to represent a prediction of the reward to come, while the 
subsequent lack of phasic firing at the US appears to indicate that there is no prediction 
error; the reward was fully predicted.  There is also some evidence that dopamine 
neurons code for negative prediction errors; the activity of midbrain dopamine neurons is 
depressed if no reward is available at the predicted time (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; 
Schultz et al., 1997).     
 Midbrain dopamine neurons not only are sensitive to whether a reward is 
predicted, they are sensitive to other important parameters of reward prediction.  
Dopamine neurons respond to the predicted magnitude of rewards; they fire more for 
predicted rewards of greater than of lesser magnitude  (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005).  
They also respond to the predicted probability of rewards.  Phasic activity of midbrain 
dopamine neurons to a CS predictive of a risky reward is positively correlated with the 
probability that the reward will occur (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Tobler et al., 
2005).  Importantly, among dopamine neurons, there is a positive correlation between the 
responsiveness to reward magnitude and the responsiveness to reward probability (Tobler 
et al., 2005).  This suggests that dopamine neurons code for the expected reward value 
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(i.e. magnitude x probability), since individual neurons show activity that positively 
scales with both parameters of expected value.   
In addition to responding to the magnitude and probability of predicted rewards, 
midbrain dopamine neurons respond to the predicted delay to rewards.  Midbrain 
dopamine neurons phasically fire more for conditioned stimuli that predict rewards which 
will occur sooner than those which will occur later (Fiorillo, Newsome, & Schultz, 2008; 
Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008).  Additionally, reductions in the firing rate of midbrain 
dopamine neurons as the predicted delay to reward increases on a reward prediction task 
are well fit by a hyperbolic discount function  (Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008).  Critically, 
these reductions may underlie hyperbolic discounting of delayed rewards, since they are 
seen in the neurons of monkeys that exhibit hyperbolic discounting during intertemporal 
choice (Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008).  However, it is unclear whether dopamine neurons 
would discount the value, or even would be involved in predicting the value of delayed 
rewards available at the types of long delays (i.e. days, weeks, or years) that are typical in 
human intertemporal choice tasks, as the paradigm used by Kobayashi & Shultz only had 
delays on the order of seconds.  
In recent years, a number of fMRI studies have looked at the neural correlates of 
predicted rewards in humans.  One paradigm that has proven useful in this regard is the 
Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task (Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000).  
On this task, individuals are presented with a cue that indicates whether they will have 
the opportunity to respond to win an amount of money, to respond to avoid losing an 
amount of money, or to respond for no monetary outcome.  Following each cue and a 
waiting period, individuals then make a response and receive feedback regarding their 
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performance; success on trials occurs only if subjects respond quickly enough.  Because 
success does not always occur, cues indicate the potential to win or lose on the trial, 
rather than indicating there will be a certain outcome.  On trials involving possibilities of 
monetary gain or loss, successful performance on a trial leads to feedback that they won 
or avoided losing the cued amount of money, respectively.  Since subjects must quickly 
respond on the MID task to receive reward, activations during reward prediction in 
studies utilizing the MID task may reflect the enhancement of preparatory motor 
responses based on value prediction, rather than a passive signal of predicted positive 
value per se.  
 Many fMRI studies utilizing the MID task have looked at activations associated 
with predicted value, which is associated with the time of waiting following cue (i.e. CS) 
presentation.   An activation likelihood estimate meta-analysis (ALE: Laird et al., 2005) 
of 20 studies using the MID or other cued-response tasks reveals that activation is greater 
for the prediction of a potential monetary gain than for prediction of a neutral outcome 
(i.e. no predicted monetary reward or loss) in various regions, including the ventral 
striatum, thalamus, and insula (Knutson & Greer, 2008).  Although not found in the meta-
analysis, there is also consistently more activation for the prediction of a potential 
monetary gain than for prediction of a neutral outcome on the MID in another region of 
the striatum, the caudate (Bjork et al., 2004; Juckel et al., 2006; Knutson, Adams, Fong, 
& Hommer, 2001; Knutson, Bhanji, Cooney, Atlas, & Gotlib, 2008; Knutson et al., 2004; 
Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & 
Hommer, 2003; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007; Wrase et al., 2007).  Together this suggests 
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that in humans, the ventral striatum, the dorsal striatum (i.e. caudate), the thalamus, and 
insula are all involved in the prediction of rewards. 
 
Predicted Negative Value 
 Understanding how the brain codes for the prediction of stimuli with positive 
value may not tell us about how the brain codes for the prediction of stimuli with 
negative value.  Positive and negative incentives might prime behavior in different 
directions, and the neural substrates of these different types of behaviors may be 
different.  Prediction of items with positive value might generate both positive feelings 
and high arousal (i.e. positive activation) which encourages one to approach them.  In 
contrast, prediction of items with negative value might generate both negative feelings 
and high arousal (i.e. negative activation) which encourages one to avoid them 
(Panksepp, Knutson, & Burgdorf, 2002).  Self-report data has shown that the emotional 
states of positive and negative activation are orthogonal (Russell, 1980), suggesting that 
each of these states has different neural substrates.  Because each type of incentive may 
be primarily linked with one of these states, the neural substrates of value prediction 
might differ depending upon on whether the predicted item is a positive or a negative 
incentive.        
 While some neural substrates of positive and negative value might be different, 
others might be the same.  Some regions of the brain could respond similarly to predicted 
value across valence, which could have a role in increasing arousal and in general 
priming of physical processes towards action.  Conversely, some brain regions could 
respond to both positive and negative value but in different directions; these regions 
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could be particularly important for economic decisions that involve comparing positive 
and negative incentives.  To have a full understanding of how the brain codes for 
predicted value, one must understand both how the brain codes for items with positive 
value and for items with negative value.          
 Although dopamine neurons play a distinct role in the prediction of rewards, their 
role in the prediction of aversive stimuli is less clear.  In contrast to the general 
responsiveness of dopamine neurons to rewards, different dopamine neurons show very 
different responses to predictions of aversive stimuli.  In an electrophysiological study, 
Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009b) found that some midbrain dopamine neurons were 
excited by a CS predicting an aversive stimulus, while others were inhibited by it.  These 
effects depended on the probability of the prediction, becoming greater as the probability 
associated with the predicted item increased.  While there were two very different 
patterns of dopamine neurons to predictions of aversive stimuli, these neurons tended to 
show only one pattern for the prediction of positive stimuli: excitation.  This study 
suggests that some dopamine neurons code for value on a single scale; by increasing their 
firing when rewards are predicted and by decreasing it when aversive stimuli are 
predicted.  These neurons could prime behavior towards approach of rewards.  Other 
dopamine neurons, however, that are excited by predictions of both positive and negative 
stimuli may instead have a role in increasing arousal.        
 In contrast to the divergent responses of dopamine neurons to stimuli predicting 
negative value, neurons in a region of the lateral habenula have been shown to exhibit 
more homogenous responses to these stimuli.  On tasks involving reward, habenula 
neurons are excited by conditioned stimuli which predict no reward, and on tasks 
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involving aversive stimuli, habenula neurons are excited by predictions of these aversive 
stimuli (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009a).  Like some dopamine neurons, habenula 
neurons appear to code for value on a single scale.  Contrary to the activity patterns of 
these dopamine neurons, however, activity in lateral habenula neurons is greater for 
predictions of more negative stimuli, raising the possibility that neurons of the lateral 
habenula may prime behavior towards avoidance of items with negative value. 
 Researchers have utilized fMRI to look for the neural correlates of predicted 
negative value just as they have to look for the neural correlates of predicted positive 
value.  In their ALE meta-analysis of activation patterns during the MID and other cued-
response tasks, Knutson and Greer (2008) found greater activation for prediction of a 
potential monetary loss than for prediction of a neutral outcome in the dorsal striatum 
(both caudate and putamen), insula, and thalamus.  Notably, activation in the caudate, 
insula, and thalamus was present in their analysis of predicted positive value as well, 
suggesting a role for all three of these regions in prediction of monetary gains and losses.  
The putamen could have a larger role in prediction of negative value than of positive 
value, given that it was only significant in the monetary loss prediction analysis.   
 One should, however, be careful in interpreting these meta-analytic results as 
regions involved in the prediction of negative value.  Many of the studies in the analysis 
used the MID.  As the goal on this task is to respond quickly enough to avoid a loss, 
activations associated with the anticipation period on loss trials might represent 
predictions of no loss rather than predictions of loss per se.  
 One region notably absent from Knutson and Greer’s (2008) meta-analysis of 
prediction of monetary loss is the ventral striatum.   In fact, in their meta-analysis there 
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was greater activation associated with the prediction of potential monetary gain than with 
the prediction of potential monetary loss in the ventral striatum, suggesting that this 
region has a larger role in the prediction of positive than of negative value.  Larger 
responses to predictions of positive value could be due to the behavior of dopamine 
neurons, as dopamine neurons project to this region (Haber, 2003).  Since more midbrain 
dopamine neurons respond to the predicted value of rewards than of aversive stimuli, this 
could lead to greater activation increases associated with the prediction of positive than 
of negative value in the ventral striatum.  This idea is consistent with the suggestion of 
Knutson and Gibbs that the fMRI BOLD response associated with the prediction of 
reward in the ventral striatum is a function of the release of dopamine in this region 
(Knutson & Gibbs, 2007). 
  
Predicted Expected Value 
 One approach for investigating which regions in the brain are involved in 
valuation of monetary incentives is to look for brain activity that scales with the expected 
value, (i.e. magnitude x probability) of a predicted reward or aversive event.  I have 
already discussed that dopamine neurons respond to both components of the expected 
value of rewards.  Here I will focus on research findings that have looked at responses in 
the human brain to expected value, or its two components (i.e. magnitude and 
probability). 
 Several fMRI studies have looked at how brain activation scales with the expected 
value of monetary rewards in humans, and have revealed a particularly important role for 
the striatum.  During passive monetary reward tasks, activation in the striatum positively 
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scales with the expected value of a predicted reward (Tobler, Christopoulos, O'Doherty, 
Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007).  Other evidence 
suggests that striatal activation may also bias selection of options with a high expected 
value.  In choice tasks for monetary rewards available with various probabilities, there is 
more activation in the striatum on trials in which high expected value options are chosen 
than on trials where options with lower expected value are chosen (Christopoulos, Tobler, 
Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; 
Tobler et al., 2009).     
 Tobler and colleagues (2009; 2007) have also shown that activation in areas of the 
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) scales linearly with the expected value of a predicted 
reward on passive monetary reward tasks, but leave unclear whether a specific portion of 
the LPFC is particularly responsive to expected value.  In one of the fMRI studies by 
Tobler et al. (2007), activation that positively scaled with expected value was seen in the 
DLPFC, but not in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC).  In contrast, in another 
fMRI study by Tobler and colleagues (2009), it was only seen in the VLPFC.   
 Activation in the striatum not only positively scales with the expected value of 
rewards, but positively scales with both of its components: magnitude and probability.  
Tobler and colleagues have repeatedly shown that the probability of receiving a monetary 
reward as predicted by a cue is positively correlated with activation in the striatum 
(Tobler, Christopoulos, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2008; Tobler et al., 2007).  
Findings from Knuston et al. (2001) reveal that activation in the striatum also responds to 
predicted reward magnitude.  On the MID, there is greater activation in both the ventral 
and dorsal striatum, and in two other regions (i.e. thalamus and dorsal MPFC), for 
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prediction of larger than of smaller rewards.  The increased activation seen in the striatum 
as the expected value of predicted rewards increase or as the components of expected 
value increase reveals that the striatum has an especially important role in predicting the 
value of rewards. 
While research shows that activation in the striatum scales linearly with the 
probability of predicted reward on passive reward tasks, activation patterns in the DLPFC 
associated with the probability of predicted reward appear to be more complex.  In an 
fMRI study, Tobler and colleagues (2008) looked for activation in the brain that showed 
increased activation as an inverse S-function of probability, to see if responses in certain 
regions of the brain responded to probability in a manner consistent with the probability 
weighting function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Compared to a 
linear function, this function overweights low probabilities and underweights high 
probabilities.  Certain options (i.e. options with a probability of 0% or 100%), however, 
are not weighted differently than they would be by a linear function.  They found that 
activation in the DLPFC responded to probability in a distorted manner, and was fit by 
the inverse S-function.  In contrast, activation in the striatum increased linearly as 
probability increased.   
No studies have investigated how activation in the human brain responds to the 
expected value of stimuli with negative values.  A few studies, however, have examined 
how activation scales with the components of expected value (i.e. magnitude and 
probability).  Activation in the striatum positively scales with the probability of a 
predicted aversive event (Bach, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009).  This suggests that the 
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striatum has a similar role in signaling the probability of positive and negative stimuli, 
responding more as predicted stimuli are more likely to occur.   
It is unresolved, however, whether regions of the brain respond to the predicted 
magnitude of positive and negative stimuli in a similar way.  Knutson et al. (2001) found 
similar responses to the predicted magnitude of potential gains and losses on the MID in 
several regions.  Activation in the dorsal striatum, thalamus, and dorsal MPFC were 
greater for both predicted gains and losses of larger magnitudes than of smaller 
magnitudes.  In contrast, on a choice task between two risky options that could both lead 
to monetary gain or loss, Tom and colleagues (2007) found regions that had increased 
activation as the magnitude of a potential gain increased, but found no regions that had 
increased activation as the predicted magnitude of a potential loss increased.  
Interestingly, activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and striatum (i.e. 
ventral striatum and caudate) was shown to respond divergently to the predicted 
magnitudes of each type of incentive; activation increased in these regions as the 
predicted magnitude of a gain increased, but decreased as the predicted magnitude of a 
loss increased.  This divergent response profile makes these regions good candidates for 
signaling economic value, because their patterns of response suggest they code for 
positive and negative predicted value on a single scale.  The conflicting findings across 
studies, however, leave unresolved how the brain responds to the magnitude of negative 
stimuli.  
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Section Summary 
  This section has reviewed findings of how the brain responds to predictions of 
positive and negative value.  This has revealed the importance of midbrain dopamine 
neurons, particularly in signaling positive value.  It has also shown that a key region 
responsive to value is the striatum.  This region responds to predictions of positive value, 
and has responses which directly scale with the expected value, magnitude, and 
probability of rewards.  Activation in the striatum also responds to predictions of negative 
value and directly scales with the probability of predicted aversive events.  Less is 
known, however, about how the brain responds to the magnitude and expected value of 
negatively valued stimuli. 
 There are some suggestions that the DLPFC is involved in the prediction of value 
as well, but it does not appear to have a central role in such processes.  An interesting 
possibility suggested by one of the studies reviewed in this section is that probability 
might be coded differently in the DLPFC than in other regions responsive to value, such 
as in the striatum.  It could respond differently to other components of prediction as well, 
such as delay.  In contrast, there is little evidence that the PPC is responsive to basic 
predictions of value.  The next section will focus specifically on the results of 
neuroeconomic studies of choice and will illustrate findings suggesting that the DLPFC 
and PPC do both have important roles during choice.  
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Neuroeconomics of Choice 
 
Subjective Value during Choice 
 Studying how the brain responds to predictions of rewarding or aversive stimuli in 
general can tell us much about the brain processes involved in economic decision 
making, but it has two important limitations.  First, some regions that respond to value 
during choice situations may be different from those that respond to value during non-
choice tasks.  Second, not everyone values different incentives the same; individuals have 
different preferences.  Because of this, value related responses in the brain that lead to 
choices might be better captured by looking for activity that scales with behavioral 
preferences (i.e. with subjective values) than with general properties of stimuli.  Activity 
correlated with an individual’s subjective valuations of items in risky choice or 
intertemporal choice tasks would be expected to directly lead to the risky or intertemporal 
choices they make.   
Several fMRI studies have taken this approach by looking for activity that scales 
with subjective value on intertemporal choice or risky choice tasks involving positive 
incentives.  To capture how each individual subjectively values items on these tasks, 
investigators have fit models (e.g. hyperbolic models of discounting) to each individual’s 
choices.  The results of studies using this approach have revealed a remarkable similarity 
in the regions that are responsive to the subjective value of risky monetary gains and 
delayed monetary gains.  In intertemporal choice tasks, it has been consistently shown 
that activation in the striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate is positively correlated with 
the subjective value of delayed rewards (Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Peters & 
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Buchel, 2009, 2010).  In risky choice tasks as well, several studies have shown that 
activation in these regions scales with the subjective value of risky rewards (Levy, Snell, 
Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Peters & Buchel, 2009).  Together with the 
findings in the last section, this reveals that the striatum is both responsive to prediction 
of rewards in general and to the subjective value of rewards on choice tasks.   
There is some evidence that the MPFC and posterior cingulate also play a role in 
signaling the subjective value of negative incentives during choice.  FitzGerald and 
colleagues (2009) found that activation in both of these regions was associated with the 
difference in subjective value between two positive incentives and between two negative 
incentives on a basic choice task that did not involve intertemporal or risk components.  
However, it is unclear whether the MPFC and posterior cingulate would respond to the 
subjective value of loss options on intertemporal or risky choice tasks, as no prior studies 
have investigated how the brain responds to the subjective value of negative incentives 
during intertemporal or risky choice.  
What about the DLPFC and PPC?  There are some clues that the DLPFC may 
play a role in valuation on intertemporal and risky choice tasks.  Research has shown that 
activation in the DLPFC scales with subjective value in a similar manner as does 
activation in the MPFC (i.e. VMPFC) in tasks that involve bidding for positive or 
negative incentives (Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & 
Rangel, 2010), and on a basic choice task (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009).  Furthermore 
disruption of the DLPFC with repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) 
affects subjective valuation as measured on a bidding task (Camus et al., 2009).  It could 
be that activation associated with subjective valuation in the DLPFC has not adequately 
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been captured by the models used to capture subjective value in past risky and 
intertemporal choice studies.  However, another possibility is that the DLPFC is not 
involved in valuation on these tasks.  Both the DLPFC and PPC could be involved in 
other functions during intertemporal and risky choice. 
   
Intertemporal Choice 
So far, I have argued how studying regions responsive to subjective value can 
inform us about what choices people make.  While it should, there are other approaches 
to studying the neural mechanisms of choice.  For example, investigators can look for 
activity that is associated with different types of choices or can see how choices are 
different when the functions of a brain region are disrupted.  Studies using these 
approaches have revealed the importance of the DLPFC and PPC in intertemporal 
choices, and the DLPFC in choices involving risk.   
The first clue that the DLPFC and PPC have an important role in intertemporal 
choice comes from an fMRI study by McClure and colleagues (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004).  They revealed that two sets of brain regions, which the 
authors labeled Beta and Delta regions, had different patterns of activation in 
intertemporal choices between smaller sooner monetary rewards and larger more delayed 
monetary rewards.  The terms for these regions were taken from a theory of delay 
discounting that contains two components– a Beta variable that captures immediacy bias 
in choice and a Delta variable that discounts at a constant rate as a function of time 
(Phelps & Pollak, 1968).  McClure and colleagues identified Beta regions as regions that 
were preferentially activated for intertemporal choices in which one of the two choice 
32 
 
options was immediate.  These regions included the ventral striatum, MPFC, and 
posterior cingulate cortex.  Notably, these are the same regions that have consistently 
shown activation patterns that scale with the subjective value of options in intertemporal 
choice tasks.  The Delta regions, however, were similarly activated on intertemporal 
choices with and without an immediate option, and included the right DLPFC and 
bilateral PPC.  As these regions are not typically associated with subjective valuation of 
options in intertemporal choice tasks, it is unclear what the functions of these regions 
were during choice.  They did appear to be involved in the choice process itself, as they 
were preferentially activated by more difficult choices.   
Using a similar design as McClure and colleagues (2004), several studies have 
replicated the effects, both with intertemporal choice for monetary rewards and for juice 
rewards (McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, 
& Jiang, 2009).  As in the original study by McClure et al. (2004), these studies found 
that the same two sets of regions were differentially activated depending on whether a 
choice was immediate.  These consistent effects indicate that the DLPFC and PPC both 
have an important role in intertemporal choices, and suggest it is different from that of 
the regions that have typically been responsive to the subjective values of items during 
intertemporal choice. 
Importantly, fMRI data suggests that the DLPFC and PPC bias intertemporal 
choice behavior differently than do the ventral striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate.  
The DLPFC and PPC may bias choice towards options of better long-term value, as there 
is greater activation in these regions when individuals choose larger more delayed 
rewards in intertemporal choice tasks (Weber & Huettel, 2008; Wittmann, Leland, & 
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Paulus, 2007).  In contrast, the ventral striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate may bias 
choice towards options of better immediate value, as activation in this set of regions 
predicts a greater chance of choosing a small immediate over a larger delayed reward 
(McClure et al., 2007).  Similarly, there is greater activation in the striatum for choice of 
small immediate than for choice of larger delayed options (Wittmann, Lovero, Lane, & 
Paulus, 2010).  The relative activity in these two sets of regions as well, may have an 
important role in choice.  McClure et al. (2004) observed that when subjects chose the 
larger later reward rather than the smaller immediate reward, there was more activation in 
the Delta regions (including the DLPFC and PPC) than in the Beta regions (i.e. the 
ventral striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate). 
If the DLPFC and PPC bias intertemporal choices towards choice of the better 
long-term option, then it might be predicted that individuals with lesions to these regions 
would be more likely to choose immediate rewards in an intertemporal choice task than 
healthy controls.  Fellows & Farah (2005), however, did not find any differences between 
the intertemporal choice behavior of individuals with lesions to either the left or right 
lateral PFC and that of individuals without lesions.  There were some limitations to the 
study, however, that make it hard to assess the findings.  Lesions to different individuals 
largely did not overlap; some individuals had lesions to the left PFC while others had 
them to the right, and different individuals had lesions to different regions of the lateral 
PFC.  These differences make it possible that many of these individuals did not have 
lesions to the DLPFC regions important for intertemporal choices.  Alternatively, effects 
were not seen because of limitations of the lesion approach; following brain damage, 
intact brain areas can sometimes compensate for the functions of the damaged ones.  
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An alternative approach to see whether or not a brain region has a necessary role 
in intertemporal choice behavior is to use low frequency rTMS to temporarily suppress 
functioning in a brain region.  This method has several important advantages over the 
lesion approach.  With rTMS, one can target the same region in different individuals, and 
the transient effects of the stimulation make it unlikely that a different brain region will 
be able to compensate for the disrupted functions of the targeted region. 
Recently, using low frequency rTMS, Figner and colleagues (2010) were able to 
demonstrate that the DLPFC has an essential role in helping individuals make choices for 
better long-term, but worse immediate rewards.  Following disruption of the left DLPFC, 
but not of the right DLPFC, individuals were more likely to choose a small immediate 
reward (and less likely to choose a larger delayed reward) on an intertemporal choice task 
than were individuals who had sham stimulation.   
There were several important patterns of the rTMS effects.  First, rTMS did not 
affect intertemporal choices that involved only delayed reward options; it only affected 
choices that involved both an immediate and a delayed option.  This suggests that 
DLPFC functions may only be needed to choose larger delayed rewards when the other 
option is immediate. Second, the effects of rTMS were greatest on difficult trials (i.e. 
where there was an intermediate difference in monetary value between both options).  
Individuals were more likely to choose the immediate option following real rTMS 
administered to the left DLPFC on these trials, suggesting that the DLPFC has a greater 
role in helping individuals choose delayed rewards when the two options are close in 
subjective value.  However, as stimuli were not matched for subjective value, it is unclear 
whether the options on the “difficult trials” were closer in subjective value than the 
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options on other trials.  Third, rTMS affected choice but did not affect valuation of the 
items on the choice task, suggesting that the DLPFC does not bias choices because it 
evaluates the desirability of items differently than do other regions.  However, this last 
suggestion is only tentative, as the valuation task used by Figner et al. had few trials and 
thus may have had low power to find effects.   
The study by Figner and colleagues has revealed that the DLPFC has a critical 
function in intertemporal choices.  But it leaves several unanswered questions.  One 
question is whether only the left DLPFC is necessary for making better long-term 
choices.  As only disruption of the left DLPFC affected choice in their study, one might 
conclude that the right DLPFC does not help individuals make such choices.  However, 
other studies have found activation associated with intertemporal choices in the right 
DLPFC or in nearby regions of the right LPFC (McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 
2004; Xu et al., 2009), suggesting that both sides may have a role in helping individuals 
make better long-term choices.  It is possible that Figner and colleagues were not able to 
find an effect following disruption of the right DLPFC due to a lack of statistical power 
or due to specific components of the intertemporal choice task used. 
An even more critical question that has currently been unaddressed is whether 
disruption of the PPC would similarly affect choice.  As reviewed in this section, patterns 
of activation in the PPC and DLPFC are similar in intertemporal choice tasks (McClure et 
al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2009), and findings show that activation in the 
PPC predicts choice of larger delayed rewards (Wittmann et al., 2007).  This suggests 
that disruption of the PPC would also lead to greater choice of small immediate over 
larger delayed rewards, and that both the PPC and DLPFC may perform similar functions 
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during intertemporal choice.  But as no studies have looked at how intertemporal choices 
are affected by neuromodulation or brain lesions to the PPC, this is only a prediction.  
Disruption of both regions could affect choice in a similar direction (e.g. towards greater 
choice of better long-term rewards), but for different reasons.  The findings discussed 
implicating the DLPFC, but not the PPC in valuation, suggest that the DLPFC is more 
likely than the PPC to be involved in valuation processes during intertemporal choice.    
Another critical question raised is whether disruption of the DLPFC or PPC 
would have similar effects in intertemporal choices involving losses.  Delay discounting 
of gains and losses are positively correlated (Murphy et al., 2001) and are fit by the same 
type of hyperbolic function (Baker et al., 2003; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Murphy et al., 
2001; Rachlin et al., 1991), suggesting that some processes in the brain might optimize 
choices of immediate vs. long-term value in both domains.  However, the discussion of 
valuation processes revealed that brain responses to predictions of positive and negative 
value are not identical; while some regions have increased activation to the prediction of 
both positive and negative incentives (e.g. dorsal striatum), others are more likely to have 
increased activation for prediction of incentives of one domain than the other (e.g. greater 
responses to gain in the ventral striatum).  This raises the possibility that the DLPFC and 
PPC might only have a critical role in choices involving gains. 
The results of an fMRI study by Xu and colleagues (2009) suggest that the 
functions of the DLPFC and PPC may be similar in both intertemporal choices involving 
gains and those involving losses.  Like McClure and colleagues (2004), Xu et al. 
analyzed their fMRI data to look for regions that preferentially responded on trials with 
an immediate option (Beta regions) and for regions that responded similarly on all trials 
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(Delta regions).  Importantly, they did this separately for intertemporal choices involving 
gains and those involving losses.  This analysis revealed similarities between patterns of 
activation for both types of choices.  Although not all regions were identical across 
analyses, for both types of intertemporal choices, the Delta regions included the DLPFC 
and PPC, and the Beta regions included the MPFC and posterior cingulate.       
The study by Xu and colleagues (2009) is only suggestive that the DLPFC and 
PPC have a similar role in intertemporal choices for gains and losses.  Currently, there 
are no findings linking the DLPFC or PPC to specific choices on intertemporal choice 
tasks involving losses.  If the functions of these regions help one select an option that has 
a better long-term value when another option has a better immediate value, one might 
expect disruption of these regions to lead to greater selection of larger delayed over 
smaller immediate losses. 
 
Choice Involving Risk 
 Investigators have also looked for activation associated with different choice 
patterns in risky choice tasks, particularly activation that is associated with choosing 
more risky options (i.e. less probable) but potentially more rewarding options and 
activation that is associated with choosing smaller less risky (i.e. more certain) options.  
Importantly, this has suggested that the DLPFC has a key role in risky choice tasks.  
 A study by Matthews and colleagues has shown that choosing less risky rewards 
is associated with activation in the DLPFC (Matthews, Simmons, Lane, & Paulus, 2004).  
They found that there is more activation in the left DLPFC before selection of a certain 
monetary reward than before selection of a larger risky monetary reward.  In contrast, 
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activation in the striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate has been associated with 
choosing riskier reward options (i.e. less probable) on choice tasks (Ernst et al., 2004; 
Weber & Huettel, 2008).  Notably these are the same regions that have been implicated in 
subjective valuation of risky rewards (Levy et al., 2010; Peters & Buchel, 2009).  One of 
these regions in particular, the striatum, appears to have a key role in biasing selection of 
risky options.  Activation in the striatum, particularly in the ventral striatum, is not only 
associated with making risky choices, but has repeatedly been shown to predict whether 
or not a risky choice will be made.  Matthews and colleagues (2004) found that there was 
more activation in the MPFC, ventral striatum, and caudate before selection of a risky 
option which could lead to a large gain or loss than before selection of a certain option 
for a small monetary gain.  Similarly, Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) found that activation 
in the ventral striatum increased the chances of choosing a risky monetary option after 
having chosen a safe option on a financial decision making task.  The ventral striatum 
plays a role in biasing selection of risky options in rodents as well.  Cardinal and Howes 
(2005) found that rats with lesions to part of the nucleus accumbens chose more small 
certain reward options and fewer potentially larger risky reward options than did control 
rats.     
Together these findings suggest that the DLPFC has a different role in choices 
involving risk than do the MPFC, striatum, and posterior cingulate.  Specifically, the 
latter regions appear to bias behavior towards greater risk seeking, while the DLPFC 
appears to bias behavior towards greater risk aversion.  However, the fMRI study 
reviewed implicating the DLPFC in such processes is only suggestive of such a role for 
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the DLPFC, since results from fMRI cannot be used to infer whether a brain region has 
an essential role in a behavior.   
 Studies using neuromodulation methods, however, have revealed that the DLPFC, 
particularly the right DLPFC, does have an essential role in helping individuals make 
choices for less risky options.  Knoch and colleagues (2006) found that disruption of the 
right DLPFC with low frequency rTMS led to greater selection of riskier options than did 
sham stimulation on Roger’s Risk Task (Rogers et al., 1999).  Following disruption of the 
right DLPFC, individuals were more likely to choose the less probable, but potentially 
more rewarding riskier options (and were less likely to choose the safer options).  Fecteau 
and colleagues (2007) have also shown that the right DLPFC has an important role in 
helping individuals avoid risk.  They found that increasing activity in the right relative to 
the left DLPFC with transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) increased choice of 
the riskier options on Roger’s Risk Task.  Together, these findings suggest that the right 
DLPFC biases individuals towards choosing less risky options.  One should not, 
however, rule out a similar role for the left DLPFC, because some evidence suggests that 
both sides of the DLPFC may play a similar role in risky choice.  One tDCS study found 
similar changes in preference on Roger’s Risk Task both after increasing activity in the 
left relative to the right DLPFC and after increasing activity in the right relative to the left 
DLPFC (Boggio et al., 2010). 
 These neuromodulation studies have revealed that the DLPFC helps individuals 
avoid taking risks, but leave several critical questions unanswered.  First, it is unclear 
whether the DLPFC biases behavior towards risk aversion for all levels of risk (i.e. all 
probabilities of reward), or only for some levels of risk.  It may be that the DLPFC 
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becomes increasingly important in preventing choice of risky rewards as the probability 
of obtaining them decreases.  Or the relationship between risk level and choice could be 
more complex.  Either way, one might suppose that the DLPFC biases behavior 
differently depending on the risk level, given that activation in the DLPFC has been 
shown to scale differently with the probability of rewards than does activation in a region 
that biases behavior towards choice of risky options, the striatum (Tobler et al., 2008).  
A second important question is whether the DLPFC helps individuals avoid 
taking risks for choices that do not involve the possibility of a loss.  It could be that 
different brain regions bias behavior towards risk aversion in choices involving gains and 
in choices involving losses, and that the DLPFC is only involved in helping people avoid 
taking risks that can lead to losses.  This possibility cannot be ruled out, since prior 
neuromodulation studies of risky choice have used Roger’s Risk Task, which requires 
subjects to make a choice between two options that can both lead to a gain or a loss.   
 
Section Summary 
This section has revealed that the DLPFC has an important role in both 
intertemporal choice and choice involving risk.  Disruption of the DLPFC increases 
choice of small immediate rewards during intertemporal choice and increases choice of 
riskier rewards during risky choice.   This suggests that a similar process of the DLPFC 
might help individuals choose less risky monetary rewards and large rewards that are 
delayed.   The PPC as well, appears to have an important role in intertemporal choice, 
similar to that of the DLPFC.  An important question is what functions are performed by 
the DLPFC and PPC during economic choice.  In order to better understand what they 
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may be, the next sections of this chapter will review research on the functions of these 
two regions of the brain.    
 
Functions of the DLPFC 
 
Divisions of the Prefrontal Cortex 
  The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is the most anterior part of the frontal cortex.  In 
humans and other primates, it consists of all cortical regions anterior to the motor and 
premotor regions of the frontal lobe.  It can be divided into three large subregions: lateral 
prefrontal cortex (LPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC).  Based on cytoarchitectonic features, the PFC can be further divided into a 
number of smaller subregions.  The most frequently used system for humans is that of 
Korbinian Brodmann (1909), and using this terminology the human PFC consists of 
Brodmann Areas (BA) 8-13, 32, 46, and 47 (Fuster, 1997). 
 Each subregion of the PFC is broad and is involved in many diverse brain 
functions.  However, it has been generalized that while the OFC and MPFC are involved 
in emotional functions, the LPFC is involved in other, more cognitive functions (Fuster, 
2001).  Here I will focus on the role of the LPFC, with an emphasis on that of the dorsal 
section (i.e. the DLPFC).   
 The LPFC can be subdivided into two regions, the DLPFC lying along the middle 
and superior frontal gyrii, containing BA 9,46, and 8, and the VLPFC lying along the 
inferior frontal gyrus, made up of BA 45, 44, and the lateral aspect of BA 47 (Petrides, 
2005).  Rostral to both regions is BA 10, the frontopolar cortex, which contains lateral, 
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medial, and orbital aspects.  This section will predominantly focus on the role of a 
specific portion of the DLPFC, that of the mid-DLPFC which contains BA 9 and 46 (or 
alternatively areas 9, 46, and 9/46 (Petrides, 1998b), following the PFC parcellation of 
Petrides and Pandya (Petrides & Pandya, 1994).  Discussion is focused on this portion of 
the DLPFC because Experiments 1 and 2 of this dissertation both involve disruption of 
this area, given its known involvement in both intertemporal choice and choice involving 
risk (Fecteau et al., 2007; Figner et al., 2010; Knoch et al., 2006; Matthews et al., 2004; 
McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2009) (see Figure 2 for location of 
regions). 
 
 
Figure 2:  Location of the Mid-DLPFC.   Figure shows Left Lateral view of the human 
brain with Brodmann areas (Brodmann, 1909) listed.  Areas 9 and 46 of the Mid-DLPFC 
are highlighted in white.  Figure modified from Caspers et al. (2006). 
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Theories of lateral PFC function with a focus on functions of the DLPFC 
 Even though the LPFC is involved in many functions, this section will largely 
focus on the role of this region in the functions of working memory and cognitive control, 
both which may be hypothesized to explain some of the contributions of the LPFC to 
economic decision making.    
Working Memory 
 Working memory has been defined by Knight and Stuss (2002, p. 577) as the 
“ability to maintain information over a delay and to manipulate the contents of this short-
term memory storage system.”  A large amount of research implicates the DLPFC, and 
the LPFC more broadly, in working memory processes.  Some neurons in the mid-
DLPFC of the primate fire during the delay period of spatial delayed response tasks, 
some have firing that is sensitive to the duration of delay, and some are unresponsive 
during this delay period when there is no memory load (Goldman-Rakic, 1987).  All of 
these findings suggest that activity in the DLPFC is involved in maintaining information 
online.  Additionally, findings from lesion studies more directly show that the DLPFC is 
important for working memory, since monkeys with lesions to this brain region perform 
poorly on working memory tasks (Butters & Pandya, 1969; Butters, Pandya, Sanders, & 
Dye, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1987).  Other regions of the LPFC, however, are also 
implicated in working memory.  Primate neurophysiological studies have demonstrated 
that neurons throughout the LPFC fire during the delay period of delayed response tasks 
(Bodner, Kroger, & Fuster, 1996; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Fuster & 
Alexander, 1971; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996).   
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Research with humans also indicates that the DLPFC is involved in working 
memory.  A meta-analysis of a large number of human Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET) and fMRI studies found bilateral activation in both the DLPFC ( BA 9, 46) and 
VLPFC (BA 44) associated with working memory processes (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000).  
Additionally, disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS has repeatedly been shown to impair 
performance on working memory tasks (Mottaghy, Doring, Muller-Gartner, Topper, & 
Krause, 2002; Mottaghy, Gangitano, Sparing, Krause, & Pascual-Leone, 2002). 
 Several different theories have been proposed to account for the role of different 
parts of the LPFC in working memory.  Goldman-Rakic’s strong view of working 
memory holds that the lateral PFC is organized along a dorsal-ventral division with 
different regions of the LPFC involved in similar working memory processes, but 
involved in working memory processes for content of different domains (Goldman-
Rakic, 1987, 1998).  According to this view the mid-DLPFC is involved in spatial 
working memory, and the mid-VLPFC is involved in non-spatial object working 
memory.  Although some non-human primate lesion and electrophysiological studies 
show such regional distinctions for visuospatial working memory (Levy & Goldman-
Rakic, 2000), a meta-analysis of human functional neuroimaging imaging studies of 
working memory does not support this distinction (Wager & Smith, 2003).  Evidence that 
many prefrontal neurons show delay-period activity for both object and spatial 
information are also non-supportive (Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997).  
A different view is that of Petrides, whose theory holds that the DLPFC and 
VLPFC are involved in different working memory processes, rather than in different 
working memory content domains (Petrides, 1998a, 2005).  This view holds that the mid-
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DLPFC (areas 46 and 9) is involved in monitoring of stimuli in working memory (i.e. 
keeping track of the current status of stimuli in relation to other stimuli in working 
memory (Champod & Petrides, 2007)), and in working memory processes that are 
thought to require monitoring, such as manipulation (i.e. rearrangement) of stimuli in 
working memory.  In contrast, this view holds that the mid-VLPFC is involved in first-
order executive processes involved in explicit encoding and retrieval.  Several functional 
imaging studies support these claims (Champod & Petrides, 2007, 2010; Doyon, Owen, 
Petrides, Sziklas, & Evans, 1996; Petrides, Alivisatos, & Evans, 1995).   
 Some evidence suggests that the DLPFC is only necessary for working memory 
tasks when distracters are present.  Monkeys with lesions of the DLPFC perform 
normally on delayed response tasks if visual distractions are absent during the delay 
period (i.e. when the lights of the room are turned off), but perform poorly when 
distractions are present (Malmo, 1942).  This has lead to the suggestion that the DLPFC 
is involved in executive aspects (i.e. executive attention) of working memory, rather than 
in basic maintenance (Kane & Engle, 2002).  Executive attention, or keeping memory 
representations active in the presence of interference, can be considered to rely on the 
function of cognitive control, which will be discussed shortly.   
Meta-analytic findings also show a role for the DLPFC beyond the basic storage 
of information in working memory. A meta-analysis of human functional neuroimaging 
studies reveals that there is more activation in the bilateral mid-DLPFC and bilateral 
frontal pole for tasks that engage working memory storage and executive processes (i.e. 
manipulation, temporal order memory, or updating) than for those that only engage 
working memory storage (Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004).  Of note, these findings are 
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consistent with the view of Petrides (1998a; 2005), since working memory tasks that 
engage executive processes can be said to require monitoring of information in working 
memory.   
Cognitive Control  
 Many investigators have delineated a more executive role for the LPFC that goes 
beyond its role in working memory.  One influential theory of PFC function is that it is 
important for cognitive control, which can be defined as top-down processing used to 
guide behavior towards internal intentions or states (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  More 
specifically, according to this theory, the PFC is said to be involved in actively 
maintaining goals, attentional templates, and/or rules.  These PFC activity patterns are 
said to provide bias signals throughout much of the brain so that an individual can 
perform a task a particular way.  Cognitive control can be used to help individuals select 
weaker, task relevant responses over more frequently used ones that have more 
established neural pathways.  This control is important for many processes including 
selective attention, behavioral inhibition, working memory, rule-based behavior, and 
goal-directed behavior.   
 Evidence for the cognitive control theory of PFC functions comes from human 
and monkey lesion studies showing that those with prefrontal cortex damage have 
problems with perseveration and distractibility, and perform poorly on tasks that require 
the ability to select a weaker, task relevant response over a more habitual, prepotent 
response (Chao & Knight, 1997; Milner, 1963; Mishkin, 1964; Perret, 1974; Vendrell et 
al., 1995).  Human fMRI evidence suggests that the mid-DLPFC in particular appears to 
be involved in the implementation of cognitive control, as there is more activation in this 
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region during the instruction period of trials when subjects are told to make a less 
habitual response than when they are told to make a more habitual response (MacDonald, 
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).  Additional evidence that the LPFC may be important 
in cognitive control comes from findings that many LPFC neurons encode the current 
behavioral context, by exhibiting response patterns that are dependent on task rules 
(Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 2000; Hoshi, Shima, & Tanji, 1998; White & Wise, 1999).  By 
encoding task rules, these neurons may help bias brain activity to help an individual 
perform behavior consistent with those rules. 
 Several different theories hold that the LPFC is functionally organized in a 
rostral-caudal manner, with more rostral areas involved in more abstract control 
processes than more caudal areas (see Badre & D'Esposito, 2009; Fuster, 2002; O'Reilly, 
2010; Petrides, 2005).  Evidence from fMRI studies is supportive of this, revealing that 
the mid-DLPFC is involved in more abstract control than more posterior DLPFC regions 
(BA 8) and premotor regions (Badre & D'Esposito, 2007; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 
2003).  Two theories of rostral-caudal function, the Cascade model of Koechlin and 
Summerfield (2007) and the policy abstraction model of Badre and D’Esposito (2007), 
also hold that organization in the LPFC is hierarchical, such that it is more common for 
rostral regions to influence more caudal regions, than for the reverse.  The findings of an 
fMRI study by Koechlin and colleagues (2003) do suggest that the rostral-caudal axis of 
LPFC function is hierarchically organized, with rostral frontal regions able to account for 
variance in activation in more caudal regions, but not vice versa.   
Dorsal vs. ventral divisions in cognitive control have also been postulated.  
Recently O’Reilly has proposed that the DLPFC provides cognitive control for the 
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brain’s posterior dorsal “how” pathway, and the VLPFC provides such control for the 
posterior ventral “what” (i.e. object and verbal information) pathway (Goodale & Milner, 
1992; O'Reilly, 2010).  According to this framework, the DLPFC is postulated to provide 
cognitive control for transforming perception into action.  This view builds off of 
Goldman-Rakic’s (1987) content model of working memory, but in substituting “how” 
processing for “where” (i.e. spatial information) processing in the dorsal stream, it is also 
able to account for some of the process-related differences in the model of Petrides 
(2005).  Consistent with O’Reilly’s model is evidence showing that the DLPFC is 
involved in rule based response selection (Bunge, 2004).    
 
Functions of the PPC 
 
Divisions of the Posterior Parietal Cortex 
The parietal lobe of the brain lies on the dorsal and lateral surface of the cerebral 
cortex posterior to the frontal lobe and superior to the temporal and occipital lobes.  
There are two major sections, the anterior section of the parietal lobe, which contains the 
somatosensory cortex, and the PPC.  In humans, the PPC can be divided into three major 
sections.  The superior parietal lobule (SPL) which contains BA areas 5 and 7, the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) made up of BA 40 (supramarginal gyrus) and 39 (angular 
gyrus), and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) which separates the inferior and superior regions 
(Caminiti et al., 2010) (see Figure 3). 
Comparison of data from human and monkey studies investigating the functions 
of the PPC are difficult, because the inferior parietal lobule has expanded a great deal in 
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humans (Hyvärinen, 1982).  It has been suggested that the monkey inferior parietal lobule 
may actually be homologous to the human superior parietal lobule (Culham & 
Kanwisher, 2001).  In monkeys, the superior parietal lobule consists of BA 5, and the 
inferior parietal lobule consists of BA 7; as in humans the IPS separates the regions.  BA 
39 and 40, however, were not identified in the non-human primate brain.  Others, 
however, have parcellated the human and monkey parietal lobes differently, creating 
similar homologous divisions in both species: PE in the superior PPC, and areas PG and 
PF in the inferior PPC (Von Bonin & Bailey, 1947; Von Economo, 1929).  In the human, 
PE roughly corresponds to BA 5 and 7, and PG and PF roughly correspond to BA 40 and 
39, respectively (Hyvärinen, 1982).  
Given the prevalence of the listing of Brodmann areas in the human functional 
imaging literature, I will utilize the labels provided by Brodmann in this section where 
available.  Since there are discrepancies in which regions are considered homologous 
across species, this section will focus more on the functions of the human PPC than that 
of the monkey.  This discussion will largely focus on the roles of BA 7 (excluding the 
medial aspect), 40, and the IPS, since Experiment 1 of this dissertation involves 
disruption of this part of the PPC, given its involvement in intertemporal choice 
(McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2009).  
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Figure 3:  Location of the PPC.  Figure shows Left Lateral view of the human brain 
with Brodmann areas (Brodmann, 1909) listed.  Areas 5, 7, 39, and 40 of the PPC are 
highlighted in white.  Figure modified from Caspers et al. (2006). 
 
 
Roles of the PPC 
PPC functions 
 One classic view of the PPC focuses on its role as part of the dorsal visual 
processing stream, which is involved in spatial perception (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 
1982).  The PPC is, however, neither structurally nor functionally monolithic.  Lesions to 
the SPL produce different deficits than those to the IPL (Goldenberg & Karnath, 2006; 
Mort et al., 2003; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988; Vallar & Perani, 1987). These differences 
have led to the proposal that the SPL is involved in controlling action while the IPL is 
important in understanding actions and spatial perception (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003).  
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As will be discussed, the PPC plays an important role in two key functions that may be 
especially relevant to economic decision making: working memory and top-down 
attention. 
   Like the DLPFC, the PPC has a role in working memory, which is impaired 
following both lesions to the SPL or IPL and following disruption of the PPC with rTMS 
(Baldo & Dronkers, 2006; Koenigs, Barbey, Postle, & Grafman, 2009; Mottaghy, Doring 
et al., 2002).  Similarly, meta-analytic findings of human functional imaging data indicate 
that regions of both the SPL and IPL (BA 7 and 40) are consistently implicated in 
working memory tasks, and that activations tend to be left-lateralized for verbal/numeric 
working memory tasks (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000).  Other meta-analytic findings reveal 
that in the SPL (BA 7) there is a preference for activation during simple storage in 
working memory of spatial, rather than object or verbal information (Wager & Smith, 
2003).  Furthermore, IPS activity is positively correlated with working memory load 
during both manipulation and maintenance tasks (Champod & Petrides, 2010; Todd & 
Marois, 2004). 
Executive processing tasks in working memory (i.e. tasks involving updating, 
order, or manipulation in working memory) are also consistently associated with more 
activation in BA 7 and BA 40 than are simple storage tasks, and BA 7 is activated for 
executive working memory involving different storage types (Wager et al., 2004; Wager 
& Smith, 2003).  However, unlike in the DLPFC where BOLD signal is primarily 
associated with working memory monitoring, rather than with manipulation, in the IPS, 
BOLD signal is more associated with working memory manipulation than with 
monitoring itself (Champod & Petrides, 2007, 2010).    
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 A function related to working memory is attention, since information in working 
memory has also been attended to (Knudsen, 2007).  Meta-analytic findings of human 
neuroimaging data show consistent activations during attention tasks in the PPC (Cabeza 
& Nyberg, 2000).  Furthermore, identical regions of the bilateral IPS are activated in both 
attention and working memory tasks (LaBar, Gitelman, Parrish, & Mesulam, 1999).   
Attention can be segmented into different sub-processes, and one of these, 
orienting, has particularly been associated with the PPC (Raz & Buhle, 2006).  According 
to Raz and Buhle (2006, p. 372), orienting or attentional selection is the “ability to select 
specific information from among multiple sensory stimuli”.  It can be both top-down (i.e. 
goal directed) and bottom-up (i.e. driven by salient or unexpected stimuli in the 
environment).  Top down and bottom up selection have been associated with different 
parts of the parietal lobe.  The more dorsal aspects of the PPC, such as the SPL and IPS, 
are associated with top-down attention, while an inferior region of the IPL, the right 
temporoparietal cortex has a role in bottom-up attention (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, 
McAvoy, & Shulman, 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Friedrich, Egly, Rafal, & Beck, 
1998).  In humans, the left IPS in particular has an important role in top-down attention.   
Several studies have shown that disruption of activity in this region with TMS impairs 
performance on an identification task when highly salient distracters must be ignored and 
less salient items have to be selected (Mevorach, Hodsoll, Allen, Shalev, & Humphreys, 
2010; Mevorach, Humphreys, & Shalev, 2006).     
Numerical Processing and the IPS 
 The PPC is also involved in another function that is relevant to economic decision 
making: numerical processing. A meta-analysis of fMRI studies investigating number 
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processing reveals that the bilateral horizontal segment of the IPS (HIPS) is consistently 
activated during tasks involving numerical quantity manipulations, such as numerical 
comparisons, addition, and subtraction (Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003).  
Similarly, lesions to this region lead to deficits in performing calculations (Takayama, 
Sugishita, Akiguchi, & Kimura, 1994).  These findings have led to the proposal by 
Deheane and colleagues (2003) that the HIPS represents the brain’s core quantity system.   
TMS studies particularly implicate the left IPS in the ability to perform numerical 
comparisons. Disruption of the left IPS using TMS or rTMS leads to impaired 
performance on numerical comparison tasks as demonstrated by increased reaction times 
(Andres, Seron, & Olivier, 2005; Cappelletti, Barth, Fregni, Spelke, & Pascual-Leone, 
2007), and impairments occur both when quantities are expressed symbolically or non-
symbolically (Cappelletti et al., 2007).  Additionally, deficits following rTMS are greater 
when comparing numbers with similar magnitudes than with dissimilar magnitudes, 
consistent with findings that activity in IPS is sensitive to distances from specific 
quantities (Cappelletti et al., 2007; Nieder & Miller, 2004; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, 
& Dehaene, 2004).  Reaction time deficits on numerical comparison tasks have also been 
observed following rTMS disruption of the left IPL (BA 39 or 40), but these deficits 
occur less consistently than do those following disruption of the left IPS (Cappelletti et 
al., 2007; Gobel, Walsh, & Rushworth, 2001; Sandrini, Rossini, & Miniussi, 2004).  In 
contrast to the effects seen following disruption of left PPC regions, disruption of the IPS 
or the adjacent IPL in the right hemisphere does not lead to significant impairments on 
numerical comparison tasks (Andres et al., 2005; Cappelletti et al., 2007; Gobel et al., 
2001; Sandrini et al., 2004), and has even led to increased performance in one study 
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(Cappelletti et al., 2007).  This reveals that the right PPC is less important for numerical 
comparisons than is the left PPC.   
 
Connectivity between the DLPFC and PPC 
 The parietal and frontal cortices are largely interconnected through the superior 
longitudinal fasciculus (SLF).  The connections are bidirectional; that is they contain both 
neurons projecting from the parietal to the frontal lobe, and neurons projecting from the 
frontal to the parietal lobe (Petrides & Pandya, 2002).  The SLF can be parsed into 3 
subdivisions, SLF I, II, and III, which differ on where the tracts originate.  Note that the 
classification of these regions is based on cytoarchitectonic designations of Petrides and 
colleagues in monkeys, rather than those of Brodmann in humans (Pandya & Seltzer, 
1982; Petrides & Pandya, 1994).  Through two of these tracts, the mid-DLPFC is 
interconnected to two areas of the PPC, PG and PF, which both lie in monkey IPL.    
These large interconnections may help explain why the PPC and DLPFC have 
involvement in similar functions.  Both regions are involved in working memory 
functions and cognitive control functions (i.e. PPC in top-down attention, and DLPFC in 
cognitive control more generally).  Furthermore, both the PPC and LPFC have neurons 
responsive to quantities (Nieder & Miller, 2004).  Importantly, the co-involvement of 
both regions in these functions may help explain why both the PPC and DLPFC show 
similar activation patterns on fMRI studies of intertemporal choice.  The next section of 
this chapter will offer some potential explanations of what functions these two regions of 
the brain may be engaged in during intertemporal choice and choice involving risk.    
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Potential roles of the DLPFC and PPC in Intertemporal Choice  
and Choice involving Risk 
 
Valuation 
 In choice situations, it is reasonable to assume that individuals tend to choose 
options that they subjectively value more highly than other options.  As previously 
discussed, a network of brain regions including the striatum, MPFC, and posterior 
cingulate are all associated with subjective valuation of rewards on intertemporal and 
risky choice tasks (Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Levy et al., 2010; Peters & Buchel, 
2009, 2010).  Less is known about how the brain codes for the subjective value of 
negative incentives on choice tasks, but some evidence implicates the MPFC and 
posterior cingulate in such a role (FitzGerald et al., 2009). 
 Prior fMRI research indicates that activation in two of the regions responsive to 
subjective valuation (i.e. MPFC and striatum) is associated with both choice of small 
immediate over larger delayed rewards (McClure et al., 2007; Wittmann et al., 2010) and 
with choice of potentially larger risky over smaller less risky rewards (Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005; Matthews et al., 2004).  An important question remains.  Why is there 
greater activation in regions that respond to subjective value only for certain types of 
choices?  If people choose what they subjectively value highly, then one would expect 
that brain activation that positively scales with subjective value would be greater for the 
chosen option, regardless of its risk level or time of receipt.   
 One possible answer to this puzzle is the proposal of McClure and colleagues 
(2004) that there are two reward evaluation systems in the brain - both an “impulsive 
system” containing the ventral striatum, MPFC, and posterior cingulate (i.e. Beta regions) 
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that places a large value on rewards that are available immediately and a more patient 
system containing both the DLPFC and PPC (i.e. Delta regions) that discounts the value 
of delayed rewards relative to immediate rewards less steeply.  Similarly, there might be 
dual evaluation systems for incentives in other types of choices, such as for losses in 
intertemporal choices and for gains in choices involving risk.  For all of these types of 
choices, the DLPFC and PPC could both be involved in one of these systems and could 
place a different value on incentives as a function of their attributes (e.g. delay or risk) 
than do other regions.  
If the DLPFC and PPC respond to subjective value, then why haven’t past 
intertemporal and risky choice studies found consistent patterns of activation related to 
subjective value in these regions?  The lack of findings may be a result of the models 
used to capture brain activity.  If activity in these regions scales to subjective value 
differently than does activity in other regions, one might not expect to find it with the 
same statistical models. 
There are several reasons one could predict a role for the DLPFC in the evaluation 
of options on intertemporal and risky choice tasks.  First, activation in the DLPFC is 
associated with the subjective value of items during basic choice (Hare et al., 2009) and 
during bidding tasks (Plassmann et al., 2007; Plassmann et al., 2010).  Second, disruption 
of the DLPFC with rTMS affects valuation of items (Camus et al., 2009).  Third, 
activation in the DLPFC scales with reward probability (Tobler et al., 2008).  In contrast, 
there is not much reason to predict a role for the PPC in valuation processes during 
choice tasks, since it does not typically respond to predicted value or its components.  
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Manipulation of Values within working memory 
 In order to choose the most highly valued option on a risky choice or 
intertemporal choice task, a person may need to hold monetary values online in working 
memory, manipulate them to account for time or risk, and then compare them.  Functions 
of brain regions directly involved in subjective valuation may automatically take into 
account the time and risk of options to determine value, but working memory could be 
used to transform the monetary value of options in a more conscious manner, such as by 
transforming values by an inflation factor or by computing expected values.  It would be 
expected that such value manipulation processes would rely on the DLPFC and PPC 
since both of these regions are engaged during working memory manipulation tasks 
(Champod & Petrides, 2007, 2010; Wager et al., 2004).   
 Evidence suggests, however, that manipulation of values within working memory 
during intertemporal choice may not be dependent on the DLPFC.  Disruption of the left 
DLPFC with low frequency rTMS leads to greater choice of smaller more immediate 
rewards on trials pitting an immediate against a delayed option, but not on trials pitting 
two delayed options against each other (Figner et al., 2010).  This pattern of findings 
suggests that disruption of the DLPFC affects choices without impairing the ability to 
manipulate values in working memory, because trials with two delayed options may be 
expected to lead to a larger working memory load than trials with a delayed option and an 
immediate option.  On trials with two delayed options, the monetary values of two 
options may both need to be manipulated to determine the present value of the options, 
whereas on trials with an immediate and a delayed option, only the monetary value of the 
delayed option should need to be manipulated to obtain the present value of the options.  
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Cognitive Control 
 The DLPFC and PPC may be involved in cognitive control operations during 
choice tasks, specifically on trials involving seductive or aversive immediate options.  In 
intertemporal choice tasks, when there are options for immediate monetary gain or loss, 
the control processes of the DLPFC and PPC may help one select a larger delayed gain 
over a smaller immediate gain or help one select a smaller immediate loss over a larger 
delayed loss.  In risky choice tasks for monetary gain, cognitive control processes of the 
DLPFC and PPC may help one select a smaller certain gain over a potentially larger risky 
gain.  In both intertemporal and risky choice tasks involving positive incentives, 
cognitive control could be used to help individuals overcome prepotent urges to choose 
rewarding options that might have better immediate values than alternatives.  Similarly, 
in tasks involving negative incentives, cognitive control could be used to help individuals 
overcome prepotent urges to avoid choosing aversive options that might have worse 
immediate values than alternatives. 
 Cognitive control could be used on choice tasks to bias behavior towards specific 
goals and rules.  People may approach intertemporal choice tasks with the goal of 
obtaining the largest long-term gain, and may have specific rules that help them compare 
the values of different options.  In intertemporal choice tasks, these goals and rules may 
be easy to follow except in situations where an option is immediate, because such options 
may lead to large activations in areas coding for subjective value that in turn influence 
choice.  In these situations, cognitive control may be needed to help one overcome a 
prepotent urge to select the option that offers the best immediate value, and to choose in 
line with one’s goals and rules.  Similarly, in risky choice tasks, cognitive control might 
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be used to help individuals follow goals to avoid choosing options with excessive risk, or 
might be used to help individuals use rules to compare the different values (e.g. 
computations of expected value).     
One might expect that the DLPFC would be particularly important in cognitive 
control on choice tasks, given the findings implicating the DLPFC (MacDonald et al., 
2000), and the PFC more generally (Miller & Cohen, 2001), in cognitive control 
functions.  However, the PPC could be involved as well.  The PPC might be expected to 
be involved in the cognitive control function of top-down attention, since this is a key 
function of the region (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  Top-down attention might be needed 
to focus on specific attributes of choice options (e.g. magnitude or probability) that are 
determined by goals, and might be especially needed when distracting options that offer 
immediate incentives are present. 
A cognitive control account of the DLPFC and PPC could offer an alternative to 
the suggestion that choice always follows directly from subjective valuation, and could 
explain why activation in these regions scales with choice patterns but does not appear to 
scale with subjective value on the same types of tasks.  This is because cognitive control 
might be able to affect choices without affecting subjective valuation.    
 
Numerical Comparisons 
Given its role in numerical comparison processes, the left PPC may be involved in 
comparing the numerical values of the two options and their components (i.e. magnitude, 
time, and probability of outcomes) on economic choice tasks (Andres et al., 2005; 
Cappelletti et al., 2007).  This proposed function overlaps with that of working memory, 
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since individuals may hold numerical values online and manipulate them in working 
memory when they compare them. 
 Ultimately which specific numerical values are compared will depend on how an 
individual decides to manipulate the components of the choice options.  An individual 
may not only compare the presented monetary, time, and probability values, but may 
compare transformations of them.  Since both the DLPFC and PPC are implicated in 
manipulation of items in working memory (but principally the PPC), such numerical 
value manipulation processes could also rely on the DLPFC (Champod & Petrides, 2007, 
2010; Wager et al., 2004).  
    
Research Plan 
 
 Experiment 1 was designed to see if transiently disrupting either the DLPFC or 
PPC with low frequency rTMS would bias intertemporal choices involving monetary 
gains and intertemporal choices involving monetary losses towards options with a better 
immediate value but a worse long-term value.  No prior studies have used 
neuromodulation to investigate the role of the PPC in intertemporal choices for gains or 
the role of either the DLPFC or PPC in intertemporal choices for losses.  It was predicted 
that disruption of either the DLPFC or PPC would lead to greater selection of small 
immediate monetary rewards over larger delayed monetary rewards than would sham 
stimulation to the same regions.  For choices involving losses, it was predicted that 
disruption of the DLPFC or PPC would lead to greater selection of larger delayed losses 
over smaller immediate losses than would sham stimulation.  This was predicted for 
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choices involving losses because larger delayed losses have a better immediate value than 
smaller immediate losses.  A secondary aim of this experiment was to see if greater 
choice of options with a better immediate value was associated with deficits in the ability 
to compare numerical values, since numerical comparison deficits could underlie 
difficulties in choosing options with the best long-term value.  This was tested by 
administering a numerical comparison task following disruption of the DLPFC or PPC.  
A further question that was investigated was whether right vs. left hemispheric disruption 
of the DLPFC and PPC differentially affected intertemporal choice.      
 Experiment 2 was designed to see if transiently disrupting the DLPFC with low 
frequency rTMS would bias choices towards greater risk seeking.  Subjects completed a 
risky choice task that involved choices between a certain option and a risky option that 
offered a potentially larger probabilistic reward.  It was predicted that disruption of the 
DLPFC would lead to greater choice of risky options than would sham stimulation.  
Choices were limited to the gain domain (i.e. choices could lead to reward or no reward, 
but never a loss) to see if disruption of activity in the DLPFC would lead to greater risk 
seeking in choices that did not involve the possibility of loss, which has not previously 
been investigated.  Additionally, the probability of the risky option was varied across 
trials to see if the effects of disrupting the DLPFC on risk preferences would vary with 
the risk level.  As in Experiment 1, a further question was whether right vs. left 
hemispheric disruption of the DLPFC differentially affected choice. 
 Utilizing rTMS offered several advantages over other approaches such as fMRI.  
While fMRI can help establish that a particular brain region is involved in a behavior, it 
cannot be used to tell whether a brain region plays an essential role in that behavior.  
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rTMS can be used to infer causality, since if a behavior is abnormal when a particular 
brain region is disrupted, one can infer a role for the region in that particular behavior.  
rTMS also has advantages over studies of patients with brain lesions in that one can 
target the same region with rTMS across subjects, whereas  lesions are rarely confined to 
the same specific region across individuals and following brain injury, reorganization of 
structure-function relationships occurs.  In the context of Experiments 1 and 2, using 
rTMS allowed us to examine if disruption of activity in specific brain regions affected 
choice in healthy individuals.  
 It is currently unclear whether the tendencies to discount the value of different 
types of monetary incentives are all related to a common personality trait.  Delay 
discounting of monetary gains is positively correlated with both delay discounting of 
losses and with probability discounting of gains (Mitchell, 1999; Murphy et al., 2001; 
Myerson et al., 2003; Richards et al., 1999), suggesting that these different types of 
discounting may have similar relationships with some trait.  A number of studies have 
investigated the relationship between one trait, impulsivity, and delay discounting of 
monetary gains, and have found a positive relationship (Kirby et al., 1999; Madden et al., 
1997; Mitchell et al., 2005; Petry, 2001, 2002; Reynolds, Richards et al., 2006).  
However, there has been little research on the relationship between impulsivity and other 
types of monetary discounting.  Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the 
relationships between different facets of impulsivity and the tendencies to discount 
different types of monetary incentives (i.e. delayed gains, delayed losses, risky gains).  A 
secondary aim was to examine relationships among different types of discounting in the 
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same subjects more directly, by examining whether the tendencies to discount different 
types of monetary incentives were correlated.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
  
EXPERIMENT 1 –  CHANGES IN INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE FOLLOWING 
DISRUPTION OF THE DLPFC AND THE PPC 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
A wealth of intertemporal choice research shows that individuals discount the 
value of delayed monetary rewards relative to immediate monetary rewards (Frederick et 
al., 2004).  All else being equal, individuals tend to prefer immediate over delayed 
rewards, and will often choose smaller immediate options over larger delayed 
alternatives.  Individuals tend to discount the value of delayed monetary losses as well 
(Estle et al., 2006), often preferring larger delayed losses over smaller immediate ones.  
Nevertheless, people are also sometimes able to choose the option with the best long-term 
value. 
 Recently, it has been shown that functions performed by the DLPFC help 
individuals make intertemporal choices for gains with the best long-term value (Figner et 
al., 2010).  Following disruption of the left DLPFC with low frequency rTMS, 
individuals are more likely to choose smaller immediate over larger delayed monetary 
rewards than they are following sham stimulation, especially on difficult trials in which 
the two options are close in value.  Importantly, only intertemporal choices that contain 
an immediate option are affected, suggesting that DLPFC processes are only needed to 
make the better long-term choice when an enticing immediate option is present.    
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 Previous research reveals that another brain region, the PPC, has similar patterns 
of brain activity to the DLPFC during intertemporal choice (McClure et al., 2007; 
McClure et al., 2004).  Activation in both regions is greater on more difficult than on 
easy intertemporal choice trials (McClure et al., 2004).  This suggests a role for both the 
DLPFC and PPC in the choice process itself, since brain areas that are involved in task 
relevant computations generally show increased activity as difficulty increases (Assmus, 
Marshall, Noth, Zilles, & Fink, 2005; Braver et al., 1997; Gould, Brown, Owen, ffytche, 
& Howard, 2003).  Activity in both regions may help individuals make better long-term 
choices through cognitive control, as cognitive control functions have been linked to both 
the DLPFC and PPC (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Mevorach et 
al., 2010; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Wager et al., 2004).  Alternatively activity in both 
regions could help individuals make better long-term choices through valuation processes 
that ascribe greater value to delayed options than do the functions of other brain regions.  
Consistent with the proposal that PPC activity helps individuals  make choices for the 
better long-term option are findings showing greater activation in the PPC when 
individuals choose larger delayed rewards over smaller immediate alternatives (Wittmann 
et al., 2007).  Also consistent with this are findings that there is more activation in a set of 
brain regions that includes the DLPFC and PPC than in a set of other regions sensitive to 
reward immediacy (i.e. ventral striatum, MPFC, Posterior Cingulate) when individuals 
choose larger delayed rewards (McClure et al., 2004).  
 However, PPC activation during intertemporal choice tasks may occur for a 
different reason – because intertemporal choices require numerical comparisons.  In order 
to choose the reward with the better long-term value, an individual must quantitatively 
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assess the value of each option, both the monetary value of the reward and the time of 
receiving it.  Both human fMRI and lesion studies indicate that one region of the PPC, the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), is involved in numerical manipulations (Dehaene et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, disruption of the left IPS using TMS or low frequency rTMS impairs 
performance on numerical comparison tasks as demonstrated by increased reaction times 
(Andres et al., 2005; Cappelletti et al., 2007).  Therefore, increased activation seen in the 
PPC during intertemporal choice tasks could reflect engagement of numerical comparison 
functions rather than engagement of valuation or cognitive control functions.  
 Another question of interest is whether the DLPFC and PPC have a similar role in 
intertemporal choices involving monetary losses and those involving monetary gains. The 
neural circuitry that helps individuals decide what rewards to approach may be different 
from the circuitry that helps them decide what aversive outcomes to avoid, an idea that is 
consistent with different theories of motivation (Gray, 1981; Panksepp et al., 2002).  If 
so, then the DLPFC and PPC could both play a function in intertemporal choices for 
gains, but not in intertemporal choices for losses.  fMRI research, however, reveals that 
the PPC and DLPFC are similarly activated during intertemporal choices involving only 
monetary gains and those involving only monetary losses (Xu et al., 2009).  These 
findings suggest the alternative possibility that the functions of the PPC and DLPFC cut 
across motivational lines and may perform the same functions in both intertemporal 
choices involving gains and those involving losses.  If so, then in both types of choices, 
the DLPFC and PPC could help individuals make choices for options with the better 
long-term value when another option has a better immediate value.  This would be 
supported if disruption of the same regions of the DLPFC or PPC with low frequency 
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rTMS increased choice of both monetary gain and loss options with better immediate 
values.  In choices involving losses, such an effect would be seen as a greater preference 
for larger delayed over smaller immediate losses. 
To examine whether the DLPFC and PPC are both essential for making choices 
for options with a better long-term but worse immediate value than alternatives, we 
utilized low frequency rTMS to transiently suppress functioning in the DLPFC and PPC 
while individuals performed an intertemporal choice task.  We predicted that disruption 
of both regions would lead to greater selection of options with a better immediate value, 
and that we would see this effect both with choices involving monetary gains and with 
choices involving monetary losses.  That is, individuals who received real rTMS were 
predicted to choose more immediate gains and fewer immediate losses than were 
individuals who had received sham rTMS.  Additionally, we administered a numerical 
comparison task to see whether greater selection of options with a better immediate value 
following disruption of brain regions would be associated with deficits in the ability to 
compare two numerical values. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 64 right-handed individuals (43.75% female) between the ages of 18 and 30 (M 
Age = 21.06, SD = 2.79) from Vanderbilt University and the Nashville community 
participated in this study.  All of these participants reported having no history of 
neurological or psychiatric problems, no females were currently pregnant, and no 
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participants had previously received TMS.  95 additional subjects were consented but 
excluded or withdrew.  Reasons subjects were excluded included baseline time 
preferences revealed in Session 1 that did not allow us to make task stimuli (see criteria 
below), inconsistent preferences as revealed in Session 1, no loss discounting as revealed 
on the loss discounting prescreen (for approximately 20 subjects this was given following 
consent), having previously received TMS, risk factors that could increase the chances of 
having negative effects from TMS (e.g. neurological conditions), excessive movement 
during TMS, and experimenter error.  Additionally, two subjects were excluded because 
they exhibited choice preferences that were extremely unstable across sessions on the 
intertemporal choice task (mean choice of delayed gains or losses changed by more than 
75% across sessions 2 and 3).  Both of these subjects were in the sham stimulation group.  
No other participants in the sham or real stimulation groups exhibited changes in 
preference across sessions of this magnitude.  All participants completed written 
informed consent approved by the Vanderbilt IRB.   
 
Session One – Indifference Point Procedure 
 We screened subjects prior to consent with a questionnaire to ensure that we only 
recruited participants who discounted delayed monetary losses.  The screen included 4 
questions, each which required participants to write the magnitude of a hypothetical 
monetary loss to be incurred in 4 weeks that they valued equally to an immediate 
hypothetical monetary loss of a specific magnitude.  Screening was essential for the study 
of monetary losses since prior research shows that some individuals actually prefer to 
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suffer a monetary loss or experience other aversive events sooner rather than later 
(Frederick et al., 2004).  
 Following consent, we determined subject indifference points between immediate 
and delayed monetary rewards.  To do so, subjects completed a task on a computer in 
which we determined 4 immediate equivalents (i.e. dollar amount of an immediate 
monetary reward that a person values equally to a delayed monetary reward) for 4 
different delayed monetary gains: $2.50, $5.00, $7.50, and $10.00 available at 4 weeks in 
the future.  The order of determining immediate equivalents was from low to high 
magnitudes.  Subjects were told that they would receive the amount of money for one 
random choice at the time associated with that choice.  For timing of one trial of this task 
and presentation of items, see Figure 4A.      
 To determine each immediate equivalent, participants were presented with an 
initial trial in which they made a choice between a delayed monetary gain and an 
immediate gain of half the value of the delayed option.  If participants chose the delayed 
option, the value of the immediate option increased by half, and if they chose the 
immediate option it decreased by half.  On the next trial, the immediate value changed in 
a similar way as on the previous trial but only by one quarter of the original value.  Over 
six trials, the immediate value increased or decreased by progressively smaller amounts 
(i.e. by 1/(2^x) where x was trial number) depending on participant responses so that the 
subjective value of the immediate amount would iteratively approach that of the delayed 
amount.  After the sixth trial, a final catch trial was presented in which the immediate 
value was higher than the just-calculated immediate equivalent.  This provided a check to 
ensure that subjects were answering according to their preferences (i.e. were answering 
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consistently).  If they did not choose the immediate value on the catch trial, the 
immediate equivalent for that specific delayed magnitude reward was determined again 
(i.e. the six trial procedure and check was repeated).  After answering consistently, or 
after completing the indifference point procedure three times, participants then performed 
the indifference point procedure for the next delay-magnitude pair.  If participants 
answered inconsistently for three indifference point procedures in a row for a given 
delay-magnitude pair they were excluded. 
 
       
Figure 4: Trial Structure of the Intertemporal Choice task.  A. Intertemporal Choice*.  
Following 500 ms of fixation, two different money/time pairs were presented on a computer 
screen (side randomized).  The pairs always consisted of a smaller amount of money to be gained 
or lost immediately and a larger amount of money to be gained or lost, respectively, four weeks in 
the future.  These time points were chosen because prior research has shown disrupted 
intertemporal choice with these time points following rTMS (Figner et al, 2011). The words “For 
Sure” indicated that subjects were making choices for options that were certain.  Subjects decided 
which money/time pair they would prefer by pressing the “z” or “m” key and had up to 6500 ms 
to respond.  Immediately after responding, the triangle under the subject’s selected option turned 
red and the other triangle disappeared to indicate the subject’s choice; this was displayed for 250 
ms.  If subjects did not respond, the next part of the trial began after 6500 ms. B.  Numerical 
Comparison.  The same two monetary values that had been shown for the intertemporal portion 
remained on the screen.  Additionally, the words “Larger” or “Smaller” were displayed above 
both monetary values, indicating whether participants were instructed to select the larger or 
smaller monetary value.  Participants had up to 4000 ms to respond, and immediately following 
response the selected option was displayed (as was done for the intertemporal choice portion) for 
250 ms.   However, if subjects did not respond within 4000 ms, the next trial began.   (* The 
timing and display of items in the Indifference Point Task were identical to those of the 
Intertemporal Choice part of the Intertemporal Choice Task (i.e. A. above) except there was no 
time limit for response). 
A B 
 
C D 
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     Following the indifference point procedure for delayed monetary gains, 
participants performed the same indifference point procedure for delayed monetary 
losses.  For the loss procedure, the same magnitudes of delayed incentives were used as 
were used for the gains task, except now subjects chose which of the two values they 
preferred to lose.  They were told that they would have to pay the amount of money for 
one random choice at the time associated with that choice.   
 Subjects whose immediate equivalents indicated they did not discount the value 
of the future gains and losses were excluded from further sessions.  Additionally, subjects 
were excluded if any immediate equivalent was smaller than 10 cents or if the difference 
between the immediate equivalent and associated delayed value was less than 10 cents.  
This was done to ensure that there would be an adequate range of values above and below 
each subject’s immediate equivalents to create choice stimuli for further sessions.  
 At the end of session one, one random trial of intertemporal choice for gain and 
one random trial of intertemporal choice for loss were selected for payout.  Subjects then 
either received or paid (depending on trial type) the amount of money at the specified 
time associated with their choice on that trial. 
 
Sessions Two and Three 
Participants that met eligibility requirements after session one were equally 
divided into 4 groups of 16 subjects.  Group one received rTMS to the left DLPFC in one 
session and to the left PPC in a separate session (with counterbalanced ordering).  Group 
two received rTMS to the right DLPFC in one session and to the right PPC in a separate 
session (with counterbalanced ordering).  Group three received sham rTMS to the same 
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areas as group one (half DLPFC first/half PPC first), while group four received sham 
rTMS stimulation to the same areas as group two (half DLPFC first/half PPC first).  Each 
of the four groups had the same gender distribution (9 Males and 7 females).  Except for 
the different brain regions stimulated across sessions, procedures in sessions 2 and 3 were 
identical.   
Prior to receiving rTMS, participants performed shortened practice versions of the 
tasks, in order to make sure they understood the tasks.  Subjects were told that one gain 
choice and one loss choice from all the task trials performed after stimulation would be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of each session.      
 After completing the practice tasks, participants received real or sham rTMS 
stimulation for 30 minutes to either the DLPFC or PPC (details outlined under TMS 
Methods section). 
Intertemporal Choice Task 
 Immediately following completion of stimulation, participants completed a 72 
trial intertemporal choice task on a computer.  On each trial, participants completed an 
intertemporal choice for monetary gain or loss (randomly mixed) followed by a 
numerical comparison (See Figure 4).  Half of the choices involved losses and half 
involved gains. 
 The values of the delayed options were the same as in session 1 ($2.50, $5.00, 
$7.50, and $10.00).  The magnitude of each immediate option was calculated as a specific 
percentage difference from that subject’s session one immediate equivalent for the 
delayed option.  This allowed us to vary the subjective value of each immediate option 
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(as revealed in session one) relative to the associated delayed option which let us predict 
which option an individual should choose on each trial (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Immediate Values for Different Trials in the Intertemporal Choice Task. 
Immediate Relative Value Total Description 
1. Immediate 
Subjective Value 
Lower than Delayed 
Subjective Value* 
32 Magnitude of immediate option is below 
immediate equivalent (i.e. immediate value at 
indifference point).  There were 4 different 
percent distances below the immediate equivalent 
(-10%, -20%, -35%, and -50%).  Subjects who 
receive sham stimulation should choose the 
delayed gain if it is a choice for gains, and the 
immediate loss if is a choice for losses.      
2. Immediate 
Subjective Value 
Equal to Delayed 
Subjective Value 
8 Magnitude of immediate option is equal to 
immediate equivalent (i.e. percent distance equal 
0%).  Neither immediate nor delayed choice is 
predicted for sham group.    
3. Immediate 
Subjective Value 
Higher than Delayed 
Subjective Value 
32 Magnitude of immediate option is above 
immediate equivalent.  There were 4 different 
percent distances above the immediate equivalent 
(10%, 20%, 35%, and 50%).  Subjects who 
receive sham stimulation should choose the 
immediate gain if it is a choice for gains, and the 
delayed loss if is a choice for losses.      
Each delayed gain and each delayed loss magnitude was shown nine times.  Each delayed 
option was paired once with an immediate option located at each of the 9 percent 
distances from the immediate equivalent of the delayed value.  Values at negative 
distances were taken as a function of the percentage difference between the immediate 
equivalent and zero.  A -35% distance indicated that the immediate value was 35% less 
than the immediate equivalent.  Thus if the immediate equivalent of a $2.50 delayed 
option was $2.00, the immediate value was $1.30 (i.e. 2.00 - .35*2.00 = 1.30).  Values at 
positive distances were calculated as a function of the percentage difference between the 
immediate equivalent and the delayed value.  A 35% distance indicated that the 
immediate value was greater than the immediate equivalent by 35% of the distance 
between the immediate equivalent and the delayed value.  Thus, if the immediate 
equivalent of a $2.50 delayed option was $2.00, the immediate value was $2.18 (i.e. 2.00 
+ (.35 * (2.50 -2.00)) = 2.18). *Lower relative subjective value means less positive value 
(for monetary gains) and less negative value (for monetary losses) than the alternative.  
Conversely higher relative subjective value means more positive value (for gains) and 
more negative value (for losses) than the alternative. 
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Following each intertemporal choice, individuals were asked to make a numerical 
comparison of the two monetary values that were available on the previous intertemporal 
choice trial (See Figure 4).  This was performed to examine whether subjects had deficits 
in the ability to compare two monetary values.  On half of the trials (determined 
randomly), participants indicated which of the two values was larger and on the other half 
of trials indicated which of the two values was smaller.  
Indifference Point Task 
After completing all of the aforementioned trials, subjects were given the identical 
indifference point procedure as in session one.  However, this time the iterative procedure 
was only done to calculate the immediate equivalent for delayed values twice, first for a 
$10.00 gain available at 4 weeks and then for a $10.00 loss to be paid in 4 weeks.  
Additionally, no consistency checks were performed in order to limit the time to 
complete the task.  Collecting subject indifference points post-stimulation provided an 
added check of whether real rTMS to the DLPFC or PPC increased impulsive choices.   
 At the end of sessions two and three, one random trial of intertemporal choice for 
gain and one random trial of intertemporal choice for loss were selected for payout.  
Subjects then either received or paid (depending on trial type) the amount of money at the 
specified time associated with their choice on that trial.   
 
TMS Methods 
Low frequency (1 Hz) rTMS was delivered with a MagStim TMS double 70 mm 
(Figure 8) coil (Magstim, Wales, UK) at 54% power.  The rTMS parameters used were 
within currently recommended guidelines (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 
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2009) and stimulation with these parameters leads to suppression of excitability in the 
targeted region for a period of time following stimulation (Robertson, Theoret, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2003).  We note that 1 Hz rTMS applied to the DLPFC at 54% power has 
previously led to altered intertemporal choices following stimulation (Figner et al., 2010).  
Sham stimulation was delivered with a MagStim placebo coil, which produced clicks that 
resembled the sound of rTMS, but without a magnetic pulse. Given the potential for 
subjects to identify whether they received sham or real stimulation, it was prudent for 
subjects to receive only one of these types of stimulation.  Subjects were blind to the type 
of stimulation (e.g. sham vs. real) they received.   
Positioning of the TMS coil was accomplished by using the 10-20 EEG System, 
which has previously been used to deliver TMS to identified brain regions with 
reasonable structural accuracy (Herwig, Satrapi, & Schonfeldt-Lecuona, 2003).  This 
method was used to ensure proper positioning of the coil over the DLPFC (BA 46/9) and 
PPC (centered on the intraparietal sulcus).  Specifically, to localize the PPC, the center of 
the coil was held tangentially to the participant’s head with the handle pointing rostrally 
and placed over P3/P4 which has been shown to lie over this area (Andres et al., 2005; 
Herwig et al., 2003).  To localize the DLPFC, the center of the coil was held tangentially 
to the participant’s head with the handle pointing caudally, and placed one cm antero-
lateral to F3/F4 which has been suggested to provide better coverage over BA 9/46 than 
do the points F3/F4 (Herwig et al., 2003).  These specific points for stimulation were 
marked on a lycra swimcap that subjects wore; the position of the swimcap was placed in 
a consistent position on the head across subjects, by using the nasion, inion, and 
preauricular points as physical landmarks for placement.  During stimulation, all 
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participants wore earplugs as protection against the noise of the rTMS pulse.  Participants 
maintained their head position during rTMS administration using a chin/head rest and 
were visually monitored to ensure that no movement had occurred.  In cases where a 
participant moved their head, the coil was immediately repositioned over the target.   
 All individuals received either real or sham rTMS to the DLPFC or PPC in 
session two for 30 minutes and the same type of stimulation to the other brain region 
(PPC or DLPFC) on the ipsilateral side for 30 minutes in session three.  The order of 
stimulating these two regions was counterbalanced across subjects in each group.  We 
used an “offline” rTMS paradigm; subjects completed tasks after stimulation was 
completed.  Since impairments in behavior following low frequency rTMS have been 
shown to last for half the time of the previous stimulation (Mottaghy, Gangitano et al., 
2002), the tasks following rTMS were limited to the first 15 minutes post-stimulation.   
 
Statistical Analysis Methods 
Using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL), data were analyzed with 
Generalized Estimating equations (GEE) which allow one to model effects while 
accounting for correlations within observations of individual subjects (Liang & Zeger, 
1986).  In order to test the effects of real stimulation relative to sham, separate GEE 
models were created for responses following stimulation to each region (i.e. left DLPFC, 
left PPC, right DLPFC, right PPC).  To examine within subject differences across 
stimulation regions in subjects who received real rTMS, separate GEE models were 
created for data for subjects who received stimulation to each hemisphere (i.e. left, right).  
All models contained an intercept term.    
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 We used GEE models with a logit link function and binomial distribution to 
predict choice of an immediate option (0 = Chose Delayed, 1 = Chose Immediate) at the 
trial level on the Intertemporal Choice Task.  Separate models were created to predict 
choice on gain and loss trials   Independent variables in all models included Stimulation 
Type (0 = Sham rTMS, 1 = Real rTMS), Immediate Relative Value (i.e. percent distance 
of the immediate option from the immediate equivalent of the delayed option, which 
ranged from -50% to 50%) and Session Number (0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).  
Additionally, we included the interaction of Immediate Relative Value by Stimulation 
Type if it was significant (p < .05).  To examine within subject differences across region 
of stimulation in the real rTMS groups, we created similar GEE models, except the within 
subject variable Region (0 = DLPFC, 1 = PPC) was used instead of the between subject 
variable Stimulation Type; the interaction of Region by Immediate Relative Value was 
only included if significant.  
 All other GEE models we created had an identity link function and normal 
distribution.  To predict reaction time on trials of the Intertemporal Choice Task 
(measured in milliseconds (ms)), we created separate GEE models for gain and loss trials.  
Between subject models (each limited to one region) and within subjects models included 
the same independent variables as the choice models, plus up to two additional variables: 
Immediate Relative Value 
2 
(i.e. Immediate Relative
 
Value squared) and the Interaction 
between this variable and Stimulation Type (or Region, depending on analysis).  
Interactions were only included in the final models if significant. 
 We next used GEE models to predict reaction time in ms on the numerical 
comparison portion of the Intertemporal Choice Task; models contained data from all 
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trials pooled together (i.e. both gain and loss) and were limited to correct trials.  Models 
contained the same independent variables as the models predictive of choice, and an 
interaction term was only included if significant. We did not create models to examine 
numerical comparison accuracy, as both real and sham rTMS groups performed at near 
perfect accuracy on the task (Mean accuracy for real rTMS group= .976, SD = .037; 
Mean accuracy for sham rTMS group= .976, SD = .023). 
 To predict effects of real relative to sham stimulation on immediate equivalents 
measured on the Indifference Point Task, we utilized the Generalized Linear model 
function in PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) with an identity link function 
and normal distribution.  Each model examined the effects of stimulation at one of the 
four regions for either gain or loss values and contained the following predictors: 
Stimulation Type, Session Number, and Session 1 Immediate Equivalent.  This last 
variable was included as a covariate because immediate values at the indifference point 
(i.e. immediate equivalents) following stimulation should be related to subject’s initial 
pre-rTMS (i.e. Session 1) values, and thus significant effects of Stimulation Type might 
not emerge without controlling for this variable.  To predict immediate equivalents across 
region of stimulation for subjects who received real rTMS, we used GEE models that 
included Region (-1 = neither (i.e. for Session 1), 0 = DLPFC, 1 = PPC) and Session 
Number (-1 = Session 1, 0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3) as predictors.  Separate models 
were run for gain and loss immediate equivalents.  
 For all GEE models, we used unstructured working correlation matrices.  
However, because the majority of analyses performed on numerical comparison reaction 
time failed to converge, we also constructed GEE models for this dependent variable with 
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exchangeable working correlation matrices.  In order to ease comparison of models for 
each dependent variable, all presented results for a specific dependent variable were 
based on models with a similar working correlation matrix structure.  Thus, while all 
reported results for numerical comparison reaction time were based on exchangeable 
matrices, all others were based on unstructured matrices.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Session One Indifference Points 
 Using independent sample t-tests, we first compared mean immediate equivalents 
measured in session 1 on the Indifference Point Task for individuals in each real rTMS 
group (i.e. left or right hemisphere) with individuals in the group that would receive sham 
rTMS to regions of the same hemisphere.  This was done to ensure that session 1 choice 
preferences across stimulation groups were not different.  Sixteen independent sample    
t-tests were performed in all: eight for subjects in the groups that would receive 
stimulation to left hemisphere regions and eight for subjects in the groups that would 
receive stimulation to right hemisphere regions.  Each t-test compared mean immediate 
equivalents across stimulation groups for one of the eight types of delayed incentives (i.e. 
4 magnitudes of delayed gain and 4 magnitudes of delayed loss).  There were no 
significant differences in mean session one immediate equivalents between the left 
hemisphere real and sham rTMS groups, and no significant differences between the right 
hemisphere real and sham rTMS groups.  Importantly, these results reveal that prior to 
receiving rTMS (i.e. in session 1), mean levels of delay discounting were similar across 
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real and matched sham rTMS groups.  For mean session 1 immediate equivalents, see 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Mean Session One Immediate Equivalents in the Indifference Point Task. 
 Left Real Left Sham  Right Real Right Sham 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Gain $2.50 1.226 (.529) 1.146 (.456) 1.424 (.598) 1.510 (.619) 
Gain $5.00 2.964 (1.096) 2.804 (1.153) 3.391 (.828) 3.234 (1.157) 
Gain $7.50 4.608 (1.767) 4.576 (1.526) 4.701 (1.683) 4.748 (1.836) 
Gain $10.00 6.836 (2.055) 6.194 (2.266) 6.523 (2.274) 6.681 (2.090) 
Loss $2.50 1.509 (.510) 1.570 (.588) 1.456 (.633) 1.389 (.555) 
Loss $5.00 3.361 (.988) 3.168 (1.109) 3.014 (1.163) 2.673 (1.306) 
Loss $7.50 5.119 (1.523) 4.640 (1.699) 4.843 (1.769) 4.916 (1.587) 
Loss $10.00 7.103 (2.130) 6.710 (2.223) 6.621 (2.282) 6.164 (2.307) 
Mean session 1 immediate equivalents for specific magnitudes of delayed gains and 
losses (listed in left column) available in 4 weeks.  Averages are constructed separately 
for subjects in each of the four rTMS groups (listed in column titles).  
 
 
Intertemporal Choices 
For descriptive statistics of overall mean proportion of choices for immediate 
gains and losses following each type of stimulation to each side of each brain region, see 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Mean Choice of Immediate Options in the Intertemporal Choice Task. 
 Left DLPFC Left PPC Right DLPFC Right PPC 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Real: Gain .389 (.213) .389 (.168) .511 (.190) .474 (.205) 
Sham: Gain .396 (.197) .413  (.156) .440 (.247) .379 (.200) 
Real: Loss .755 (.178) .728 (.172) .653 (.190) .644 (.194) 
Sham: Loss .749 (.183) .711 (.197) .718 (.176) .749  (.245) 
Mean proportion of choices for the immediate option across subjects computed for each 
type of stimulation (i.e. Real vs. Sham) to each side and region (listed in column titles).  
Statistics are collapsed across all gain trials and all loss trials separately.   
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Model parameters for all GEE models that predict choice of an immediate 
monetary option are presented in Table 4.  All between subject models contained 
Stimulation Type, Immediate Relative Value, Session Number, and an intercept as 
predictors.  We also included the interaction of Immediate Relative Value by Stimulation 
Type in all initial models, to assess whether effects of real rTMS on choice depended on 
the relative value of the immediate reward.  However, if this interaction term was not 
significant (p >= .05), we did not include it in the final model. 
Disruption of the right DLPFC led to greater choice of options with a better 
immediate but worse long-term value.  Importantly, this was seen in both the gain and 
loss domains.  Individuals who received real rTMS to the right DLPFC chose more 
immediate monetary gains (Odds Ratio(OR) = 1.645, p <.01) than did individuals who 
received sham stimulation to the same region (see Figure 5A).  They also chose less 
immediate monetary losses (OR = .653, p < .05) than did individuals who received sham 
stimulation to the same region (see Figure 5B).  These effects were not dependent on the 
relative value of the immediate option, as similar differences in choice behavior emerged 
across the range of gain and loss values.  In contrast to the effects seen following 
disruption of the right DLPFC, disruption of the left DLPFC did not affect choices.      
 Disruption of the right PPC also led to greater choice of options with a better 
immediate, but worse long-term value, and occurred in both the gain and loss domains.  
In contrast to the effects seen following disruption of the right DLPFC, the effects seen 
following disruption of the right PPC were dependent on the relative subjective value of 
the immediate option.  There was an interaction of Immediate Relative Value by 
Stimulation Type on choice of both immediate monetary gains (p <.01) and immediate 
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monetary losses (p <.05).  At low relative subjective values of the immediate option, 
individuals who received real stimulation chose similarly to those who received sham 
stimulation.  However, as the subjective value of the immediate option increased relative 
to that of the delayed option, individuals became increasingly more likely to choose 
immediate monetary gains (see Figure 5C) and increasingly less likely to choose 
immediate monetary losses than individuals who received sham stimulation to the same 
region (see Figure 5D).  Across both gain and loss choices, those who received real rTMS 
became increasingly more likely than subjects who received sham rTMS to choose the 
option with the better immediate, but worse long-term value, as the relative value of the 
immediate option increased.  
 Disruption of the left PPC also affected choice behavior, but only for gain trials.  
Real rTMS administered to the left PPC led to fewer choices for immediate monetary 
gains than did sham stimulation (OR = .751, p <.05) (see Figure 5E).  The effect of left 
PPC stimulation contrasted with that of right PPC stimulation for gain trials in two ways.  
First, disruption of the left PPC led to decreased rather than increased choice of monetary 
gains with the better immediate value. Second, the effect occurred across the range of 
gain trials rather than interacting with Immediate Relative Value. 
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Table 4: Between and Within Subject GEE Models for Intertemporal Choice. 
  GAIN Model  LOSS Model  
 B (SE) OR B (SE) OR 
Between: Left DLPFC        
Intercept   -.563*** (.155)      .569                        .848*** (.121)       2.335     
StimType  .138      (.149)   1.148       .162      (.161)         1.176 
Imm. Rel. Value                       .038***   (.003)   1.039                      -.027*** (.002)         .973 
Session  .194     (.153)   1.215                         .588*** (.164)       1.800 
Between: Left PPC        
Intercept   -.379*** (.102)        .685                       1.264*** (.168)     3.538          
StimType -.286* (.115)        .751          .065       (.172)     1.067 
Imm. Rel. Value                       .037*** (.003)     1.038                        -.032*** (.002)       .968 
Session -.040       (.115)        .961                        -.405* (.170)       .667 
Between: Right DLPFC        
Intercept   -.599*** (.116)       .549                           .943*** (.109)     2.568 
StimType .498**   (.158)    1.645                         -.426*     (.167)      .653 
Imm. Rel. Value                      .039*** (.002)     1.039                         -.031*** (.002)      .969 
Session  .421**    (.159)     1.523                          .210      (.164)      1.233 
Between: Right PPC        
Intercept   -.177     (.158)        .838                         1.307*** (.180)   3.696 
StimType  .442**    (.168)     1.555                         -.719*** (.213)      .487 
Imm. Rel. Value                       .036*** (.003)     1.036                         -.022*** (.004)      .978 
Session -.757*** (.171)      .469                            .185      (.200)     1.203 
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value    .011**    (.004)    1.011                        -.011*     (.005)      .989 
Real Within: Left       
Intercept      -.646*** (.081)       .524                       1.090*** (.142)    2.974 
Region       .051         (.073) 1.053                        -.067      (.064)      .936 
Imm. Rel. Value                          .036*** (.003)    1.037                       -.030*** (.003)      .970 
Session      .070        (.077)   1.072                          .178**   (.065 1.195   
Real Within: Right       
Intercept     .148       (.077)    1.160                           .404*** (.099)      1.498 
Region     -.208*** (.050)       .812                           .052       (.067)     1.054 
Imm. Rel. Value                         .043*** (.003)    1.044                         -.032*** (.002)       .969 
Session    -.205*** (.049)       .815                           .249*** (.070)     1.283 
Models predict choice of immediate option on each gain trial (in columns listed GAIN Model) or 
on each loss trial (in columns listed LOSS Model).  In left column model predictors are listed 
below each model (name of model listed in Bold).  Models listed “Between”: contain data from 
subjects who received real rTMS and from subjects who received sham rTMS to region listed 
after word “Between”.  Models listed “Real Within” contain data from subjects who received real 
rTMS to regions of the hemisphere listed after words “Real Within”. OR = Odds Ratio (eB). SE = 
Standard Error of B.  Intercept = Model Intercept.  Imm. Rel. Value = Immediate Relative Value 
(percent distance of the immediate option from immediate equivalent of the delayed option). 
Region = Stimulation Region (0 = DLPFC, 1 = PPC). StimType=Stimulation Type (0 = Sham 
rTMS, 1 = Real rTMS).  Session = Session Number (0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).  X = Predictor 
is interaction of two terms.  Models only contained interaction if significant at p < .05.* p < .05; 
** p <.01; *** p <.001. 
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Figure 5: Intertemporal Choice Graphs.  Probability of choosing the immediate option 
as a function of the relative value of the immediate option.  Numbers on x-axis are the 
percent distance between the immediate option and the immediate equivalent of the 
delayed option (i.e. x-axis represents Immediate Relative Value).  Graphs show choice at 
average session (Session = .5). A-E. Compares choice on gain or loss trials (listed in title) 
between real vs. sham stimulation to one region (listed in title).  F.  Compares choice on 
gain trials across stimulation region for those who received real rTMS to right 
hemisphere regions. * Paired comparison significant at p < .05.  
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D C 
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To determine whether there was a stronger effect of rTMS in the right PPC or 
right DLPFC, we examined whether there were significant effects of stimulation region 
within subjects who received real rTMS (see Table 4).  Individuals chose fewer 
immediate monetary gains following disruption of the right PPC than of the right DLPFC 
(OR = .812, p <.001) (see Figure 5F).  However, the magnitude of this effect was small, 
indicating that choice patterns were not very divergent following disruption of either 
region.  Because of the small size of the effect, it is not discussed further.  In contrast to 
the effect of region of disruption in the right hemisphere on choice for gains, there was no 
effect of region of disruption in the right hemisphere on choice for losses.  Additionally, 
region of disruption in the left hemisphere did not affect choice of either gains or losses.  
Additionally, there were no significant interactions of Immediate Relative Value by 
Region on choice in any within subject models.  
Both between and within subject analyses reveal that participants were sensitive 
to the relative subjective values of the two options as predicted.  In all monetary gain 
models, there was a positive effect of Immediate Relative Value such that subjects were 
more likely to chose the immediate gain as the relative value of the immediate option 
increased (all p <.001).  In contrast, in all monetary loss models, there was a negative 
effect of Immediate Relative Value, such that subjects were less likely to choose  the 
immediate loss as the relative value of the immediate loss increased (i.e. as the magnitude 
of the immediate loss increased) (all p < .001).  This reveals that while disruption of 
several regions with rTMS affected choice, disruption did not make participants 
insensitive to the relative values of the two options.     
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We found some effects of Session Number on choice of monetary gains and 
losses in between subject models, but these effects did not exhibit consistent patterns 
across models.  In between subject models, there was a positive effect of Session Number 
on choice of immediate gains following stimulation to the right DLPFC (p <.01), but a 
negative effect of Session Number following stimulation to the right PPC (p <.001).  In 
the domain of losses, there was a positive effect of Session Number on choice of 
immediate losses following stimulation to the left DLPFC (p <.001), but a negative effect 
of Session Number following stimulation to the left PPC (p <.05).  It is difficult to 
interpret how Session Number affected choice across all subjects, because there was no 
consistent effect of Session Number in either the gain or loss domain. 
 There were, however, more interpretable effects of Session Number in within 
subject models.  Amongst individuals who received real rTMS, Session Number was 
consistently positively associated with greater choice of the option with the better long-
term value.  Individuals were less likely to choose immediate gains following disruption 
of right hemisphere regions (p < .001) and more likely to choose immediate losses 
following disruption of regions of either hemisphere (both p <.01) in session 3 than in 
session 2. This suggests that individuals who received real rTMS improved in their ability 
to choose the better long-term option over time; they were more likely to choose the 
larger delayed gain and the smaller immediate loss in session 3 than in session 2.  
As a supplemental analysis, we investigated whether subjects who received real 
rTMS to right hemisphere regions were more likely to choose the option with the better 
immediate value than were subjects who received real rTMS to the same regions in the 
left hemisphere.  To assess this, we constructed between subject GEE models similar to 
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those produced across real and sham groups, except the predictor Stimulation Type was 
replaced by Hemisphere (0 = Left, 1 = Right).  Each model only included data from 
participants who received real rTMS to a brain region (PPC or DLPFC).  Consistent with 
the between subject results, disruption of either right DLPFC or right PPC was associated 
with a greater tendency to choose the option with the better immediate value.  Individuals 
who received real rTMS to the right DLPFC were more likely to choose immediate gains 
(OR = 2.137, p < .001) and less likely to choose immediate losses (OR = .461, p <.001) 
than were individuals who received real rTMS to the left DLPFC.  Similarly, those who 
received real rTMS to the right PPC were more likely to choose immediate gains (OR = 
2.064, p < .001) and less likely to choose immediate losses (OR = .636, p < .01) than 
were those who received real rTMS to the left PPC.  There was no interaction of 
Immediate Relative Value by Hemisphere in any of the models.  Thus, unlike in the 
between stimulation type analyses, in the between hemisphere analyses, the effects of 
disruption of the right PPC on choice were not dependent on the relative value of the 
immediate option.  The greater tendency to choose the better immediate, but worse   
long-term gains and losses seen following disruption of right than of left hemisphere 
regions supports the results of our analyses investigating differences in choice following 
real vs. sham rTMS to the right DLPFC and right PPC.  Together, both analyses indicate 
that disruption of the right DLPFC and the right PPC increased choice of gain and loss 
options with better immediate, but worse long-term values.  
We performed another supplemental analysis to see if changes in choice patterns 
seen following disruption of the DLPFC or PPC were dependent on how close the 
subjective values of the two options were to each other.  This was done because prior 
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research shows that disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS affects choice more on difficult 
intertemporal choices (Figner et al., 2010), and it might be more difficult to compare the 
values of the two options and make a choice as the subjective values approach each other.  
To assess this, we reran all eight of our between subject GEE models that compared 
choice between individuals in the real and sham rTMS groups, but added two terms to the 
models: a quadratic effect of Immediate Relative Value and an interaction of this term 
with Stimulation Type.  The quadratic effect, Immediate Relative Value Squared (i.e. 
Immediate Relative Value
2
), was used because the value of this term decreased as the 
subjective values of the two options approached each other.  These analyses revealed a 
significant interaction between Immediate Relative Value
2
 and Stimulation Type on loss 
trials following stimulation to the left DLPFC (p=.003).  Despite this interaction, there 
were no significant differences between groups on choice.  Because of the lack of 
significant differences, this finding is not further discussed.   In contrast to the interaction 
seen following stimulation to the left DLPFC, there were not any significant interactions 
between Immediate Relative Value
2
 and Stimulation Type following stimulation to other 
regions.  Importantly, these results indicate that the effects on choice following disruption 
of the right DLPFC and the right PPC were not dependent on how close the relative 
subjective values of the two options were to each other. 
 
Intertemporal Choice Reaction Time 
 We next tested whether reaction time was different across groups using GEE 
models (see Table 5) to see whether changes in choice patterns following disruption of 
brain regions were associated with changes in the time it took to choose between the 
89 
 
options.  We assumed that as comparisons and choices became more difficult, reaction 
time would increase.  Choices could become more difficult as the relative subjective 
values of the two options approach each other, and also as the objective monetary values 
of the two options approach each other.  To examine both of these effects, all reaction 
time models included both linear and quadratic effects of Immediate Relative Value.  As 
the linear term, Immediate Relative Value, increased, the monetary value of the 
immediate option approached that of the delayed option.  In contrast, as the quadratic 
effect, Immediate Relative Value squared (i.e. Immediate Relative Value
2 
), decreased, 
the subjective values of the two options approached each other.  As the relationship 
between Immediate Relative Value and choice could differ across groups, we also probed 
for interactions between Stimulation Type and the linear and quadratic effects of 
Immediate Relative Value.  These interactions were only included in final models if 
significant. 
Real rTMS over the right DLPFC or right PPC slowed reaction times relative to 
sham stimulation on loss trials (both p < .05).  These slowed reaction times could indicate 
that it was harder following real stimulation to choose loss options with the better long-
term value, since real stimulation to these regions decreased the tendency to choose these 
options.  However, one should not make a strong claim based on the patterns of these 
effects.  This is because changes in choice and reaction time interacted differently with 
the relative values of the two options.  There were significant negative effects of 
Immediate Relative Value
2  
on reaction time following real rTMS to the right PPC and to 
the right DLPFC but not following sham rTMS to these regions, as indicated by the 
significant interactions of Stimulation Type by Immediate Relative Value
2  
(both p <.05) 
90 
 
and the nonsignificant main effects of Immediate Relative Value
2
.  This reveals that 
reaction time slowed as the subjective values of the two options approached each other 
for the real rTMS group, but not for the sham group.  Additionally, it suggests that real 
rTMS made it more difficult for individuals to choose amongst losses as the subjective 
values of the two monetary loss options approached each other (see Figure 6A & 6B).  If 
this reaction time effect were linked to choice, one would expect that individuals who 
received real rTMS would make fewer choices for options with the better long-term 
outcome as the subjective values of the options approached each other as well.  However, 
as discussed earlier this was not the case.  There were no significant interactions between 
Immediate Relative Value
2  
and Stimulation Type on choice following stimulation to right 
hemisphere regions.   
We did not find evidence for a relationship between changes in reaction time and 
changes in choice patterns on gain trials following disruption of the right DLPFC or the 
right PPC.  There was an interaction of Immediate Relative Value by Stimulation Type 
on intertemporal choice reaction time for gain trials following stimulation to the right 
PPC (p < .05).  While individuals who received sham rTMS to this region responded 
more slowly as Immediate Relative Value increased, individuals who received real 
stimulation did not.  Despite this difference, reaction time following disruption of right 
PPC was not significantly slower than reaction time following sham stimulation (see 
Figure 6C), even though these subjects were more likely to choose immediate gains than 
those in the sham group.  Additionally, there was no effect of Stimulation Type to the 
right DLPFC on reaction time for gain trials, even though choice was affected.  The lack 
of significant differences in reaction time on gain trials across groups that had significant 
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differences in choice patterns on these trials indicates that changes in the ability to make 
good long-term choices on gain trials were not associated with changes in reaction time, 
following disruption of right hemisphere regions. 
In contrast, there did appear to be a relationship between changes in reaction time 
and choice on gain trials following disruption of the left PPC.  Relative to individuals 
who received sham stimulation, those who received real rTMS to the left PPC both had 
decreased reaction time on gain trials (p < .001; see Figure 6D) and made fewer choices 
for immediate gains.  Neither the effects on reaction time nor the effects on choice 
following disruption of this region were dependent on the relative value of the immediate 
option, showing a similarity between the two effects.  Individuals responded more 
quickly and were more likely to choose the better long-term option following disruption 
of the left PPC.   
We found some between subject effects on reaction time in the left DLPFC as 
well.  However, these effects appeared to be modest and were not linked to any changes 
in choice patterns, since disruption of the left DLPFC did not affect choice.  Following 
stimulation delivered to the left DLPFC, we saw a significant interaction between 
Immediate Relative Value
2
 and Stimulation Type (p < .05), such that reaction time on 
loss trials for the sham group slowed more as the two subjective values approached each 
other than it did for the real rTMS group (see Figure 6E).  However, as no reaction time 
differences between groups reached statistical significance, this effect is not discussed 
further.  
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Table 5: Between Subject GEE Models for Intertemporal Choice Reaction Time.  
 GAIN Model  LOSS Model  
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Between: Left DLPFC      
Intercept 3136.488***   (75.437)   3396.698***  (94.894)   
StimType  -15.041      (89.065)               -91.084       (126.894)     
Imm. Rel. Value                       3.435***        (.522)   4.736***            (.706) 
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.070***       (.014)    -.153***            (.031)   
Session -414.228***   (89.483)   -375.119***        (100.187)   
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value          ---†    -1.172         (1.250)     
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value
2   
  ---      .086*            (.040)     
Between: Left PPC     
Intercept 3375.831***   (77.763)   3468.686***       (80.793)    
StimType -348.695***   (72.604)     -6.946           (84.845)      
Imm. Rel. Value                        .282      (.829)        5.102***            (.524)   
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.113***      (.015)        -.036*        (.015)    
Session -479.025***   (72.556)    -550.298***        (90.422)     
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value        2.451*      (1.086)     ---   
Between: Right DLPFC     
Intercept 3330.106***   (57.810)           3387.930***       (66.438)   
StimType   46.987   (76.358)      232.525*       (109.378)     
Imm. Rel. Value                       2.952***        (.771)      6.213***             (.881) 
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.110***        (.019) 
  
    .017                  (.018)     
Session -452.088***    (82.957) -449.830***        (95.091)   
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value     ---    -1.633                (1.116)       
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value
2   
  ---     -.075*                (.035)      
Between: Right PPC     
Intercept 3599.815*** (84.868) 3433.702***      (69.620) 
StimType  -32.280   (81.097)  452.172***       (91.683) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       2.526**     (.884)       8.206***               (.883) 
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.117***       (.015)      .001                  (.025)     
Session -573.447***   (82.021) -673.276***      (78.212) 
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value       -3.057*     (1.289)     -2.267                 (1.214) 
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value
2   
  ---     -.128***                (.033)     
Models predict reaction time (ms) on gain or loss trials.  Imm. Rel. Value
2 
= Immediate 
Relative Value squared.  ---†= Interaction not included in model (models only contained 
interaction if it was significant at p < .05).  Other abbreviations same as in Table 4. * p < 
.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 
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Figure 6: Between Subject Intertemporal Choice Reaction Time Graphs.  Choice 
reaction time (in ms) as a function of the relative value of the immediate option.  
Numbers on x-axis are the percent distance between the immediate option and the 
immediate equivalent of the delayed option.  Graphs show reaction time at average 
session (Session = .5). A-E. Compares reaction time on gain or loss trials (listed in title) 
between real vs. sham stimulation to one region (listed in title).  * Paired comparison 
significant at p < .05. 
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The results of our between subject reaction time analyses suggest that the 
relationship between choice patterns and reaction time is dependent on the region of 
stimulation and the type of choice (i.e. gain or loss).  Some effects on choice were 
associated with changes in reaction time, particularly on gain trials following rTMS to the 
left PPC, while others were clearly dissociable (i.e. effects following rTMS to right 
hemisphere regions on gain trials).  There was some evidence that slowed reaction time 
was associated with greater choice of better immediate but worse long-term loss options, 
and that speeded reaction time was associated with greater choice of better long-term but 
worse immediate gain options.  However, with the exception of the effects following 
rTMS to the left PPC, the relationships between choice and reaction time appeared to be 
weak.  
For subjects who received real rTMS, there were some differences in reaction 
time that depended on region of stimulation, but only following left hemisphere 
stimulation (see Table 6).  Following real rTMS to the left DLPFC and the left PPC, there 
were effects of Region on loss trials that were dependent on both Immediate Relative 
Value and Immediate Relative Value
2
 (both p < .001; see Figure 7B), and effects of 
Region on gain trials that were dependent on Immediate Relative Value
2
 (p < .001; see 
Figure 7A).  To investigate whether the divergent effects of Immediate Relative Value
2
 
across regions were coupled with changes in choice patterns, we reran our left 
hemisphere within subject GEE gain and loss intertemporal choice models for subjects in 
the real rTMS group, but this time included additional terms for Immediate Relative 
Value
2 
and the interaction of this term with Region.  Both terms were nonsignificant, 
revealing that reaction time effects were not coupled with effects on choice.  Since 
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analyses revealed there were no effects of Region on intertemporal choice following real 
rTMS to the left hemisphere, these reaction time effects are not discussed further.   
 
Table 6: Within Subject GEE Models for Intertemporal Choice Reaction Time. 
 GAIN Model  LOSS Model  
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Real Within: Left     
Intercept 3213.539***      (53.855) 3339.426***
  
(75.206) 
Region    75.152 (46.643)    8.890 (49.856) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       3.159***    (.631)    3.394***           (.866) 
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.065**        (.020)    -.113***           (.021) 
Session -568.657***       (31.514)                   -398.777***    (40.386)           
Region  X Imm. Rel. Value                 .508    (.629)    3.305***   (.951) 
Region  X Imm. Rel. Value
2   
         -.119***    (.036)     .084***   (.022) 
Real Within: Right     
Intercept 3374.700*** (57.030) 3624.722***
  
(71.978) 
Region    61.083    (37.630)   31.714 (44.156) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       1.267*      (.609)    5.409***   (.558) 
Imm. Rel. Value
2
    -.102***    (.017)              -.070***   (.018) 
Session -289.310*** (38.950) -339.540*** (43.682) 
Models predict reaction time (ms) for subjects who received real rTMS on gain or loss 
trials.  Imm. Rel. Value
2 
= Immediate Relative Value squared.  Models only contained 
interaction if it was significant at p < .05. Other abbreviations same as in Tables 4. * p < 
.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 
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Figure 7: Within Subject Intertemporal Choice Reaction Time Graphs.  
Intertemporal choice reaction time (in ms) as a function of the relative value of the 
immediate option.  Numbers on x-axis are the percent distance between the immediate 
option and the immediate equivalent of the delayed option.  Graphs show reaction time at 
average session (Session = .5). A-B.  Compares reaction time on gain or loss trials (listed 
in title) across region of stimulation for those who received real rTMS to left hemisphere 
regions.  * Paired comparison significant at p < .05. 
 
 
 
All intertemporal choice reaction time models revealed an effect of Session 
Number, such that subjects responded more quickly in session 3 than in session 2 (all p < 
.001); this improvement in reaction time was likely due to familiarity with the task.  
Additionally, in all models there was a significant positive linear effect of Immediate 
Relative Value (p < .05) and/or a significant negative quadratic effect of Immediate 
Relative Value (i.e. of Immediate Relative Value
2
) (p < .05), as predicted.  Reaction time 
thus increased as the monetary values of the two options approached each other (i.e. as 
Immediate Relative Value increased) and/or increased as the subjective value of the two 
options approached each other (i.e. as Immediate Relative Value
2
 decreased).  These 
reaction time effects suggest that trials did become more difficult both as the monetary 
values and as the subjective values of the two options approached each other. 
 
A B 
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Numerical Comparison Reaction Time 
 We next used GEE models to examine the effects of Stimulation Type, Immediate 
Relative Value, and Session Number on numerical comparison reaction time for correct 
trials to see if an increased tendency to choose options with the better immediate value on 
the Intertemporal Choice Task was associated with an impaired ability to perform 
numerical comparisons (see Table 7).  We included Immediate Relative Value (i.e. of the 
option that had been immediate on the preceding intertemporal choice trial) as an 
independent variable, because numerical comparisons should become more difficult and 
slower as the monetary values of the two numbers approach each other, consistent with 
past research (Moyer & Landauer, 1967).  As with other analyses, we only included an 
interaction term containing Immediate Relative Value if it was significant. 
There were no significant effects of Stimulation Type on numerical comparison 
reaction time following stimulation to the right DLPFC or right PPC.  There were also no 
significant interactions between Stimulation Type and Immediate Relative Value 
following stimulation to these regions.  Thus, there was no evidence that a greater 
tendency to choose the option with the better immediate value, following disruption of 
right hemisphere regions, was due to a disrupted ability to perform numerical 
comparisons.   
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Table 7: Between and Within Subject GEE Models for Numerical Comparison 
Reaction Time.  
 B (SE) 
Between: Left DLPFC   
Intercept 1229.931*** (60.732) 
StimType  -10.794 (53.764) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       1.791***    (.331) 
Session -146.037** (53.735) 
Between: Left PPC   
Intercept 1206.382*** (45.622) 
StimType   -6.429 (57.072) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       1.567***    (.442) 
Session -133.138* (57.058) 
StimType X Imm. Rel. Value    -1.051*    (.512) 
Between: Right DLPFC   
Intercept 1157.663*** (55.137) 
StimType  -17.158 (84.379) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       1.946***    (.352) 
Session   89.258 (84.527) 
Between: Right PPC   
Intercept 1317.983*** (60.156) 
StimType   42.651 (70.440) 
Imm. Rel. Value                        .900**    (.279) 
Session -286.806*** (70.442) 
Real Within: Left   
Intercept 1199.186*** (38.567) 
Region   -12.359 (23.388) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       1.929***    (.401) 
Session -106.250*** (23.403) 
Region  X Imm. Rel. Value                   -1.412**    (.451) 
Real Within: Right   
Intercept 1234.196*** (66.061) 
Region    33.197 (27.166) 
Imm. Rel. Value                       2.109***    (.377) 
Session -100.784*** (27.106) 
Region  X Imm. Rel. Value                   -1.291*    (.531) 
Models predict reaction time (ms) on accurate trials for subjects who received real or 
sham rTMS to listed region in bold.  Models only contained interaction if it was 
significant at p < .05. Imm. Rel. Value is the Immediate Relative Value of the option that 
was immediate on the preceding choice trial. Other abbreviations same as in Table 4. * p 
< .05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.   
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Disruption of only one region, the left PPC, affected numerical comparison 
reaction time differently across real and sham stimulation.  Following rTMS delivered to 
this region, there was an interaction of Immediate Relative Value by Stimulation Type on 
reaction time (p < .05).  Although reaction time increased as Immediate Relative Value 
increased following both real and sham rTMS, this value dependent increase was greater 
for sham than real stimulation.  Despite this difference, however, there were no 
significant differences in reaction time across groups (see Figure 8A), revealing that this 
effect was modest. 
We next looked at the effects of stimulation region on reaction time within 
subjects who received real rTMS (see Table 7).  We found significant interactions of 
Immediate Relative Value by Region on numerical comparison reaction time among 
individuals who received real rTMS to the left hemisphere and among those who 
received it to the right hemisphere (both p < .05).  Although reaction time increased as 
Immediate Relative Value increased following disruption of all regions, this value 
dependent increase was greater for DLPFC regions than for PPC regions (see Figure 8B 
& 8C).  This suggests that while it became more difficult to compare the values of the 
numbers as they approached each other following disruption of either the DLPFC or PPC 
to either hemisphere, the level of difficulty increased more as the two values approached 
each other following disruption of the DLPFC.  
All models revealed that subjects were sensitive to the relative numerical values 
of the two options.  In every GEE model, there was a positive effect of Immediate 
Relative Value, such that as the value of the smaller option increased and the monetary 
values of the two options approached each other, reaction time increased (all p < .01).  
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This was expected as numerical comparisons should become more difficult as the 
distance between the two numbers decreases.  Additionally, almost all models revealed 
an effect of Session Number.  All significant effects of Session Number were in the 
negative direction, such that participants responded more quickly in session 3 than in 
session 2 (all p < .05), suggesting that performance improved with familiarity.   
   
 
Figure 8: Numerical Comparison Reaction Time Graphs.  Numerical comparison 
reaction time (in ms) as a function of the relative value of the immediate option on the 
preceding choice trial.  Numbers on x-axis are the percent distance between the 
immediate option and the immediate equivalent of the delayed option.  Graphs show 
reaction time at average session (Session = .5). A. Compares reaction time between real 
vs. sham stimulation to the left PPC.  B-C  Compares reaction time across region of 
stimulation for those who received real rTMS to regions in one hemisphere (listed in 
title).  * Paired comparison significant at p < .05. 
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 As a supplementary analysis, we reran our numerical comparison reaction time 
models by only modeling reaction time on correct trials in which the reaction time was 
>= 100 ms and that were within two standard deviations of each subject’s mean reaction 
time.  This was done to remove trials in which subjects may have hastily responded and 
trials that were outliers.  It also allowed us to better compare our results with those of 
prior studies that have investigated the effects of TMS or rTMS on numerical comparison 
abilities, since it is typical to remove outliers before analysis (Andres et al., 2005; 
Cappelletti et al., 2007; Sandrini et al., 2004).  This supplementary analysis led to similar 
results as the primary reaction time analysis, except there was now no longer any 
significant interaction of Immediate Relative Value by Stimulation Type following rTMS 
to the left PPC.  Importantly, both the supplementary and primary analyses show that 
increased choice of better immediate, but worse long-term options, following disruption 
of the right DLPFC and the right PPC, was not associated with an impairment in the 
ability to perform numerical comparisons.   
 
Indifference Points 
   As a second approach to examining changes in intertemporal choice, we 
examined whether subject’s immediate equivalents for $10 delayed gains and losses were 
affected by disruption of the DLPFC and PPC.  In order to examine the difference in 
immediate equivalents following real and sham rTMS to each hemisphere, we used the 
Generalized Linear Model, which included Stimulation Type, Session Number, and 
Session One Immediate Equivalent as predictors.  We also created within subject GEE 
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models for subjects who received real rTMS to more thoroughly investigate how real 
rTMS affected immediate equivalents. 
Contrary to the findings of the Intertemporal Choice Task, there were no effects 
of real rTMS on immediate equivalents on the indifference point procedure for monetary 
gains or losses.  There was both no effect of Stimulation Type in between subject models 
and no effect of Region in within subject models for individuals who received real rTMS.  
Thus, greater choice of options with the better immediate value on the Intertemporal 
Choice Task was not associated with altered levels of delay discounting on the 
Indifference Point Task.   
The lack of findings on the Indifference Point Task may have been partially due 
to decay of rTMS effects since this task was completed after the Intertemporal Choice 
Task.  However, this is unlikely, since all subjects completed the Indifference Point Task 
before the effects of rTMS should have completely decayed (i.e. all subjects completed 
the task within 15 minutes after the termination of stimulation).  Maximum completion 
time for the Indifference Point Task was 12.110 minutes (min) post stimulation        
(Mean = 8.242 min, SD = 1.102 min), and maximum completion time for the preceding 
Intertemporal Choice Task was 10.275 minutes post stimulation (Mean = 7.413 min,    
SD = .965 min).   
The lack of findings could also have been due to differences in the components of 
the intertemporal choice and indifference point tasks.  The smaller number of trials on the 
Indifference Point Task may have made choices insensitive to neuromodulation relative 
to choices on the Intertemporal Choice Task, which provided both a greater number of 
trials and a greater range of immediate and delayed values.   
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Discussion 
 
We found that disruption of either the right DLPFC or the right PPC with rTMS 
led to greater choice of options with a better immediate, but worse long-term value, 
supporting the hypothesis that the functions of both of these regions help individuals 
make choices that optimize long-term value relative to immediate value.  Increased 
choice of options with a better immediate value following rTMS was found in both the 
gain and loss domains.  Individuals were more likely to choose small immediate 
monetary gains and less likely to choose small immediate monetary losses than were 
sham subjects and subjects who received real rTMS to contralateral brain regions 
 Although disruption of the right DLPFC or right PPC led to increased choice of 
options with a better immediate value, the effects seen following disruption of each brain 
region were different.  Disruption of the right DLPFC led to increased choice of options 
with a better immediate value (i.e. immediate gains and delayed losses) generally.  In 
contrast, the increased tendency to make choices for options with the better immediate 
value following disruption of the PPC was dependent on the value of the immediate 
option.  Following disruption of the right PPC, individuals became increasingly more 
likely than sham subjects to choose options with a better immediate, but worse long-term 
value as the relative value of the immediate option increased (i.e. as immediate gains and 
losses increased).  This suggests that both regions are involved in different functions 
during intertemporal choice.   
Past neuroeconomic studies have outlined three major models to account for 
intertemporal choice behavior: single-valuation (Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2009), dual-
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valuation (McClure et al., 2004), and self-control (Figner et al., 2010).  The single and 
dual valuation accounts both posit that choice directly follows from valuation, but differ 
in the number of valuation processes that influence choice.  The single-valuation model 
holds that a number of regions of the brain, including the MPFC and ventral striatum, 
respond to the value of both immediate and delayed rewards, but respond less for rewards 
as they become more delayed.  According to this model, disrupting the DLPFC or PPC 
should not lead to increased choice for either type of option because it would not change 
valuation of the choice options.  In contrast, the dual-valuation model holds that there are 
two valuation processes, an impatient system, that values immediacy, and a more patient 
system, that includes the LPFC and PPC, which discounts delayed rewards much less 
steeply than the impatient system.  Disruption of a region involved in the patient system 
should lead to decreased valuation of delayed rewards and increased choice of options 
with the better immediate value.  Self-control accounts on the other hand hold that 
activity in the DLPFC, and possibly other brain regions, can override or modulate 
valuation-related activity in other regions so that individuals can choose the better long-
term option (Figner et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009).  The self-control processes in the 
intertemporal choice theory of Figner and colleagues (2010) are characterized as classic 
cognitive control mechanisms that are deliberate and that have the ability to override 
more prepotent responses (i.e. prepotent responses to choose the option with the best 
immediate value), in favor of goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001).   
The effects on choice seen following disruption of the right DLPFC are most 
consistent with the dual-valuation account, suggesting that functions of the DLPFC place 
more weight on the long-term value of options than do other regions.  Disruption of this 
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region led to a shift in preference for options with a better immediate value, and this shift 
did not depend on the relative values of the two options.  This is the effect one would 
expect if one disrupted activity in a brain region that does not discount the value of 
delayed rewards, relative to immediate rewards, as much as other regions do.  
Specifically, if there are parallel patient and impatient valuation systems, and the patient 
system is disrupted, the impatient system’s valuation will dominate the decision process. 
In the dual-valuation model of McClure et al. (2004), impatient systems (i.e. ventral 
striatum, MPFC) would become dominant, once regions of the patient system (i.e. 
DLPFC and PPC) are disrupted.  Our findings are consistent with the model of McClure 
and colleagues, and suggest that the DLPFC is part of a “patient valuation” system.  
The authors of a past rTMS study of intertemporal choice have argued against a 
valuation role for the DLPFC based on their finding that disruption of the DLPFC 
affected choices but not valuation of the options (Figner et al., 2010).  However, their 
lack of an effect could have been due to limited power to detect differences on the 
valuation task, as there were only 12 trials.  This is quite possible, as the findings of 
several other studies do suggest that the DLPFC has an important role in valuation.  
Activation in the DLPFC has been shown to scale with the subjective value of items on 
both bidding and choice tasks (Hare et al., 2009; Plassmann et al., 2007; Plassmann et al., 
2010).  Furthermore, disruption of the DLPFC with low frequency rTMS has led to 
altered valuation of items on a bidding task (Camus et al., 2009).  In contrast to the 
findings of Figner et al., the findings of these other studies are supportive of our 
suggestion that the DLPFC is involved in valuation of items during intertemporal choice.  
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Our effects of disruption of the right DLPFC do not support a self-control account 
for this region in intertemporal choice.  A self-control account could predict that a region 
involved in self-control would show more involvement as the motivational drive to 
choose an immediate gain (or to avoid choosing an immediate loss) becomes more 
prepotent, under the assumption that it should be harder to override this prepotent urge as 
it increases.  Since this prepotent urge should increase as the value of the immediate 
option increases, this idea holds that disruption of a region involved in self-control would 
lead to greater choice of the best immediate option as the value of the immediate option 
increases and becomes closer to the monetary value of the larger delayed option.  
Alternatively, a self-control account could predict that a region involved in self-control 
would show more involvement as intertemporal choices become more difficult, that is as 
the values of the two options approach each other, under the assumption that it should be 
harder to override a prepotent urge to choose an immediate gain or to avoid choosing an 
immediate loss when the two options are close in subjective value.  This idea holds that 
disruption of a region involved in self-control would lead to greater choice of options 
with the better immediate value as the subjective values of the two options approached 
each other.  However, disruption of the right DLPFC did not lead to either of the changes 
in choice that might be expected to occur after disruption of a self-control process.  As 
the value of the immediate option increased, individuals who received real rTMS did not 
become increasingly more likely than those who received sham stimulation to choose the 
option with the better immediate value, as demonstrated by the non-significant 
interactions between Stimulation Type and Immediate Relative Value.  Similarly, 
supplementary analyses revealed that individuals who received real rTMS to the right 
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DLPFC did not become increasingly more likely than those who received sham 
stimulation to choose the better immediate option as the subjective values of the two 
options approached each other; there were non-significant interactions between 
Stimulation Type and the quadratic effect of Immediate Relative Value (i.e. Immediate 
Relative Value
2
).  Rather, the effect of rTMS appeared consistent across the range of 
values studied.  Thus, the right DLPFC data appear most consistent with a dual-valuation 
account.  
The effects seen after disruption of the right PPC, however, are more consistent 
with a self-control account than a dual-valuation account.  Disruption of the right PPC led 
to changes in choice that were dependent on the relative values of the two options.  
Importantly, when the value of the immediate option was low, disruption of the right PPC 
did not lead to increased choice of the option with the better immediate value.  As the 
value of the immediate option increased, however, individuals who received real rTMS 
became increasingly more likely than those who received sham stimulation to choose the 
option with the better immediate value.  In other words, following disruption of the right 
PPC, individuals became increasingly less likely than those in the sham group to choose 
the option with the better long-term, but worse immediate value as the value of the 
immediate option increased.  This suggests that the right PPC helps individuals override 
or inhibit prepotent drives to select options with better immediate value so that options 
with better long-term value can be selected.  Supplementary analyses revealed that 
individuals who received real rTMS to the right PPC did not become increasingly more 
likely than those who received sham stimulation to choose the better immediate option as 
the subjective values of the two options approached each other, as demonstrated by the 
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non-significant interactions between Stimulation Type and the quadratic effect of 
Immediate Relative Value.  Together, this suggests that cognitive control functions of the 
right PPC play an increasingly important role in helping individuals choose the best long-
term option as the motivational drive to choose an immediate gain (or to avoid choosing 
an immediate loss) increases, rather than as the subjective values of the two options 
approach each other.  Thus, the data suggest that the right PPC helps individuals choose 
in line with their goals when there is a conflict between those goals and motivational 
drives.    
Although we have suggested that PPC self-control functions help a person choose 
the option with a better long-term value as the value of an immediate option increases, a 
person might not want to engage these self-control processes to choose the best long-term 
option when the value of the immediate option is sufficiently high.  It is unlikely, 
however, that the values of our immediate choice options were high enough to discourage 
a person from wanting to use self-control.  Across subjects, the average percent 
difference between immediate and delayed monetary values when the Immediate Relative 
Value was at its highest were within a range that others have shown is not associated with 
an exclusive bias for choosing either better immediate or better long-term intertemporal 
choice options (i.e. percent difference in monetary value between 4% and 34%) (McClure 
et al., 2004).   
This is the first study to show that disruption of the DLPFC or the PPC has similar 
effects on both intertemporal choices involving gains and losses.  We found that 
disruption of either of these regions in the right hemisphere led to greater choice of 
options that were associated with a better immediate value but a worse long-term value 
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than alternatives.  Disruption of the right DLPFC led to a general shift in preference 
(towards immediate gains and away from immediate losses) overall.  In contrast, 
disruption of the right PPC led to changes in preference that depended on the value of the 
immediate alternative, such that there was a greater tendency to choose immediate gains 
and to not choose immediate losses as the values of the immediate options increased (i.e. 
as gains and losses became more positive and more negative, respectively).  This has 
important implications given that past theories of motivation have postulated different 
neural circuits for motivations to approach rewards and motivations to avoid aversive 
outcomes (Gray, 1981; Panksepp et al., 2002).   Contrary to the predictions of these 
theories, our results reveal that disruption of the same brain regions leads to a greater 
tendency to both approach immediate rewards and avoid immediate losses.  Our findings 
show that the right DLPFC and PPC are involved in optimization of long-term vs. 
immediate value in general during choice, rather than being specific to one motivational 
system. 
An important question is how the right DLPFC and right PPC interact with other 
brain areas involved in the decision making process.  For instance, the DLPFC and PPC 
could exert an influence on choice by modulating activity in other regions responsive to 
value.  Evidence supports this conjecture for the DLPFC.  When individuals make 
choices for food based on attributes associated with better long-term value (i.e. health) 
rather than better immediate value (taste), activation in the DLPFC is functionally 
connected with activation in the VMPFC, an area with activation related to subjective 
valuation of food items on the task (Hare et al., 2009).  This suggests that the DLPFC 
lends more weight to the value of delayed options in the decision process by modulating 
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value signals in other brain regions. The PPC might also modulate value signals on 
choice tasks, but this has not previously been investigated.  Another possibility is that 
activity in the DLPFC and PPC more directly affect choice, by overriding activity in 
other regions that strongly favors immediate value.  There is also a third possibility, that 
the DLPFC and PPC could affect choice by affecting processes prior to valuation.  The 
PPC could engage controlled attentional processes that lead to greater focus on delayed 
alternatives, or on alternatives with the highest monetary value, and such a process might 
be engaged more as the smaller immediate options become more distracting (i.e. larger in 
value).  Previous research has linked the PPC to controlled attention, making this idea 
plausible (Corbetta et al., 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Friedrich et al., 1998).  
Future fMRI work that examines the time courses of activation in different brain regions 
during different components of the intertemporal choice process (i.e. as a choice unfolds 
and is made) and that looks at functional connectivity between regions will help 
differentiate between these alternative accounts.   
While we have postulated a different role for the right PPC and right DLPFC 
based on our results, one finding suggests an alternative possibility that the right PPC 
may be involved in a similar valuation process as the right DLPFC during intertemporal 
choice.  A close look at the between subject loss graphs in Figure 5B and 5D reveals that 
the interaction involving losses following stimulation to the right PPC actually may have 
been due to differences in the sham group rather than in the real rTMS group, as 
demonstrated by the shallower slope of the loss line following right DLPFC sham 
stimulation than following right PPC sham stimulation. We note that if the right PPC 
between subject loss model is rerun without an interaction term, the main effect of 
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Stimulation Type is significant (p < .05), and in a similar direction as the main effect of 
Stimulation Type in the right DLPFC loss model.  In contrast, the interaction following 
stimulation to the right PPC on gain trials does not appear to have been driven by changes 
in the sham group.  This suggests that self-control rather than valuation was affected 
following disruption of the right PPC on gain trials.  Given the parallel interactions 
between Stimulation Type and Immediate Relative Value seen following stimulation to 
the right PPC on both gain and loss trials, we believe the data more strongly support a 
role for the right PPC in self-control than in valuation on loss trials as well.  However, it 
is unclear why individuals performed differently on loss trials following sham stimulation 
to the right DLPFC and right PPC. It does suggest that preferences on choice tasks may 
be somewhat unstable over time.  This is a possibility given that individuals received 
stimulation to each region on different days.   
Although disruption of right hemisphere regions led to greater choice of options 
with a better immediate value, it did not make subjects insensitive to the relative 
subjective values of the two options.  Both subjects who received real rTMS and those 
who received sham rTMS to regions of the right hemisphere were more likely to choose 
the immediate gain and less likely to choose the immediate loss as the relative subjective 
value of the immediate option increased.  Interestingly, it was the sham subjects rather 
than the real rTMS subjects who had choices that were more inconsistent with their prior 
preferences.  When the relative value of the immediate option was equal to that of the 
delayed option, sham subjects were more likely to make a choice for the option with the 
better long-term value than for the option with the better immediate value, even though 
they were predicted to choose each option with equal frequency.  In contrast, at the same 
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Immediate Relative Value, subjects who received real rTMS to right hemisphere regions 
had choice patterns closer to chance level.    
A greater tendency to make choices for the option with the better long-term value 
following sham stimulation may have occurred because of the different structures of our 
intertemporal choice task and our indifference point task.  The numerical comparison 
portion of our intertemporal choice task may have led individuals to focus more on the 
magnitude of the two monetary options rather than the available time of the two options 
on the Intertemporal Choice Task, since the numerical comparison task required 
individuals to compare the two monetary values but not the times of payment.  If subjects 
indeed focused more on magnitude, they may have exhibited less delay discounting than 
they did on the Indifference Point Task, which did not have a numerical comparison 
component.  This in turn would have led to more choices for the option with the better 
long-term value than were predicted in the sham group, as we observed.  Prior research 
has shown that how delays are framed (i.e. date vs. delay) affects delay discounting 
(Read, Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005); our results raise the possibility that whether 
an individual attends to reward magnitudes vs. delays affects delay discounting as well.   
It is important to note that we found a lack of coupling between changes in choice 
and the ability to compare numerical values following disruption of right hemisphere 
regions.  Although previous research has shown slowed reaction time on numerical 
comparison tasks following disruption of the left PPC (Andres et al., 2005; Cappelletti et 
al., 2007), we did not observe altered numerical comparison reaction time following 
disruption of either side of the PPC.  Our lack of differences may have been due to an 
inability to localize the specific region of the IPS important for numerical comparisons, 
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or may have been due to differences in our numerical comparison task from those used in 
other studies.  Unlike typical numerical comparison tasks, subjects in our study did not all 
receive the same stimuli.  This was done to ensure that individuals compared numbers in 
our task that had been in the previous intertemporal choice, but since subjects had already 
seen the numbers before the beginning of the numerical comparison, our task may have 
been easier than typical tasks.  Nevertheless, we found no support that altered 
intertemporal choice following disruption of regions of the DLPFC and PPC was due to 
an impaired ability to compare the values of the two alternatives, suggesting that neither 
of these brain regions may be necessary for numerical comparisons in intertemporal 
choice.  However, we note that this does not rule out a role for these regions in more 
complex value comparisons.  The numerical comparisons that accompanied our 
numerical comparison task may have been less demanding than the comparisons that are 
required to make an intertemporal choice.  While the numerical comparison task required 
comparison of two values (i.e. two magnitudes), the intertemporal choice task required 
comparison of 4 (i.e. two magnitudes and two time points).  
In contrast to our finding of increased choice for the better immediate option 
following disruption of the right PPC in both the gain and loss domains, we found that 
disruption of the left PPC led to decreased choice of the better immediate option, but only 
involving gains.  Also unlike the effects seen following disruption of the right PPC, 
disruption of the left PPC led to a general shift in the choice function, rather than changes 
that interacted with the relative values of the two options.  The increased tendency to 
choose delayed monetary gains following disruption of the left PPC was coupled with 
decreased reaction time, suggesting that when the left PPC was disrupted, individuals 
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were able to more efficiently choose delayed gains.  One possible explanation for the 
different pattern of results following disruption of the left vs. the right PPC is that the 
functions of the left PPC may normally inhibit self-control functions of the contralateral 
right PPC during intertemporal choice.  If so, then disrupting the left PPC could lead to 
greater activity in the right PPC and increase the likelihood and speed of choosing better 
long-term options.  Why individuals should be more likely to choose larger delayed 
monetary rewards after disruption of the left PPC, but have unaltered choices involving 
losses is unclear.  The inability to find an effect in the loss domain may have been 
because the effects of disrupting the left PPC on choice were modest.  The magnitude of 
the effect on choice following disruption of the left PPC was smaller than those seen 
following disruption of right hemisphere frontal and parietal regions.  Because of the 
small magnitude of this effect, it is not discussed further.   
Our reaction time measures revealed that individuals were sensitive to both the 
relative subjective values and the objective monetary values of the two options during 
intertemporal choice.  Reaction time slowed as both the subjective values and the 
monetary values approached each other, revealing that intertemporal choices are not only 
more difficult when the subjective values of two options are close, but also when the 
monetary values are close.  We found slower choice reaction time following disruption of 
right hemisphere regions in the loss, but not the gain domain.  This effect was greatest 
when the subjective values of the two options were close.  Given that this finding only 
emerged in the loss domain and emerged as the choices became more difficult suggests 
that intertemporal choices involving losses are more difficult than those involving gains.  
While the choice itself may be more difficult, we did not find evidence that the ability to 
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choose the better long-term option was harder when choices involved losses.  In fact, it 
appeared to be easier for individuals to make such choices for losses than for gains.  As 
demonstrated by the right hemisphere between subject choice graphs in figure 5(A-D), 
when the relative values of the two options were equal, both sham and real rTMS groups 
were more likely to make choices for the better long-term outcome in the loss domain 
(i.e. choose immediate loss) than they were in the gain domain (i.e. choose delayed gain).  
Past evidence shows that individuals are less likely to discount the value of delayed 
losses than gains (Baker et al., 2003; Benzion et al., 1989; Estle et al., 2006; Frederick et 
al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2001).  Our findings extend this by suggesting that even when 
the subjective values of delayed and immediate options are equal, it may be easier to 
choose the option with the better long-term value in the loss domain than in the gain 
domain.   
Reaction time would be expected to be slower when individuals use self-control 
processes during choice than when they do not, since it should take more time to make 
decisions when using deliberative cognitive control processes than when solely using 
more automatic valuation processes.  This is because that performance on tasks is thought 
to take longer when it relies on controlled rather than on automatic processes (Cohen, 
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990).  If the right PPC is involved in self-control processes 
during intertemporal choice, then one might predict that disruption of it would affect both 
choice and reaction time more as the relative value of an immediate option increases.  
The reason for this is that self-control processes that are used to help one choose the best 
long-term option should be engaged more as the relative value of an immediate option 
increases.  If these self-control processes are taken offline following real rTMS to the 
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right PPC, then individuals who receive real rTMS would be expected to have 
increasingly faster reaction times than sham subjects as the relative value of the 
immediate option increases.  We, however, did not find that reaction times were faster 
following real than following sham rTMS to the right PPC.  Rather, reaction time 
increased following real rTMS, but only on loss trials.  These reaction time findings thus 
are not consistent with our suggestion that the right PPC is involved in self-control during 
choice.  However, increases in reaction time following real rTMS may have occurred 
because other processes in addition to self-control processes were disrupted.  Our 
intertemporal choice task required subjects to switch between performing different     
sub-tasks: choice amongst gains, choice amongst losses, and numerical comparisons.  
Disruption of the right PPC may have led to increased reaction time because it disrupted 
the ability to switch between different tasks, a proposal that is plausible given prior 
findings linking the right PPC to task-switching (Brass & von Cramon, 2004).  Self-
control processes may have been disrupted following real rTMS as well, but reaction time 
may have been more affected by disruption of task-switching processes than by 
disruption of self-control processes. 
While previous findings show that disruption of the left DLPFC leads to increased 
choice for small immediate over larger delayed rewards (Figner et al., 2010), we found 
that disruption of the right, but not the left DLPFC, had this effect.  Although our 
lateralized effect is inconsistent with the rTMS study by Figner and colleagues (2010), it 
is consistent with prior fMRI work.  Intertemporal choice studies often show task-related 
activation in the right DLPFC, or nearby lateral PFC regions, as well as or instead of 
activations in the left hemisphere (McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Xu et al., 
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2009).  PPC activations are also often seen in the right hemisphere or bilaterally on 
intertemporal choice tasks (McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2009).  
Taken together, this reveals the possibility that neural activity in both the right and left 
DLPFC (and PPC) may increase the chances of choosing the best long-term option 
during intertemporal choice.  However, the relative importance of each hemisphere may 
depend on the characteristics of the intertemporal choice task being performed.  Our task 
was most likely more difficult than that employed by Figner and colleagues.  While their 
subjects only performed intertemporal choices for monetary gains, our subjects 
performed randomly mixed trials of choices involving monetary gains and losses.  
Furthermore, on each trial of our task there were two sub-tasks, an intertemporal choice 
and a numerical comparison, further increasing difficulty since subjects had to switch 
from doing one task to another.  This raises the possibility that the right DLPFC is more 
involved in making intertemporal choices in difficult situations.  This possibility may be 
further supported by our inability to find differences on our indifference point task 
following disruption of the right DLPFC or right PPC, which was probably easier than 
the Intertemporal Choice Task, since it did not mix gain and loss trials and did not 
contain a numerical comparison task.  Given that our results are based on a larger number 
of trials than those employed by Figner and colleagues, and the fact that we saw similar 
effects in both the gain and loss domain, our results provide strong evidence that the right 
DLPFC is more crucial than the left in the ability to choose the better long-term, but 
worse immediate, incentive.   
In conclusion, we found that disruption of either the right DLPFC or the right 
PPC with low frequency rTMS led to greater choice for monetary options with a better 
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immediate, but worse long-term value in both the gain and loss domain.  This reveals that 
activity in both regions helps individuals make choices that optimize long-term positive 
and negative value in relation to immediate value.  However, our findings also suggest 
that the specific roles of the DLPFC and PPC are different in intertemporal choice.  
Effects seen following disruption of the right DLPFC suggest it is involved in valuation 
of items, and that valuation processes of the DLPFC put less weight on the value of 
immediate options than do valuation functions in other brain regions.  In contrast, effects 
seen following disruption of the right PPC suggest that is involved in cognitive control 
functions that help individuals make better long-term choices, rather than valuation 
functions, during intertemporal choice.  Our findings help clarify the roles of the DLPFC 
and PPC during intertemporal choice, and indicate that the functions performed by these 
regions do not depend on whether choices involve positive or negative incentives.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
  
EXPERIMENT 2 – CHANGES IN RISKY CHOICE  
FOLLOWING DISRUPTION OF THE DLPFC 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 Many economic choices that people make are between options with varying levels 
of risk.  For instance, when deciding whether to buy a stock or a bond or when deciding 
whether to buy a lottery ticket or save one’s money, a person is confronted with options 
that have different levels of risk.   Such situations involve deciding whether or not to 
select an option that could lead to a better outcome, but that also has a higher probability 
of leading to a worse outcome than the alternative option.  Although others have defined 
risk level in different ways (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970; Weber & Johnson, 2009), here 
we define it as a direct function of the probability of outcomes on a choice task.  Risk 
level can be said to increase as the probability that an option leads to a rewarding 
outcome decreases, or conversely, risk level can be said to increase as the probability that 
an option leads to a negative, or non-rewarding, outcome increases.  Even though there 
are limitations to the choice scenarios this definition can be applied to, we think that this 
definition of risk is useful because it is able to directly capture the effects of different 
probabilities of gain or loss on choice.   
Several pieces of evidence suggest that in choices involving risk, the right DLPFC 
has an important role in helping individuals avoid taking risks.  In an important study, 
Knoch and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that disruption of the right DLPFC with low 
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frequency rTMS leads to greater selection of a riskier, but potentially larger reward 
option over a less risky reward option on “Roger’s Risk Task” (Rogers et al., 1999), in 
which individuals make choices between two options that differ in terms of probability 
and magnitude of reward and loss.  Evidence that increasing activity in the right relative 
to the left DLPFC with tDCS leads to fewer choices for the riskier option on Roger’s 
Risk Task is consistent with the rTMS findings (Fecteau et al., 2007).   
Several other findings suggest that the left DLPFC also has an important role in 
choice involving risk.  Matthews and colleagues found that fMRI BOLD signal in the left 
DLPFC, rather than the right DLPFC, predicted choice of a smaller certain over a larger 
risky reward (Matthews et al., 2004).  Additionally, both increasing activity in the left 
relative to the right DLPFC, or increasing activity in the right relative to the left DLPFC 
with tDCS has led to greater choices for the riskier option on Roger’s Risk Task in older 
adults (Boggio et al., 2010).  The divergent results across studies, however, leave unclear 
whether the role of the left DLPFC is different from that of the right DLPFC in choices 
involving risk. 
An important question that has not previously been adequately addressed is 
whether disruption of the DLPFC only leads to a greater preference for risk in situations 
that have specific levels of risk.  Disruption of the DLPFC could affect risk preferences in 
general, shifting preferences towards greater preference for choosing risky options.  
Alternatively, shifts in preference could interact with the level of risk.  An increased 
preference for risk might occur at different levels of risk but be greater at higher than at 
lower levels of risk.  This could occur if the processes in the DLPFC that increase risk-
aversion are engaged for different levels of risk but become engaged to a greater extent as 
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the risk level increases.  While some evidence suggests that neuromodulation of the 
DLPFC can affect the relationship between the level of risk and choice (Fecteau et al., 
2007), how the risk level of various options affects risk preference has not been reported.   
Moreover, it is unclear whether disrupting activity in the DLPFC would lead to 
greater risk taking on tasks that do not involve the possibility of a loss, as prior studies 
have utilized Roger’s Risk Task which offers the possibility of a potential loss in addition 
to the possibility of a potential gain on every trial.  This is an important question given 
that individuals’ propensities to take risks are different when losses and gains are 
involved (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992).  It may be 
that different brain regions bias behavior towards risk-aversion when risky options can 
lead to losses than when they cannot.  If so, the DLPFC might only bias behavior towards 
risk-aversion when there is a possibility of a loss.  Alternatively, the DLPFC may bias 
behavior towards risk-aversion when there is a possibility of a loss and when there is not.  
This possibility would be supported if disrupting activity in the DLPFC was shown to 
lead to greater risk taking in choices that do not involve the possibility of a loss.   
To examine whether activity in the DLPFC underlies risk-aversion for choices 
involving monetary gains, but not losses, with differing levels of risk, we utilized low 
frequency rTMS to transiently suppress functioning in the left or right DLPFC while 
individuals performed a risky choice task that involved choices between a certain option 
and a risky option that offered a larger reward with one of two probabilities.  By only 
varying the probability of one option, our design allowed us to more precisely examine 
how the probability of a risky option affects choices than have prior neuromodulation 
studies.  We varied the relative subjective values of the options on the choice task 
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according to subject’s pre-stimulation preferences and predicted that individuals would 
become more risk seeking following disruption of either side of the DLPFC.  There were 
two competing hypotheses regarding how increases in risk seeking would interact with 
risk level.  If functions of the DLPFC lead to risk-aversion in general, then increased risk 
seeking following disruption of this region should be similar under different levels of 
risk.  Alternatively, if the functions of the DLPFC are more likely to lead to risk aversion 
under higher levels of risk, then there should be a greater increase in risk seeking at 
higher than at lower levels of risk, following disruption of this region.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 30 right-handed individuals (46.67% female) between the ages of 18 and 29 (M 
Age = 21.17, SD = 3.10) from Vanderbilt University and the Nashville community 
participated in this study.  All of these participants reported having no history of 
neurological or psychiatric problems, and no females were currently pregnant.  55 
additional subjects were consented but excluded or withdrew.  Reasons subjects were 
excluded included baseline risk preferences as revealed in Session 1 that did not allow us 
to make task stimuli (see criteria below), having previously received TMS, risk factors 
that could increase the chances of having negative effects from TMS (e.g. neurological 
conditions), and experimenter error.  All participants completed written informed consent 
approved by the Vanderbilt IRB.       
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Session One – Indifference Point Procedure 
 We screened subjects prior to consent with a questionnaire to ensure that we only 
recruited participants who were risk averse or risk neutral.  There were 6 questions, each 
which required participants to write the magnitude of a hypothetical monetary gain 
available with 100% probability that they valued equally to a risky hypothetical monetary 
gain available with a less than certain probability.  On half of the questions the risky 
option was available with 70% probability and on the other half it was available with 
90% probability.  Any subjects who were risk seeking (i.e. if any of the certain values 
were greater than the expected value of the matched risky gain) were excluded.  This was 
done to increase power because if the DLPFC modulates risk aversion and prevents risk-
seeking behavior, disruption of this region may not have effects or may have smaller 
effects on individuals who are already risk-seeking.   
 Following consent, we determined subject indifference points between certain and 
risky monetary rewards.  The risky rewards offered a reward with a probability of 70% or 
90%, and offered no reward with the opposing probability (i.e. 100 - probability).  
Subjects completed an indifference point task on a computer in which we determined 8 
certainty equivalents (i.e. dollar amount of a certain monetary reward that the person 
values equally to a risky monetary reward) for 8 different risky monetary gains: 4 
different magnitudes (i.e. $2.50, $5.00, $7.50, and $10.00) available with one of two 
probabilities (i.e. 70% or 90%).  The order of determining certainty equivalents was from 
low to high magnitudes, and the lower probability risky option was always determined 
first (i.e. order was $2.50 with 70%, $2.50 with 90%.... $10 with 90%).  Subjects were 
told that one of their choices would randomly be selected for payment.  If the selected 
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choice was certain, they would definitely receive the money, but if it was risky, they 
would have a chance to receive it (associated with the probability of the option).  For 
timing of one trial of this task and presentation of items, see Figure 9.      
 To determine each certainty equivalent, participants were presented with an initial 
trial in which they made a choice between a risky monetary gain available with 70% or 
90% probability and a certain option of half the maximum value of the risky option.  If 
participants chose the risky option, the value of the certain option increased by half, and 
if they chose the certain option it decreased by half.  On the next trial, the certain value 
changed in a similar way as in the previous trial but only by one quarter of the original 
value.  Over six trials, the certain value increased or decreased by progressively smaller 
amounts (i.e. by 1/(2^x) where x was trial number) depending on participant responses so 
that the subjective value of the certain amount would iteratively approach that of the risky 
amount.  After the sixth trial, a final catch trial was presented in which the certain value 
was higher than the just-calculated certainty equivalent.  This provided a check to ensure 
that subjects were answering according to their preferences (i.e. were answering 
consistently).  If they did not choose the certain value on the catch trial, the certainty 
equivalent for that specific risky magnitude reward was determined again (i.e. the six trial 
procedure and check was repeated).  After answering consistently, or after completing the 
indifference point procedure three times, participants then performed the indifference 
point procedure for the next probability-magnitude pair.  If participants answered 
inconsistently for three indifference point procedures in a row for a given probability-
magnitude pair, they were excluded.   
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Figure 9: Trial Structure of the Risky Choice task
*
.  A. Decision Phase.  Following 500 ms of 
fixation, two different money/probability pairs were presented on a computer screen (side 
randomized).  The pairs always consisted of a smaller amount of money to be gained with 100% 
probability (written as “For Sure”) and a larger amount of money to be gained with either 70% or 
90% probability.  The words “Today” indicated that subjects were making choices for options to 
be paid that day.  Subjects decided which money/probability pair they would prefer by pressing 
the “z” or “m” key and had up to 6500 ms to respond.  B. Post Choice Phase.  Immediately after 
responding, the triangle under the subject’s choice turned red and the other triangle disappeared 
to indicate subjects’ choice; this was displayed for 250 ms.  If subjects did not respond, this post 
choice phase was skipped, and the next trial began after 6500 ms. (* The timing and display of 
items in the Indifference Point Task were identical to those of items in the Risky Choice Task 
except there was no time limit for response). 
 
     
Subjects whose certainty equivalents indicated they were risk-seeking were 
excluded from further sessions (i.e. they were excluded if any certainty equivalent was 
greater than the expected value of the paired risky option).  Additionally, subjects were 
excluded if any certainty equivalent was smaller than 10 cents.  This was done to ensure 
that there would be an adequate range of values below each subject’s certainty 
equivalents to create choice stimuli for further sessions.  
 At the end of session one, one random trial was selected for payout.  Subjects then 
received the amount of money associated with their choice on that trial.  However, if the 
chosen option was for a risky selection, subjects rolled a 10 sided die to determine 
whether they would be paid.  If they rolled a number less than or equal to the tens digit of 
D 
A B 
126 
 
the probability listed on that trial (i.e. less than 7 for 70%), then they were paid the 
chosen amount. 
 
Sessions Two and Three 
Participants that met eligibility requirements after session one were equally 
divided into 2 groups of 15 subjects.  Group one received rTMS to the left DLPFC in one 
session and to the right DLPFC in a separate session (with counterbalanced ordering).  
Group two received sham rTMS to the same areas as group one (half left DLPFC 
first/half right DLPFC first).  Each of the two groups had the same gender distribution (8 
Males and 7 females).  Except for the different brain regions stimulated across sessions, 
procedures in sessions 2 and 3 were identical.  
Prior to receiving rTMS, participants performed shortened practice versions of the 
tasks, in order to make sure they understood the tasks.  Subjects were told that one choice 
from the tasks performed after stimulation would be randomly selected for payment at the 
end of each session, and that they would receive that payment with the associated 
probability.      
 After completing the practice tasks, participants received real or sham rTMS 
stimulation for 30 minutes to either the left DLPFC or right DLPFC (details outlined 
under TMS Methods section).  
Risky Choice Task 
Immediately following completion of stimulation, participants completed a risky 
choice task on a computer.  On each trial, participants made a choice between a certain 
monetary gain and a risky monetary gain of potentially larger magnitude (See Figure 9).   
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 The values of the risky options were the same as in session 1 ($2.50, $5.00, $7.50, 
and $10.00).  Half of the risky options were available with 70% probability and half were 
available with 90% probability.  The magnitude of each certain option was calculated as a 
specific percentage difference from that subject’s session one certainty equivalent for the 
risky option on that trial.  This allowed us to vary the subjective value of each certain 
option (as revealed in session one) relative to the associated risky option, which let us 
predict which option an individual should choose on each trial (See Table 8).  There were 
72 of these trials on the Risky Choice Task.   
There were also 40 additional trials on the Risky Choice Task with different 
stimulus properties than those just discussed.  On 8 of the additional trials, the risky 
option had an equal expected value to that of the certain option, and on the other 32 
additional trials, the risky option had a lower expected value than did the certain option.  
On trials with two options of equal expected value, the mean proportion of choices for the 
risky option were .283 (SD = .260) for the real rTMS group and .130 (SD = .193) for the 
sham rTMS group.  On trials that contained a risky option that had a lower expected 
value than the certain option, the mean proportion of choices for the risky option were 
.138 (SD = .153) for the real rTMS group and .075 (SD = .122) for the sham rTMS 
group.  These additional trials are not discussed further, as they were not created to test 
our primary hypotheses.  
Indifference Point Task 
After completing all of the aforementioned trials, subjects were given the identical 
indifference point procedure as in session one.  However, this time the iterative procedure 
was only done to calculate the certainty equivalent for risky values twice, first for a 
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$10.00 gain available with 70% probability and then for a $10.00 gain available with 
90% probability.  Additionally, no consistency checks were performed in order to limit 
the time to complete the task.  Collecting subject indifference points post-stimulation 
provided an added check of whether real rTMS to the DLPFC increased risk seeking.   
 
Table 8: Certain Values for Different Trials in the Risky Choice Task. 
Certain Relative Value Total Description 
1. Certain Subjective 
Value Lower than 
Risky Subjective 
Value 
32 Magnitude of certain option is below certainty 
equivalent (i.e. certain value at indifference 
point).  There were 4 different percent distances 
below the certainty equivalent (-10%, -20%, -
35%, and -50%).  Subjects who receive sham 
stimulation should choose the risky option.      
2. Certain Subjective 
Value Equal to Risky 
Subjective Value 
8 Magnitude of certain option is equal to certainty 
equivalent (i.e. percent distance equal 0%).  
Neither certain nor risky choice is predicted for 
the sham group.    
3. Certain Subjective 
Value Higher than 
Risky Subjective 
Value 
32 Magnitude of certain option is above certainty 
equivalent.  There were 4 different percent 
distances above the certainty equivalent (10%, 
20%, 35%, and 50%).  Subjects who receive sham 
stimulation should choose the certain option.      
Each 70% and each 90% risky option magnitude was shown nine times.  Each risky 
option was paired once with a certain option located at each of the 9 percent distances 
from the certainty equivalent of the risky value.  Values at negative distances were taken 
as a function of the percentage difference between the certainty equivalent and zero.  A    
-35% distance indicated that the certain value was 35% less than the certainty equivalent.  
Thus if the certainty equivalent of a $2.50 risky option available with 70% probability 
was $1.50, the certain value was $.98 (i.e. 1.50 - .35*1.50 = .98).  Values at positive 
distances were calculated as a function of the percentage difference between the certainty 
equivalent and the risky value.  A 35% distance indicated that the certain value was 
greater than the certainty equivalent of the risky option by 35% of the distance between 
the certainty equivalent and the risky value.  Thus if the certainty equivalent of a $2.50 
risky option available with 70% probability was $1.50, the certain value was $1.85 (i.e. 
1.50 + (.35 * (2.50 -1.50)) = 1.85).     
 
 
At the end of sessions two and three, one random trial was selected for payout.  
Subjects then received the amount of money associated with their choice on that trial.  
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However, if the chosen option was for a risky selection, subjects rolled a 10 sided die to 
determine whether they would be paid.  If they rolled a number less than or equal to the 
tens digit of the probability listed on that trial (i.e. less than 7 for 70%), then they were 
paid the chosen amount. 
   
TMS Methods 
Low frequency (1 Hz) rTMS was delivered with a MagStim TMS double 70 mm 
(Figure 8) coil (Magstim, Wales, UK) at 54% power for 30 minutes.  The rTMS 
parameters used were within currently recommended guidelines (Rossi et al., 2009) and 
stimulation with these parameters leads to suppression of excitability in the targeted 
region for a period of time following stimulation (Robertson et al., 2003).  We note that 1 
Hz rTMS applied to the DLPFC at 54% power has previously led to altered decision 
making following stimulation (Figner et al., 2010).  Sham stimulation was delivered with 
a MagStim placebo coil, which produced clicks that resembled the sound of rTMS, but 
without a magnetic pulse.  Given the potential for subjects to identify whether they 
received sham or real stimulation, it was prudent for subjects to receive only one of these 
types of stimulation.  Subjects were blind to the type of stimulation (e.g. sham vs. real) 
they received. 
Positioning of the TMS coil was accomplished by using the 10-20 EEG System, 
which has previously been used to deliver TMS to identified brain regions with 
reasonable structural accuracy (Herwig et al., 2003).  This method was used to ensure 
proper positioning of the coil over the DLPFC (BA 46/9).  Specifically, to localize the 
DLPFC, the center of the coil was held tangentially to the participant’s head with the 
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handle pointing caudally, and placed one cm antero-lateral to F3/F4 which has been 
suggested to provide better coverage over BA 9/46 than do the points F3/F4 (Herwig et 
al., 2003).  These specific points for stimulation were marked on a lycra swimcap that 
subjects wore; the position of the swimcap was placed in a consistent position on the 
head across subjects, by using the nasion, inion, and preauricular points as physical 
landmarks for placement.  During stimulation, all participants wore earplugs as protection 
against the noise of the rTMS clicking.  Participants maintained their head position 
during rTMS administration using a chin/head rest and were visually monitored to ensure 
that no movement had occurred.  In cases where a participant moved their head, the coil 
was immediately repositioned over the target.   
 All individuals received either real or sham rTMS to the left or right DLPFC in 
session two for 30 minutes and the same type of stimulation to the DLPFC on the 
contralateral side for 30 minutes in session three.  The order of stimulating the two sides 
of the DLPFC was counterbalanced across subjects in each group.  We used an “offline” 
rTMS paradigm; subjects completed tasks after stimulation was completed.  Since 
impairments in behavior following low frequency rTMS have been shown to last for half 
the time of the previous stimulation (Mottaghy, Gangitano et al., 2002), the tasks 
following rTMS were limited to the first 15 minutes post-stimulation.   
 
Statistical Analysis Methods 
 Using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL), data were analyzed with 
Generalized Estimating equations (GEE) which allow one to model effects while 
accounting for correlations within observations of individual subjects (Liang & Zeger, 
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1986).  All models contained an intercept term and an unstructured working correlation 
matrix.   
In order to examine whether subjects chose differently under conditions of 
differing risk, separate within-subject GEE models with a logit link function and 
binomial distribution were created for subjects who received real stimulation and for 
subjects who received sham stimulation.  These models were created to predict choice of 
a risky option (0 = Chose Certain, 1 = Chose Risky) at the trial level on the Risky Choice 
Task.  Independent variables in both models were Probability of the risky option (0 = 
70%, 1 = 90%), Certain Relative Value (i.e. percent distance of the certain option from 
the certainty equivalent of the risky option, which ranged from -50% to 50%), and 
Session Number (0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).   
We also used GEE models with a logit link function and binomial distribution to 
see how choice of risky options that had a specific probability of reward were affected by 
stimulation type and stimulation side.  Separate models were created to predict choice of 
the risky option on 70% risky probability trials and 90% risky probability trials.  In order 
to test the effects of real stimulation relative to sham, separate GEE models were created 
for responses following stimulation to each hemisphere (i.e. left DLPFC, right DLPFC).  
Independent variables in all models included Stimulation Type (0 = Sham rTMS, 1 = 
Real rTMS), Certain Relative Value, and Session Number.  Additionally, we included the 
interaction of Certain Relative Value by Stimulation Type if it was significant (p < .05).  
To examine within subject differences in the real rTMS group, we created similar GEE 
models, except the within subject variable Side (0 = Left, 1 = Right) was used instead of 
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the between subject variable Stimulation Type; the interaction of Side by Certain Relative 
Value was only included if significant.   
 To predict reaction time on trials of the Risky Choice Task (measured in 
milliseconds (ms)), we also created separate GEE models for 70% risky probability trials 
and 90% risky probability trials.  These models contained an identity link function and 
normal distribution.  Between subject models (each limited to one hemisphere) and 
within subjects models included the same independent variables as the choice models, 
plus one additional variable: Certain Relative Value
2
 (i.e. Certain Relative Value 
squared).  No interactions were included in the models. 
 To predict effects of real relative to sham stimulation on certainty equivalents 
measured in the indifference point procedure, we utilized the Generalized Linear Model 
function in PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) with an identity link function 
and normal distribution.  Each model examined the effects of stimulation in one 
hemisphere for either 70% risky probability or 90% risky probability certainty 
equivalents and contained the following predictors: Stimulation Type, Session Number, 
and Session 1 Certainty Equivalent.  This last variable was included as a covariate 
because certain values at the indifference point (i.e. certainty equivalents) following 
stimulation should be related to subject’s initial pre-rTMS (i.e. Session 1) values, and 
thus significant effects of Stimulation Type might not emerge without controlling for this 
variable.  To predict certainty equivalents across region for subjects who received real 
rTMS, we used GEE models with an identity link function and normal distribution that 
included Side (-1 = neither (i.e. for Session 1), 0 = Left DLPFC, 1 = Right DLPFC) and 
Session Number (-1 = Session 1, 0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3) as predictors.  Separate 
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models were created for 70% risky probability and 90% risky probability certainty 
equivalents.  
  
Results 
 
Session One Indifference Points 
 Using independent sample t-tests, we compared mean certainty equivalents 
measured in session 1 on the Indifference Point Task for individuals in the real rTMS 
group with individuals in the sham rTMS group.  This was done to ensure that session 1 
risk preferences across stimulation groups were not different.  Eight t-tests were 
performed in all; each t-test compared mean certainty equivalents across stimulation 
groups for one of the eight types of risky gains (i.e. 4 magnitudes of risky gains available 
with 70% probability and 4 magnitudes of risky gains available with 90% probability).  
There were no significant differences in mean session 1 certainty equivalents between 
real and sham rTMS groups.  Importantly, these results reveal that prior to receiving 
rTMS (i.e. in session 1), mean levels of probability discounting were similar across real 
and matched sham rTMS groups.  For mean session 1 certainty equivalents, see Table 9. 
 
Effects of Risk Level on Choice 
For descriptive statistics of overall mean proportion of choices for risky options 
following each type of stimulation to each side of the DLPFC, see Table 10.   
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Table 9: Mean Session One Certainty Equivalents in the Indifference Point Task. 
 Real rTMS Sham rTMS  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
$2.50 with 70%  1.275 (.494) 1.375 (.394) 
$5.00 with 70% 2.597 (.904) 2.715 (.992) 
$7.50 with 70% 3.892 (1.352) 3.692 (1.447) 
$10.00 with 70% 4.963 (1.792) 4.987 (2.032) 
$2.50 with 90% 1.907 (.477) 1.818 (.451) 
$5.00 with 90% 3.511 (1.190) 3.610 (.974) 
$7.50 with 90% 5.139 (1.906) 5.224 (1.513) 
$10.00 with 90% 6.686 (2.429) 7.350 (1.842) 
Mean session 1 certainty equivalents for specific magnitudes of risky gains available with 
70% or 90% probability (listed in left column).  Averages are constructed separately for 
subjects in the real and sham rTMS groups (listed in column titles).  
 
 
Table 10: Mean Choice of Risky Options in the Risky Choice Task. 
 Left DLPFC Right DLPFC 
 70% Probability 90% Probability 70% Probability 90% Probability 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Real  .665 (.284) .625 (.245) .601 (.265) .566 (.259) 
Sham .381 (.222) .563 (.217) .368 (.254) .504 (.226) 
Mean proportion of choices for the risky option across subjects computed for each type of 
stimulation (i.e. Real vs. Sham) to each side of the DLPFC (side listed in column title).  
Statistics are collapsed separately for trials with a different level of risk (i.e. risky option 
available with 70% Probability or 90% Probability). 
 
 
 
We first tested whether the tendency to choose the risky option was dependent 
upon the risk level (i.e. probability) of this option.  As this relationship could differ 
following disruption of the DLPFC, separate within subject models were created for 
subjects who received real and sham rTMS.  Each model predicted choice of a risky 
reward as a function of Probability of the risky option, Certain Relative Value, and 
Session Number.  For a list of model parameters, see Table 11. 
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Table 11: GEE Models for Risky Choice as a Function of the Probability of the 
Risky Option. 
 Real Within Sham Within 
 B (SE) OR B (SE) OR 
Intercept      1.079***    (.130)      2.941 -.922***   (.074)  .398 
Cert. Rel. Value                    -.028***  (.004)         .973                    -.036***   (.002)         .965        
Session      .156*      (.067)        1.168                     .194***   (.039)       1.214        
Prob.                                      -.109        (.093)          .897                      .801***   (.077)       2.228   
Models predict choice of risky option on each trial of the Risky Choice Task.  In the left 
column are model predictors.  Models listed “Real Within” and those listed “Sham 
Within” contain data from subjects who received real or sham stimulation, respectively.  
OR = Odds Ratio (e
B
). SE = Standard Error of B.  Intercept = Model Intercept.  Prob = 
Probability that risky option leads to reward (0 = 70%, 1 = 90%). Cert. Rel. Value = 
Certain Relative Value (percent distance of the certain option from certainty equivalent of 
the risky option). Session = Session Number (0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).  * p < .05; ** 
p <.01; *** p <.001.  
 
  
While the likelihood of choosing the risky option differed as a function of the risk 
level for the sham group, it did not for the real rTMS group.  Sham subjects were less 
likely to choose the risky option on trials when its probability was 70% than when it was 
90% (p < .001; see Figure 10B).  In contrast, subjects who received real rTMS chose 
similarly under different levels of risk (see Figure 10A). 
As expected, individuals in both groups were less likely to choose the risky option 
as the relative subjective value of the certain option increased.  In both GEE models, 
there was a negative effect of Certain Relative Value, such that both sham and real rTMS 
subjects were less likely to choose the risky option as the relative value of the certain 
option increased (both p <.001) (See Figure 10A & 10B).  All subsequent GEE models 
predicting choices on the Risky Choice Task showed these same effects (see Table 12).  
This demonstrates that disruption did not make participants completely insensitive to the 
relative subjective values of the two options.        
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Figure 10: Graphs for Risky Choice as a Function of the Probability of the  
Risky Option.  Probability of choosing the risky option as a function of both the relative 
value of the certain option and of the probability that the risky option led to reward (i.e. 
70% or 90%).  Numbers on x-axis are the percent distance between the certain option and 
the certainty equivalent of the risky option (i.e. x-axis represents Certain Relative Value).  
A. Compares choice for real rTMS group.  B.  Compares choice for sham group. Graphs 
show choice at average session (Session = .5).  * Paired comparison significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Additionally, there were positive effects of Session Number within both groups 
(both p <.05).  This indicates that choice of the risky option was more likely in session 3 
than in session 2 for both groups.     
Because there was a significant effect of risk level on choice in the sham group, 
all subsequent analyses limited themselves to choice on trials with a specific level of risk.  
Thus behavior on 70% risky probability trials was analyzed separately from behavior on 
90% risky probability trials. 
 
Risky Choice  
 We created separate between subject models to see how risky choice differed as a 
function of Stimulation Type, Certain Relative Value, and Session Number.  Each model 
A B 
137 
 
focused on one stimulation site (i.e. left or right DLPFC), and one probability level of the 
risky option.  For all model parameters, see Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Between and Within Subject GEE Models for Risky Choice for each 
Probability of the Risky Option.  
 70% Probability Trials 90 % Probability Trials 
 B (SE) OR B (SE) OR 
Between: Left DLPFC        
Intercept   -.596***   (.168)          .551  .025   (.128)           1.025 
StimType 1.316***   (.210)         3.729     .243   (.164)           1.275 
Cert. Rel. Value                     -.032***   (.002)           .969                   -.029*** (.002)              .971    
Session  .046   (.206)         1.047                     .500** (.162)           1.648 
StimType X Cert. Rel. 
Value 
 .013***     (.004)         1.013  ---†   
Between: Right DLPFC        
Intercept   -.761***    (.178)           .467  .246 (.154)          1.279        
StimType  .900***   (.181)          2.459            .233       (.166)          1.262 
Cert. Rel. Value                     -.023***   (.002)            .977 -.024*** (.002)            .977 
Session      .401*       (.180)         1.493     -.408* (.165)            .665 
Real Within       
Intercept  .501***    (.123)         1.650  .367*** (.095)          1.443 
Side   -.288***   (.042)           .750    -.138*** (.040)             .871 
Cert. Rel. Value                      -.020***   (.002)           .981    -.023*** (.002)             .978 
Session    .246***   (.042)         1.278                     .152*** (.039)          1.164 
Models predict choice of risky option on each trial of Risky Choice Task.  In left column 
model predictors are listed below each model (listed in Bold).  Models listed “Between”: 
contain data from subjects who received real rTMS and from subjects who received sham 
rTMS to the side of DLPFC listed after word “Between”.  Models listed “Real Within” 
contain data from subjects who received real rTMS.  OR = Odds Ratio (e
B
). SE = 
Standard Error of B.  Intercept = Model Intercept.  StimType=Stimulation Type (0 = 
Sham rTMS, 1 = Real rTMS).  Session = Session Number (0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).  
Cert. Rel. Value = Certain Relative Value (percent distance of the certain option from 
certainty equivalent of the risky option).  Side = Stimulation Side (0 = Left, 1 = Right).  
X = Predictor is interaction of two terms.  ---†= Interaction not included in model 
(models only contained interaction if it was significant at p < .05).  * p < .05; ** p <.01; 
*** p <.001.  
 
 Disruption of either side of the DLPFC increased choice of risky options on the 
higher risk trials of the task.  Choice of the risky option was greater for individuals who 
received real rTMS to the right hemisphere than for individuals who received sham 
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stimulation to the same hemisphere when the probability that the risky option led to 
reward was 70% (Odds Ratio (OR) = 2.459; p < .001) (see Figure 11C).  Similarly, on 
trials with this level of risk, choice of the risky option was greater for individuals who 
received real rTMS to the left hemisphere than for matched sham subjects.  Unlike the 
effect seen in the right hemisphere, the effect of stimulation in the left hemisphere was 
dependent on the relative value of the certain option.  Although the real rTMS group was 
more likely to choose the risky option at all relative values of the certain option following 
left hemisphere stimulation, as the relative value of the certain option increased, the 
increased tendency for the real rTMS group to choose the risky option also increased (see 
Figure 11A).  When the relative value of the certain option was at its highest (i.e. Certain 
Relative Value was 50), the effect of stimulation on risky choice in the left hemisphere 
was particularly large (OR = 7.143, p <.001). 
Unlike the effects of stimulation seen on trials when the probability of the risky 
option was 70%, when the probability of the risky option was 90%, there were no 
differences in risky choice between individuals who received real rTMS and those who 
received sham rTMS (see Figure 11B & 11D).  Thus the effects of disrupting the DLPFC 
on choice were not present on the lower risk trials of the task. 
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Figure 11: Risky Choice Graphs for each Probability of the Risky Option.  
Probability of choosing the risky option as a function of the relative value of the certain 
option.   Numbers on the x-axis are the percent distance between the certain option and 
the certainty equivalent of the risky option (i.e. x-axis represents Certain Relative Value). 
A-D: Compares choice on trials with a 70% or 90% risky option probability  (listed in 
title) between real and sham stimulation to one side of DLPFC (listed in title).  E-F. 
Compares choice on trials with a 70% or 90% risky option probability (listed in title) 
across side of stimulation for those who received real rTMS.  Graphs show choice at 
average session (Session = .5).  * Paired comparison significant at p < .05. 
B 
F 
D 
E 
C 
A 
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We also investigated whether there was greater choice of risky options following 
real rTMS delivered to one side of the DLPFC than to the other.  There was a lesser 
tendency to choose the riskier option following disruption of the right than of the left 
DLPFC both on trials where the probability of the risky option was 70% (p < .001; OR = 
.750) and on trials where the probability of the risky option was 90% (p < .001; OR = 
.871) (See Table 12 and Figure 11E & 11F).  These effects were not dependent on the 
relative value of the certain option, indicating that disruption of the left DLPFC led to a 
greater overall increase in risky choice than did disruption of the right DLPFC. 
We found different effects of Session Number on choice in left hemisphere and 
right hemisphere between subject models    Following stimulation to the left DLPFC, 
there was a positive effect of Session Number on choice of the risky option when the 
risky probability was 90% (p <.01), but no effect when it was 70%.  In contrast, 
following stimulation to the right DLPFC, there was a negative effect of Session Number 
on choice of the risky option when the risky probability was 90%, but a positive effect 
when it was 70% (both p < .05).  It is difficult to interpret how Session Number affected 
choice across all subjects, because there was no consistent effect of Session Number on 
either choice of 90% or of 70% risky rewards.  
There were, however, more interpretable effects of Session Number in within 
subject models.  Amongst individuals who received real rTMS, Session Number was 
consistently positively associated with greater choice of the risky option.  In both within 
subject models for higher risk and lower risk trials, there was a positive effect of session 
(all p <.001), such that subjects who received real rTMS were more likely to choose the 
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riskier option in session 3 than in session 2.  This reveals that individuals who received 
real rTMS exhibited greater risk seeking over time.  
We performed a supplemental analysis to see if the increased tendency to choose 
risky options on the higher risk trials following disruption of the DLPFC was dependent 
on the difficulty of the choices.  Choices should become more difficult as the subjective 
values of the two items approach each other, and disruption of the DLPFC could make it 
especially hard to avoid choosing risky options when the two items are close in subjective 
value.  To assess this, we reran our two between subject GEE models that compared 
choice between individuals in the real and sham rTMS groups for choices with risky 
options available with 70% probability, but added two terms to the models: a quadratic 
effect of Certain Relative Value and an interaction of this term with Stimulation Type.  
The quadratic effect, Certain Relative Value Squared (i.e. Certain Relative Value
2
), was 
used because the value of this term decreased as the subjective values of the two options 
approached each other.  We note that trials could also have become more difficult as the 
expected values of the two options approached each other, but given that expected values 
of the certain options differed across subjects depending on their preferences, we did not 
include a variable based upon how close the expected values were to each other.  We do 
note that many subjects were close to risk-neutral in session 1, and because of this, the 
expected values of the two options were often closest in value when the two options were 
equally subjectively valued.  Thus adding a term based on expected value would have 
exhibited substantial collinearity with the Certain Relative Value
2 
predictor.  This 
supplementary analysis revealed that there were no significant interactions between 
Certain Relative Value
2
 and Stimulation Type.  This suggests that the increased risk-
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seeking on trials with a larger amount of risk following disruption of the DLPFC was not 
dependent on the difficulty of the choices. 
 
Choice Reaction Time 
 We next tested whether reaction time was different across real rTMS and sham 
groups with GEE models to see whether changes in risky choice following disruption 
were associated with specific changes in reaction time.  We assumed that as comparisons 
and choices became more difficult, reaction time would increase.  We thus included a 
quadratic effect of Certain Relative Value, Certain Relative Value Squared (i.e. Certain 
Relative Value
2
), as a predictor in all models, because trials should become more difficult 
as the subjective value of the two options approach each other (i.e. as Certain Relative 
Value
2 
decreases).  We also included the linear effect of Certain Relative Value in all 
models, since this would ease interpretation of the quadratic effect.  For model 
parameters, see Table 13. 
 Disruption of either hemisphere led to faster responding on the Risky Choice 
Task.  Individuals who received real rTMS to the left DLPFC responded more quickly 
than individuals who received sham stimulation to the same region both on trials where 
the probability of the risky option was 70% and on trials where it was 90% (both p < 
.001).  Individuals who received real rTMS to the right DLPFC also responded more 
quickly than individuals who received sham stimulation to the same region on trials 
where the probability of the risky option was 90% (p < .01).  Additionally, there was a 
trend for individuals who received real rTMS to the right DLPFC to respond more 
quickly than the matched sham group on trials with a risky option probability of 70% (p 
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< .10).  Faster reaction times on the choice task following disruption may have been 
associated with less deliberation before responding.  They do not appear, however, to 
have been associated with a greater tendency to make risky choices.  This is because 
reaction time differences between stimulation groups emerged on all trials, while 
differences in the tendency to make risky choices were only present on trials where the 
probability of the risky option was 70%. 
 In all models but one, there was a significant negative effect of Certain Relative 
Value
2
 as expected (all p <.001).  Thus, as the subjective values of the two options 
approached each other, reaction time slowed, supporting the conjecture that difficulty 
increased as well.  It is unclear, however, why there was not a significant effect of 
Certain Relative Value
2
 on 90% risky reward trials following left hemisphere stimulation.   
There was a negative effect of Certain Relative Value on trials with a 70% 
probability following left DLPFC stimulation (p < .05), indicating that reaction time 
decreased as the value of the certain option increased.  However, since no linear trends of 
Certain Relative Value were significant in other models and there was no hypothesized 
relationship between this term and reaction time, this predictor is not further discussed. 
 We found significant effects of Session Number on choice reaction time in the left 
hemisphere between subject models, but not in the right hemisphere between subject 
models.  Individuals who received stimulation to the left DLPFC responded more quickly 
in Session 3 than in Session 2 both on trials with 70% and those with 90% risky option 
probabilities (both p < .001).   These faster reaction times may have reflected increased 
familiarity with the task.  It is surprising, however, that there were no effects of  
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Session Number on reaction time following stimulation to the right hemisphere, as the 
level of familiarity of the task should have been the same regardless of the side of 
stimulation.  One possibility is that the different effects across models were driven by 
different effects of Session Number on reaction time following real rTMS to the left and 
right DLPFC, which could have occurred if disruption of the right, but not the left 
DLPFC, interfered with learning.  A divergent effect following rTMS to each side of the 
DLPFC, however, would not have been captured by our between subject models that 
included data from both sham and real rTMS subjects, because we did not include a 
predictor in our models for the interaction of Session Number with Stimulation Type.   
 
Table 13: GEE Models for Risky Choice Reaction Time. 
 70% Probability Trials 90 % Probability Trials 
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Between: Left DLPFC      
Intercept    3263.657***  (69.485) 3128.853***  (92.375) 
StimType  -388.575***  (82.483) -348.732***   (90.935) 
Cert. Rel. Value                        -1.195*            (.489)     .660               (.577) 
Cert. Rel. Value
2
     -.093***    (.016)    -.015    (.018) 
Session -1026.217***  (82.376) -978.375***  (92.057) 
Between: Right DLPFC      
Intercept    2546.824*** (118.588) 2582.488***   (88.957) 
StimType   -235.720+ (122.148) -312.514** (101.369) 
Cert. Rel. Value                          .452                  (.572)    -.341          (.541) 
Cert. Rel. Value
2
         -.062***    (.015)    -.071***         (.013) 
Session     2.591 (121.157)     .797      (105.103) 
Models predict reaction time (ms) in Risky Choice Task.  Cert. Rel. Value
2 
= Certain 
Relative Value squared.  Other abbreviations same as in Table 12. + p <.10, * p < .05; ** 
p <.01; *** p <.001. 
 
 
To see if the divergent effects of Session Number were driven by changes 
following real rTMS, we reran all four of our between subject GEE models for reaction 
time but included the interaction of Session Number with Stimulation Type.  In no cases 
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was this interaction significant, revealing that changes in reaction time across sessions 
were not driven by changes following real rTMS.  This suggests that the effects of 
Session Number on reaction time in the left hemisphere between subject models were not 
due to familiarity with the task, as familiarity should have been the same following sham 
stimulation to either hemisphere.  
 
Indifference Points 
 As a second approach to examining changes in risky choice, we examined 
whether subject’s certainty equivalents for $10 risky gains available with 70% and 90% 
probability were affected by disruption of the left or right DLPFC.  In order to examine 
the difference in certainty equivalents following real and sham rTMS to each hemisphere, 
we used the Generalized Linear Model which included Stimulation Type, Session 
Number, and Session 1 Certainty Equivalent as predictors (See Table 14).  In all between 
subject models there was a significant effect of Session 1 Certainty Equivalent (all p < 
.001), which was expected, since certainty equivalents across time should be related. 
Consistent with the results on the Risky Choice Task, real rTMS led to a greater 
preference for risk than did sham stimulation when the probability of the risky reward 
was 70%.  Following disruption of either the left or the right DLPFC, individuals had 
higher certainty equivalents for the risky reward available with 70% probability than did 
matched sham subjects (both p < .05), revealing that they became more risk-seeking.  
However, they did not have higher certainty equivalents than the matched sham group for 
the risky reward available with 90% probability (although there was a trend for them to 
have higher certainty equivalents following disruption of the left DLPFC).  This is 
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consistent with our findings on the Risky Choice Task; disruption of either the left or the 
right DLPFC led to a greater tendency to choose the risky option than did sham 
stimulation on trials of the Risky Choice Task where the risky option led to reward with 
70% probability, but not when it led to reward with 90% probability.   
 
Table 14: Between Subject GENLIN Models for Certainty Equivalents. 
 70% Probability Trials 90 % Probability Trials 
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Between: Left DLPFC      
Intercept    .951   (.963)  3.465***  (.848) 
StimType 1.427*  (.592)   .796+  (.441) 
Session -.360   (.595)   .510   (.437) 
Session1CE  .775***  (.160)  .522***  (.105) 
Between: Right DLPFC      
Intercept    .728 (1.071) 2.154+ (1.101) 
StimType 1.349*  (.677)   .300   (.560) 
Session  .448   (.681)    -.111  (.555) 
Session1CE  .781***  (.184)   .751***  (.133) 
Models Predict Certainty Equivalents for Risky Rewards on Indifference Point Task.  
Session1CE = Session 1 Certainty Equivalent.  Other abbreviations same as in Table 12.  
* p < .05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 
 
 
 We also created within subject GEE models for subjects who received real rTMS 
to more thoroughly investigate how real rTMS affected certainty equivalents (see Table 
15).  Consistent with the between subject findings, disruption of either side of the DLPFC 
increased preference for risk when the probability of the risky reward was 70%.  
Certainty equivalents for the risky reward available with 70% probability increased 
following disruption of the left or the right DLPFC (both p < .05).  There was also some 
evidence for increased preference for risk when the probability of the risky reward was 
90%.  Certainty equivalents for the risky reward available with 90% probability were 
significantly higher than Session 1 values following disruption of the left DLPFC (p 
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<.001), and there was a trend for them to be higher following disruption of the right 
DLPFC (p < .01). 
 As a supplementary analysis, we also created within subject GEE models for 
subjects who received sham rTMS to assess the stability of certainty equivalents across 
sessions (see Table 15).  For subjects who received sham stimulation, there were no 
significant effects of Side of stimulation or of Session Number, indicating that certainty 
equivalents for individuals who did not receive real rTMS were stable over time.  
 
Table 15: Within Subject GEE Models for Certainty Equivalents. 
 70% Probability Trials 90 % Probability Trials 
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Real Within     
Intercept   4.963*** (.447)                          6.686*** (.606)          
Right Side 1.046* (.489)            .812+ (.468) 
Left Side  .847* (.400) 1.174** (.435) 
Session  .143  (.172)   .014  (.337) 
Sham Within     
Intercept   4.987*** (.507) 7.350*** (.459) 
Right Side  .180 (.452) -.297 (.395) 
Left Side -.398 (.513) -.288 (.567) 
Session -.083 (.249)  .345 (.323) 
Models Predict Certainty Equivalents for Risky Rewards on Indifference Point Task.  
Right Side = rTMS delivered to right DLPFC (predicts stimulation to right relative to 
session one baseline value).  Left Side = rTMS delivered to Left DLPFC (predicts 
stimulation to left relative to session one baseline value).  Session = Session Number (-1 
= Session 1, 0 = Session 2, 1 = Session 3).  Real within = within subject models for 
subjects who received real rTMS. Sham within = within subject models for subjects who 
received sham rTMS.  Other abbreviations same as in Table 12.  + p <.10, * p < .05; ** p 
<.01; *** p <.001. 
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Discussion 
 
 
 
We found that disruption of either the left or right DLPFC with rTMS increased 
preferences for risk on two monetary reward tasks.  On the Risky Choice Task, 
individuals who received real rTMS had a greater tendency to choose the risky option 
than did individuals who received sham rTMS when the risky option had a 70% chance 
of leading to reward, but not when it had a 90% chance.  Similarly, certainty equivalents 
for the 70% risky option as measured on the Indifference Point Task were significantly 
higher for the real rTMS group than for the sham rTMS group, while certainty 
equivalents for the 90% risky option were not significantly different across groups.  
Importantly, while subjects who received sham rTMS exhibited risk preferences on the 
Risky Choice Task that were modified by the probability level of the risky option, those 
who received real rTMS did not. 
Our data suggest that the DLPFC is involved in devaluation of rewards that are 
risky, and that the amount of devaluation is dependent upon the level of risk.  When 
functioning of the DLPFC was disrupted, individuals responded similarly on trials with 
different levels of risk.  In contrast, individuals who received sham stimulation were 
more likely to choose the risky option on trials with a lower level of risk than on trials 
with a higher level of risk, suggesting that functions of the DLPFC devalued risky 
options with a higher level of risk.  This is further supported by the between subject 
findings on the Risky Choice Task.  Individuals who received real rTMS chose more 
risky options on trials with a higher level of risk than did sham subjects, but did not 
choose more risky options on trials with a lower level of risk, suggesting that valuation of 
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only the more risky items was greater following disruption.  Together, this suggests that 
DLPFC functions alter the subjective value of options available with risk (i.e. with less 
than certain probability), and that this effect is dependent on the risk level.     
An important question is whether the DLPFC devalues all risky rewards, but 
devalues them more as the risk level increases, or only devalues risky rewards that have a 
certain level of risk.  Our data provide some support for the first possibility.  Although 
there were no significant effects of Stimulation Type on choice on the lower risk trials of 
the Risky Choice Task, there were some indications that risk preference did increase at 
this lower level of risk following real rTMS.  Certainty equivalents for the 90% risky 
reward on the Indifference Point task were higher following disruption of the left 
DLPFC, and marginally higher following disruption of the right DLPFC, than they were 
for the same individuals prior to stimulation.  Additionally, there was a trend for certainty 
equivalents for the 90% risky reward to be higher following real rTMS than following 
sham stimulation to the left DLPFC.  Together with the findings on the Risky Choice 
Task, this suggests that the DLPFC devalues risky rewards of different risk levels, but 
devalues them more as the risk level increases.   
Although we have suggested that the DLPFC devalues all risky rewards, with the 
level of devaluation increasing as the level of risk increases, the DLPFC may only 
devalue risky rewards of a certain level.  It might even overvalue risky rewards of some 
risk levels.  There is some evidence that activation in the DLPFC responds to risk in a 
nonlinear manner (Tobler et al., 2008).  Tobler and colleagues found that activation in the 
DLPFC associated with the predicted probability of reward was fit by an inverse S-
function of probability, which overweighted low probabilities and underweighted high 
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probabilities relative to a linear function.  In contrast to the response seen in the DLPFC, 
activation in the striatum scaled with risk in a linear manner.  This different pattern raises 
the possibility that compared to other regions of the brain, the DLPFC devalues risky 
rewards available with high probabilities but overvalues risky rewards available with low 
probabilities.  Would such a pattern fit with our findings?  It could if risky rewards 
available with a sufficiently high probability were not devalued, or devalued less than 
those available with a slightly lower probability.  The findings of Tobler et al. are not 
inconsistent with this possibility since the highest non-certain reward probability in their 
study was closer to that of our higher risk level (i.e. 75% in their study) than that of our 
lower risk level.  If the DLPFC does overvalue rewards available with low probabilities 
(i.e. rewards with a high level of risk), then disruption of the DLPFC might actually lead 
to greater risk aversion at high levels of risk.  To answer this question, future rTMS 
studies should parametrically vary the level of risk over a wide range of levels.   
For intertemporal choices, it has been suggested that the brain contains multiple 
valuation systems, which are differentially sensitive to immediate rewards (McClure et 
al., 2004).  Our results suggest that the brain has multiple valuation systems for choice 
involving risk as well, and that the DLPFC is part of one of these valuation systems.  Past 
neuroimaging studies have shown that activation in several regions of the brain, including 
the striatum and MPFC, scales with the subjective value of risky rewards on choice tasks 
(Levy et al., 2010; Peters & Buchel, 2009).  Given our results, activation in the DLPFC 
would be expected to scale with subjective value as well.  However, this activation might 
not be well captured by the same models that have been used to capture activation 
associated with the subjective value of risky rewards in other brain regions.  This is 
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because the DLPFC appears to ascribe a different weight to the level of risk of rewards 
than do other regions involved in valuation.  
How does the DLPFC interact with other brain areas involved in the decision 
making process?  One possibility is that risk related responses in the DLPFC could bias 
individuals towards greater risk aversion by modulating activity associated with 
subjective value in other brain regions.  There is some evidence that activity in the 
DLPFC can modulate activity related to valuation on choice tasks that do not involve 
risk.  When individuals make choices between two rewarding items, activation in the 
DLPFC is functionally connected with activation in the VMPFC, an area with activation 
that responds to the subjective value of the items on the task (Hare et al., 2009).  
However, it has not previously been investigated whether risk related responses in the 
DLPFC are functionally connected to subjective value related responses in the VMPFC 
or other regions on risky choice tasks. 
Previously, it has been suggested that disruption of the DLPFC leads to increased 
choice of risky options because it disrupts self-control processes that are used to help one 
choose the safer option (Knoch & Fehr, 2007; Knoch et al., 2006).  Self-control accounts 
of choice hold that the DLPFC, or other frontal regions, perform a cognitive control 
function during choice by helping one override, modulate, or inhibit prepotent urges that 
favor selection of superficially seductive options (Figner et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009; 
Knoch et al., 2006).  In choices involving risks, prepotent urges could favor selection of 
options that might lead to the highest possible reward, even if they are risky.  If so, then 
self-control might be needed to choose a safer option. 
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Our data, however, do not support the suggestion that the DLPFC is involved in a 
self-control function that is used to prevent risk seeking.  It could be argued that self-
control would be increasingly needed to choose the smaller certain option as the value of 
the certain option decreases with respect to that of the risky option.  This is because as the 
value of the certain option decreases, the motivational drive to choose the risky option 
should become more prepotent, and it should become harder to override this urge.  If so, 
then disruption of a region involved in self-control would be expected to lead to greater 
choice of the risky option as the value of the certain option decreases (i.e. as it becomes 
more prepotent).  Alternatively, a self-control account could predict that a region 
involved in self-control would show more involvement as the choice becomes more 
difficult, that is as the values of the two options approach each other, under the 
assumption that it should be harder to override a prepotent urge to choose the riskier, but 
potentially more rewarding option when the two options are close in subjective value.  
This idea holds that disruption of a region involved in self-control would lead to greater 
choice of risky options as the subjective values of the two options approached each other.  
Disruption of the DLPFC, however, did not lead to either of the changes in choice that 
might be expected to occur after disruption of a self-control process that helps prevent 
risk seeking.  Individuals who received real rTMS did not become increasingly more 
likely than individuals in the sham group to choose the risky option as the relative value 
of the certain option decreased.  They also did not become increasingly more likely than 
individuals in the sham group to choose the risky option as the relative subjective values 
of the two options approached each other.  Thus, the pattern of our results suggest that the 
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increased risk seeking that occurred following disruption of the DLPFC was not due to 
disrupted self-control processes. 
One difficulty in the neuromodulation literature is imprecision in the use of the 
terminology for risk.  Risk can be defined in various ways, such as the possibility of a 
loss, the magnitude of a possible loss, the probability of a non-positive outcome, or as a 
property of the spread of possible outcomes (e.g. variance or mean-preserving spread).  
These terms have been conflated in prior neuromodulation studies, making it unclear 
which of these variables is affected by disruption of DLPFC functioning (Boggio et al., 
2010; Fecteau et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2006).  Our conclusions are limited as well, in 
that the item with the greater spread of possible outcomes in our task was also always the 
least probable.  This, however, does not lessen the importance of our findings, as our 
study was designed to observe how subjective valuation of risky options changed rather 
than tease apart different risk constructs.  By only varying the probability of one option, 
we were able to see how choices between certain and risky rewards that were matched for 
subjective value were affected by disruption of the DLPFC. 
An important finding of our study is that we were able to show that risk taking 
increased following disruption of the DLPFC on a task that offered no possibility of loss.  
This reveals that the DLPFC has an important role in helping people avoid choosing risky 
options, even when options cannot lead to losses.  Given our findings that disruption of 
the DLPFC increased risk seeking for choices limited to the gain domain, an important 
future question is whether it would increase risk seeking for choices limited to the loss 
domain as well.  Compared to other regions involved in valuation, the DLPFC might 
devalue risky options in both domains, or alternatively might only devalue risky options 
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that can lead to monetary gain.  The divergent risk preferences that people exhibit in the 
gain and loss domains suggest that how the brain responds to the level of risk may differ 
when risks involve gains and when risks involve losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  This raises the possibility that the DLPFC might evaluate 
the desirability of risk differently in both domains.  
Our results reveal that disruption of either the left or the right DLPFC increases 
preference for risks, suggesting that the functions of both sides of the DLPFC bias 
individuals towards risk aversion.  Although one past study has found a similar role for 
both the left and right DLPFC in risk preferences (Boggio et al., 2010), the findings of a 
larger number of studies have suggested that the roles of the two sides of the DLPFC are 
different in risk preferences, and that only the functions of the right DLPFC bias 
individuals towards risk aversion (Fecteau et al., 2007; Gianotti et al., 2009; Knoch et al., 
2006).  While the right DLPFC may have a more central role in risk-aversion, one 
possibility is that under conditions of increased task difficulty, the left DLPFC may also 
come online to help prevent risky choices.  It may even have a larger role in risk aversion 
than the right DLPFC in more difficult conditions, as demonstrated by our within subject 
findings that individuals chose more risky options on the Risky Choice Task following 
disruption of the left than of the right DLPFC.  Our task was most likely more difficult 
than the risk task (i.e. Roger’s Risk Task) employed by Knoch and others (Boggio et al., 
2010; Fecteau et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2006; Rogers et al., 1999).  Options on the trials 
of Roger’s Risk Task that were analyzed in past neuromodulation studies had large 
differences in expected value.  While the expected value of the less risky option was 
always positive, that of the riskier option was always negative.  Because of these large 
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differences in expected value, the less risky options may have clearly dominated the 
riskier ones, making it relatively easy to make a risk-averse choice.  In contrast, on our 
risky choice task, stimulus pairs were based on participants’ pre-stimulation subjective 
valuations.  We presented two options that were often very close in previously 
established relative subjective values, and thus it may have been harder to compare the 
values of the two options and avoid choosing the risky option on our task than on Rogers’ 
Risk Task.  The hypothesis that both hemispheres of the DLPFC are necessary for risk-
aversion under more difficult situations may also help explain why Boggio and 
colleagues (2010), who focused on more elderly subjects, observed a similar role for both 
the right and left DLPFC on Roger’s Risk Task after neuromodulation.  This task may 
have been more difficult for the elderly individuals who participated in that study, than 
for the younger individuals who participated in the study by Knoch et al. (2006).  
One unanticipated finding was that sham subjects made more risk-averse choices 
on the high risk trials of the Risky Choice Task than was predicted by previously 
established subjective values.  A close look at figure 10 reveals that on trials with a lower 
amount of risk (i.e. risky probability of 90%), sham subjects chose the risky option about 
half the time when the two options had equal relative subjective values, as predicted.  
However, on trials with a higher amount of risk (i.e. risky probability of 70%), they chose 
the risky option approximately 30% of the time when the two options had equal relative 
subjective values, revealing that they were more risk-averse than predicted.  An important 
question is why sham stimulation led to greater risk-aversion than predicted by session 
one preferences, but only on trials that had a higher level of risk.  We believe this was 
likely due to the differing characteristics of our task used to elicit preferences (i.e. the 
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Indifference Point Task) and the Risky Choice Task.  This conjecture is supported by 
supplementary analyses showing that the sham group did not subjectively value risky 
rewards differently on the Indifference Point Task across sessions.   
There are several possible reasons why sham subjects were more risk averse than 
predicted on the trials of the Risky Choice Task that had a higher level of risk.  One 
possible reason preferences changed is that cross session behavior differed across tasks 
due to a framing effect.  While the Indifference Point Task presented all trials with one 
level of risk before presenting trials with the other level of risk, the Risky Choice Task 
randomly mixed trials with different levels of risk.  Individuals may have been more risk 
averse when confronted with a risky option that led to reward with a 70% probability on 
the Risky Choice Task because it seemed relatively riskier when it was mixed with less 
risky trials than when it was not mixed with them.  Another possible reason why subjects 
exhibited more risk aversion on the Risky Choice Task than on the Indifference Point 
Task is because the former task had a time limit while the latter did not.  Prior research 
has shown that individuals are more risk averse when they have less time to respond (Ben 
Zur & Breznitz, 1981).  However, this does not explain why sham subjects only exhibited 
more risk aversion on the trials with a higher level of risk, unless the effect of response 
time only occurs at certain levels of risk. Future research investigating this can help 
resolve this issue. A third possibility is that preferences are less stable when there is a 
higher level of risk than a lower level of risk.  This possibility does not seem very 
convincing, however, because preferences on the Indifference Point Task for sham 
subjects did not change across sessions.  Certainty equivalents for sham subjects were no 
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less stable for the risky reward available with 70% probability than for the one available 
with 90% probability.   
Although the preference shifts seen for the sham group on the Risky Choice Task 
make it difficult to determine how much preferences for risk shifted on the task following 
real rTMS, data from the Indifference Point Task provide direct evidence that disruption 
of the DLPFC increased risk seeking above baseline levels.  Between subject analyses on 
this task showed that individuals had a greater preference for risk, as demonstrated by 
higher certainty equivalents for the risky reward available with 70% probability 
following real than following sham rTMS.  This directly indicates that individuals 
became more risk seeking following real rTMS, because those in the sham group did not 
have different certainty equivalents across sessions.  Within subject analyses for those 
who received real rTMS provide even more direct evidence that subjects’ preferences for 
risk were greater following disruption of the DLPFC than they were prior to disruption.  
Certainty equivalents for the risky reward available with 70% probability were greater 
following disruption of the left or the right DLPFC than they were for the same subjects 
in session one (i.e. disruption led to greater preference for risk).  There was also some 
evidence that disruption led to a greater preference for risk for the risky reward available 
with 90% probability.  Certainty equivalents were significantly higher following 
disruption of the left DLPFC and there was a trend for them to be higher following 
disruption of the right DLPFC than they were for the same subjects in session one.   
 We found some evidence that following disruption of the left, but not the right 
DLPFC, subjects were less sensitive to the relative subjective values of the two items.  
The slope of the choice curve that predicted whether subjects chose the risky option on 
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the higher risk trials of the Risky Choice Task was shallower for those who had real 
rTMS to the left DLPFC than for those who had sham rTMS to this region, indicating 
that disruption led to choice patterns that were less dependent on the relative subjective 
values of the options.  Other results, however, indicate that even following disruption of 
the left DLPFC, subjects were not completely insensitive to the relative subjective values 
of the two options.  Following disruption of either side of the DLPFC, individuals were 
less likely to choose the risky reward with a 70% probability and less likely to choose the 
risky reward with a 90% probability as the relative value of the certain option increased.   
Subjects who received real rTMS had faster reaction times on the Risky Choice 
Task than did subjects who received sham stimulation.  Disruption of either the left or the 
right DLPFC may have been associated with decreased reaction time because subjects 
deliberated less prior to making a choice.  One could imagine that less deliberation might 
be associated with greater choice of potentially larger risky options if individuals spend 
less time focusing on the relative risk levels of the two options before making a decision.  
Unlike changes in choice on the Risky Choice Task following real rTMS, however, 
speeded reaction time occurred following real rTMS both for trials with a 70% risky 
reward and for trials with a 90% risky reward.  This divergent pattern of results across 
analyses reveals that differences in the amount of time spent deliberating over the options 
cannot fully account for the differences in choice between groups.   
 In conclusion, our findings extend those of prior neuromodulation studies by 
showing that the precise changes in risk taking that occur following disruption of the 
DLPFC depend on the level of risk.  We found that disruption of activity in either side of 
the DLPFC with low frequency rTMS led to significantly greater choice of risky options 
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than did sham stimulation on trials with a higher level of risk, but not on trials with a 
lower level of risk, on a task that offered no possibility of monetary loss.  This difference 
was largely due to a relative insensitivity to different levels of risk following disruption.  
Importantly, our results suggest that both sides of the DLPFC devalue some risky rewards 
more than do other regions of the brain involved in valuation.  Whether the DLPFC 
solely devalues risky rewards more than other regions, or devalues risky rewards of some 
levels of risk and values risky rewards of other levels of risk more than other regions is 
an important question for future research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
  
EXPERIMENT 3 – INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN  
DELAY AND PROBABILITY DISCOUNTING AND IN IMPULSIVITY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The subjective values of delayed monetary gains and losses are discounted with 
respect to those of immediate incentives.  Intertemporal choice research has shown that 
the rate of delay discounting for both delayed gains and losses can be modeled by a 
hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic curve (Estle et al., 2006; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; 
Madden et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2001; Myerson & Green, 1995; Rachlin et al., 1991).  
Hyperbolic delay discounting is expressed with the following equation (Mazur, 1987): 
                                  V = A/(1+KD) .      (Equation 1) 
In this equation, the discounted value (V) of a delayed monetary incentive (i.e. 
gain or loss) is a function of the objective amount of the incentive (A), the delay to 
receiving (or paying) the incentive (D), and the individual’s discount rate (K).  The 
amount of discounting across individuals is variable, and is captured by the discount rate 
parameter.  Higher rates of delay discounting indicate that the individual places greater 
weight on the monetary value of immediate relative to delayed incentives.  An 
individual’s discount rate, K, may differ for monetary gains of different magnitudes, and 
for gains and losses.  In fact, individuals tend to discount delayed monetary gains more 
than delayed monetary losses (Baker et al., 2003; Benzion et al., 1989; Estle et al., 2006; 
Frederick et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2001).  
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Empirical data reveal that individuals discount the value of risky monetary 
rewards (i.e. available with less than 100% probability) relative to certain rewards in a 
similar manner to how they discount delayed rewards relative to immediate ones.  When 
probability is converted to odds against reward, the subjective value of a risky reward 
decreases as odds against reward increases, and this decrement in value can be modeled 
by a hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic curve (Myerson et al., 2003; Rachlin et al., 1991).  
Hyperbolic probability discounting is expressed with the following equation (Rachlin et 
al., 1991):   
                                  V = A/(1+HO) .                            (Equation 2) 
  The discounted value of a risky monetary gain (V) is a function of the objective 
amount of the gain (A), the probability discount rate (H), and the odds against receiving 
the gain (O, where O = (1/probability of reward) – 1).  As with delay discounting, 
individuals differ in their rates of probability discounting (H), and higher rates of 
discounting reveal that a person places greater weight on the monetary value of certain 
relative to risky incentives.  
Given the individual differences seen in both forms of discounting, it is 
worthwhile to search for personality traits that may be related to discounting of different 
types of incentives.  Since delay discounting of monetary gains involves a preference for 
immediate over delayed rewards, a logical place to look for relationships are self-report 
measures of impulsivity.  Impulsive behavior can be defined as the tendencies to give 
into urges and to respond quickly without planning (Buss & Plomin, 1975).  Both of 
these traits could be related to delay discounting, since a person may choose immediate 
rewards over larger delayed alternatives either because they cannot override urges to 
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choose immediate options or because they respond without thinking of the long-term 
consequences of their choices.  Impulsivity could similarly be related to delay 
discounting of monetary losses, since individuals may prefer larger delayed losses over 
smaller immediate ones either because of a lack of planning or because of a failure to 
override urges that encourage avoidance of immediate losses.  
Although the tendency to discount risky incentives relative to certain incentives of 
the same magnitude is not commonly thought of as impulsive behavior, the positive 
correlations that have been observed between discounting of delayed and risky rewards 
suggests that a similar process may underlie both types of discounting (Mitchell, 1999; 
Myerson et al., 2003; Richards et al., 1999).  Other evidence suggesting a common 
process are fMRI findings that the subjective value of both delayed and risky rewards 
during choice tasks are positively associated with brain activation in similar brain 
regions, including the MPFC and striatum (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Peters & Buchel, 
2009, 2010).  These similarities raise the possibility that both probability discounting and 
delay discounting have a similar relationship to an impulsivity trait.  Alternatively, these 
similarities may reflect something other than impulsivity.  In fact, both types of 
discounting might actually be expected to have divergent relationships with an 
impulsivity trait.  This is because in the domain of risk, an individual who is highly 
impulsive might have a tendency to take risks.  Such an individual could exhibit low 
levels of probability discounting   If so, then high levels of an impulsivity trait could be 
related to both low levels of probability discounting and high levels of delay discounting.  
To date, a large number of studies have examined the relationship between delay 
discounting of monetary gains and impulsivity.  Many of these studies have found 
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positive correlations between measures of impulsivity, such as the Eysenck Impulsivity 
Scale (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsop, 1985), Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978), or Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS:  Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995), and levels of delay discounting (Kirby et al., 1999; Madden et al., 1997; 
Mitchell et al., 2005; Petry, 2001, 2002; Reynolds, Richards et al., 2006).  In contrast, a 
study that has investigated the relationship between probability discounting of monetary 
gains and impulsivity found a negative correlation (Mitchell, 1999).  The findings from 
these studies suggest that delay discounting and probability discounting of gains may 
have divergent relationships with impulsivity.  However, support for this hypothesis is 
limited because of the pattern of findings in the Mitchell (1999) study.  First, the study 
used more than one impulsivity measure, and the two types of discounting (probability 
and delay) were not significantly correlated with the same measure.  Second, correlations 
between delay discounting and impulsivity were negative, contrary to the findings of 
other studies.  Furthermore, in one of the largest studies that investigated the relationship 
between impulsivity and delay discounting, no significant correlations were found 
(Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).   
One possible reason for the inconsistencies across studies is that many of the 
studies have used relatively small sample sizes on the order of 30 to 50 people.  This is a 
hindrance because studies with small samples are more likely to have results that are 
driven by outliers, and thus may find relationships that are very different from those in 
the population. Another possible reason is that impulsivity is not a unitary construct, and 
different measures of impulsivity, such as the BIS and Eysenck Impulsivity Scale, may 
not in fact be measuring the same underlying trait.   
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In order to better understand the relationships between impulsivity and different 
types of discounting, it would be helpful to observe how different facets of impulsivity 
that are common across measures of impulsivity are related to delay and probability 
discounting.  One existing impulsivity scale that fits this description is the UPPS 
Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  Items on the UPPS were selected 
by performing an exploratory factor analysis on a number of existing personality scales, 
including impulsivity measures that have shown significant relationships with monetary 
discounting (e.g. BIS, Eysenck Impulsivity Scale).  Items that had high loadings on 
specific factors were used to construct subscales for different facets of impulsivity.  The 
UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale measures four facets of impulsivity: Negative Urgency, 
Lack of Premeditation, Lack of Perseverance, and Sensation Seeking.  A revised version 
of the scale (UPPS-P) adds a fifth facet: Positive Urgency.  This fifth facet captures the 
tendency to engage in impulsive actions when in a positive mood (Cyders & Smith, 
2007).  Prior research reveals that the level of delay discounting of monetary gains is 
positively correlated with impulsivity on the Lack of Premeditation facet of the UPPS 
(Lynam & Miller, 2004), but as no studies have utilized the UPPS-P, it is unclear if delay 
discounting is related to Positive Urgency.  Additionally, no studies have looked at how 
levels of probability discounting of gains are related to scores on any of the UPPS-P 
facets.  This is a critical comparison which will help uncover whether similar impulsivity 
traits have divergent relationships with probability and delay discounting.   
As prior studies have also not investigated the relationships between delay 
discounting of losses and facets of the UPPS-P, another important question is whether 
delay discounting of gains and losses are both related to a similar facet of impulsivity on 
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this measure.  The positive correlations that have been observed between both types of 
discounting (Murphy et al., 2001) suggest that a similar process underlies delay 
discounting of gains and losses.  If so, then it might be expected that delay discounting of 
losses would be positively associated with impulsivity, since delay discounting of gains 
often shows this relationship with impulsivity.  However, there has been very little 
research on the relationship between delay discounting of losses and impulsivity.  
Ostaszewski & Karzel (2005) divided subjects up into three groups depending on their 
levels of impulsivity on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck, Eysenck, & 
Barrett, 1985), and found that those who had the lowest impulsivity scores discounted the 
value of delayed losses more than those who were the most impulsive.  A limitation of 
this study is that they did not look at the relationship for the full range of individuals in 
their sample.  To date, no single study has investigated the relationships between 
impulsivity and both delay discounting of gains and of losses.  One might expect that the 
Lack of Premeditation facet on the UPPS-P would be positively correlated with levels of 
both types of delay discounting.  Individuals who discount the value of both delayed 
gains and losses more than others might do so because they spend less time thinking 
about the long-term value of options before making choices.  
 The current study was designed to investigate the relationships between different 
facets of impulsivity on the UPPS-P and different types of discounting (delay discounting 
of gains, delay discounting of losses, and probability discounting of gains) in the same 
subjects.  It was predicted that the Lack of Premeditation facet of the UPPS-P would be 
positively correlated with levels of delay discounting of gains and losses, but negatively 
correlated with levels of probability discounting of gains.  As lack of consensus seen in 
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the literature may be due to previous studies utilizing small sample sizes, we utilized a 
larger sample than is typical, with only one previous study using a sample of similar size 
(Lynam & Miller, 2004).  This gave us sufficient power to uncover relationships between 
impulsivity and discounting.  It also gave us sufficient power for our secondary aim: to 
look at relationships between all three types of discounting.  Understanding the 
relationships between the tendencies to discount incentives in different domains is 
important, because it can help reveal whether shared mechanisms underlie different types 
of discounting.   
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 225 right-handed individuals (45.78% female) between the ages of 18 and 30 (M 
Age = 21.13, SD = 2.87) from Vanderbilt University and the Nashville community 
participated in this study.  All of these participants reported having no history of 
neurological or psychiatric problems, and no females reported being currently pregnant.  
Specifically, these individuals were consented to participate in either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2 of this dissertation.  For numbers consented in each study please see 
Chapters II and III.  Note that some individuals were consented in both Experiments 1 
and 2 because their session 1 data made them ineligible for one study but not ineligible 
for the other (these subjects only completed session 1 once).  The study outlined in this 
chapter is based on session 1 data from all subjects consented in Experiment 1 or 2.  All 
of the procedures in session 1, but the prescreening procedures, were identical in 
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Experiments 1 and 2.  Additional procedures not mentioned in the preceding two chapters 
are mentioned in this chapter, as they were not pertinent to the hypotheses of the other 
experiments but are pertinent to those of the experiment outlined here.  
26 additional subjects were consented but excluded or withdrew.  Reasons 
subjects were excluded included no loss discounting as revealed on the loss discounting 
prescreen (for approximately 20 subjects this was given following consent), having 
previously received Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), risk factors that could 
increase the chances of having negative effects from TMS (e.g. neurological conditions), 
and experimenter error.  All participants completed written informed consent approved 
by the Vanderbilt IRB.       
   
Indifference Point Procedure 
 Subjects received one of two questionnaires prior to consent depending on 
whether they were initially consented in Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 (144 subjects 
were consented in Experiment 1 and 81 subjects were consented in Experiment 2).  The 
questionnaire for Experiment 1 assessed delay discounting of monetary losses, while the 
questionnaire for Experiment 2 assessed risk preferences for monetary gains. For details 
on these prescreens see methods of experiments in Chapters II and III.  Subjects 
consented in Experiment 1 were excluded if the delay discounting prescreen indicated 
they did not discount the value of delayed monetary losses, while those consented in 
Experiment 2 were excluded if the risk prescreen indicated they were risk seeking.  
 Following consent, we determined subject indifference points between immediate 
and delayed monetary rewards.  To do so, subjects completed a task on a computer in 
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which we determined 12 immediate equivalents (i.e. dollar amount of an immediate 
monetary reward that person values equally to a delayed monetary reward)) for 4 
different delayed monetary gains ($2.50, $5.00, $7.50, and $10.00) available at three 
different time points in the future (2 weeks, 4 weeks, 8 weeks).  The order of determining 
immediate equivalents was from low to high magnitudes, and from nearer to farther time 
points in the future (i.e. order was $2.00 available in 2 weeks, $2 available in 4 weeks, $2 
available in 8 weeks, … $10 available in 8 weeks).  Subjects were told that they would 
receive the amount of money for one random choice at the time associated with the 
choice.  For timing of one trial of this task and presentation of items, see Figure 12. 
 
           
Figure 12: Trial Structure of the Indifference Point Task*.  A. Decision Phase.  Following 
500 ms of fixation, two different options were presented on a computer screen (side randomized).  
Each option had an associated probability (i.e. 70%, 90% or 100%, the latter labeled “For Sure”), 
valence (i.e. Gain or Loss), amount, and time.  The figure above depicts a trial of the Indifference 
Point task for risky gains.  For this task, only the probability and amounts varied across trials.  
The word “Today” indicated that subjects were making choices for options to be paid that day.  
Subjects decided which option they would prefer by pressing the “z” or “m” key and there was no 
time limit to respond.  B. Post Choice Phase.  Immediately after responding, the triangle under the 
subject’s choice turned red and the other triangle disappeared to indicate the subject’s choice; this 
was displayed for 250 ms.  For the example given above, the value of the certain option would be 
increased on the following trial, since the risky option was just chosen. (*Example shows the 
indifference point task for risky rewards.  Trial structure of the indifference point task for delayed 
incentives was the same, except that time, rather than probability, was varied across trials.) 
 
     
A B 
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To determine each immediate equivalent, participants were presented with an 
initial trial in which they made a choice between a delayed monetary gain and an 
immediate gain of half the value of the delayed option.  If participants chose the delayed 
option, the value of the immediate option increased by half, and if they chose the 
immediate option it decreased by half.  On the next trial, the immediate value changed in 
a similar way as in the previous trial but only by one quarter of the original value.  Over 
six trials, the immediate value increased or decreased by progressively smaller amounts 
(i.e. by 1/(2^x) where x was trial number) depending on participant responses so that the 
subjective value of the immediate amount would iteratively approach that of the delayed 
amount.  After the sixth trial, a final catch trial was presented in which the immediate 
value was higher than the just-calculated immediate equivalent.  This provided a check to 
ensure that subjects were answering according to their preferences (i.e. were answering 
consistently).  If they did not choose the immediate value on the catch trial, the 
immediate equivalent for that specific delayed magnitude reward was determined again 
(i.e. the six trial procedure and check was repeated).  After answering consistently, or 
after completing the indifference point procedure three times, participants then performed 
the indifference point procedure for the next delay-magnitude pair.  
Following the indifference point procedure for delayed monetary gains, 
participants performed the same indifference point procedure for delayed monetary 
losses.  For the delayed loss procedure, the same times and magnitudes of delayed 
incentives were used as were used for the delayed gains task, except now subjects chose 
which of the two values they preferred to lose.  They were told that they would have to 
pay the amount of money for one random choice at the time associated with the choice.   
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Subjects next performed another indifference point procedure, in which they 
made choices between certain and risky monetary rewards.  The risky rewards offered a 
reward with a probability of 50%, 70%, or 90%, and offered no reward with the opposing 
probability (i.e. 100 - probability).  We determined certainty equivalents (i.e. dollar 
amount of a certain monetary reward that the person values equally to a risky monetary 
reward) for 12 different risky monetary gains: 4 different magnitudes (i.e. same as those 
used for delayed rewards) available with one of three probabilities (i.e. 50%, 70%, or 
90%).  The order of determining certainty equivalents was from low to high magnitudes, 
and from lower to higher probability (i.e. order was $2.50 with 50%, $2.50 with 70%.... 
$10 with 90%).  Subjects were told that one of their choices would randomly be selected 
for payment.  If the selected choice was certain, they would definitely receive the money, 
but if it was risky, they would have a chance to receive it (associated with the probability 
of the option).  On the first trial of this task, individuals were presented with a choice 
between a risky option and a certain option of half the maximum value of the risky 
option.  Other details of this task were the same as for the indifference point procedure 
for delayed incentives, except here the magnitude of the certain option was varied rather 
than that of the immediate option.  For all trials of the indifference point procedures, the 
side of the screen that each option appeared on was determined randomly.  
 At the end of the session, three random trials were selected for payment: one trial 
from the indifference point procedure for delayed gains, one trial from the indifference 
point procedure for delayed losses, and one trial from the indifference point procedure for 
risky gains.  Subjects then either received or paid (depending on trial type) the amount of 
money at the specified time associated with their choice on that trial.  However, if the 
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chosen option for the selected trial from the procedure for risky gains was a risky option, 
subjects rolled a 10 sided die to determine whether they would be paid.  If they rolled a 
number less than or equal to the tens digit of the probability listed on that trial (i.e. less 
than 7 for 70%), then they were paid the chosen amount. 
 
Impulsivity Questionnaire 
 Immediately after completing the indifference point procedure (and before being 
paid), individuals completed the UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior scale (Lynam, Smith, 
Whiteside, & Cyders, 2006).  This 59-item scale assesses five facets of impulsivity: 
Negative Urgency (NU), Lack of Perseverance (LPers), lack of Premeditation (LPrem), 
Sensation Seeking (SS), and Positive Urgency (PU).  Higher scores on each facet indicate 
more impulsivity within that domain.  On the UPPS-P, one rates on a 4-point scale how 
much they agree or disagree with a number of statements related to their own behavior.  
We computed scores for each facet by taking the mean score of all items within a facet 
(note that some items were reverse-coded). 
We had complete UPPS-P data for 88.4% of the subjects.  There were two reasons 
for missing data.  We had no UPPS-P data for one subject due to experimenter error; the 
subject was not given the questionnaire.  All other subjects with missing data were given 
the questionnaire and completed some of the items, but did not answer all of them.  If 
subjects had completed at least 70% of the items on a facet, we computed that facet score 
by replacing missing values with the average of the other scores for that subject on that 
facet.  This allowed us to compute all facet scores for all subjects for whom we had data, 
with one exception.  We did not compute one facet score (i.e. PU) for one subject who 
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had completed less than 70% of the items for that facet, as recommended in the UPPS-P 
scoring instructions.   
         
Statistical Analysis Methods 
We analyzed data with PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL).  Delay 
discount rates (k) were computed by fitting hyperbolic discount functions (Equation 1) to 
subjects’ immediate equivalents across the range of delays (measured in days) using 
nonlinear regression. Probability discount rates (h) were computed similarly by fitting 
hyperbolic discount functions (Equation 2) to subject’s certainty equivalents; in order to 
compute these discount rates, the probability that the risky option led to reward was 
converted to the odds against receiving a reward.  We note that hyperbolic discount 
functions could only be fit to a subject’s data if their immediate or certainty equivalents 
for a specific magnitude incentive varied as the delay or probability of the incentive 
changed.  For each subject, we computed eight time discount rates, one for each gain and 
loss magnitude, and four probability discount rates, one for each gain magnitude.  Higher 
k or h values indicate a greater degree of discounting.  We assessed the model fit of each 
nonlinear regression by computing Shrunken R
2
 (i.e. R
2
 = 1 – (Sum of Squared 
Error/Corrected Total Sum of Squares)).  
  
We also computed three average discount 
rates, by averaging the four magnitude-specific discount rates for each of the three types 
of discounting (delayed gain, delayed loss, and risky gain).  Average model fit scores for 
the three types of discounting were computed by averaging the four respective shrunken 
R
2
 values.   
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 We also assessed discounting using a model-free measure of discounting, area 
under the curve (AUC) (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001).  For each subject, 
we calculated the area under each of their 12 indifference curves (i.e. four delayed gain 
magnitude curves, four delayed loss magnitude curves, four risky gain magnitude 
curves).  To do so, we first normalized the subjective value of delayed or risky monetary 
gain or loss (i.e. from immediate or certainty equivalents at indifference points) and 
normalized the delay to the incentive or odds against reward, such that the undiscounted 
value of the incentive was equal to one, and the maximum delay or maximum odds 
against reward was equal to one.  By normalizing the curves, it allows the area under the 
discounting curve to vary from 0 at the low end (complete discounting) to 1 at the high 
end (no discounting), and makes the measure of AUC comparable across magnitudes.  
Thus, lower AUC values indicate a greater degree of discounting.  For further details on 
how to compute AUC, see Myerson et al. (2001).  We also computed three average AUC 
values, by averaging the four magnitude-specific AUC rates for each type of discounting 
(delayed gain, delayed loss, and risky gain).  All subsequent analyses were computed 
with AUC values rather than k or h values, because data were available for more subjects, 
and because the distribution of AUC values was much closer to a normal distribution 
(there was much less skew).  However, AUC values were still significantly non-normal 
(Shapiro-Wilk p < .05). 
Relationships between discounting and impulsivity, and relationships between 
different types of discounting were assessed with Spearman correlations (2-tailed) 
between average AUC values and each facet of impulsivity.  We assessed differences 
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between delayed gain and delayed loss discounting by computing Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests (2-tailed) for averaged AUC values.   
As a supplemental analysis, we examined the relationship between magnitude of 
incentives and discounting by using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), which 
model effects while accounting for correlations within observations of individual subjects 
(Liang & Zeger, 1986).  Using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL), we created 
GEE models with an unstructured correlation matrix and a normal distribution to predict 
averaged AUC values as a function of magnitude.  A separate GEE model was created for 
each of the three types of incentives.  
 Data involving delayed gains for a subject were not analyzed if we were missing 
any of that subject’s delayed gain immediate equivalents.  Similarly, data involving 
delayed losses and data involving risky gains were not analyzed if we did not have any of 
a subject’s delayed loss immediate equivalents or risky gain certainty equivalents, 
respectively.  This only occurred if subjects answered inconsistently 3 times in a row on 
the indifference point procedure for at least one item on that task.  In all, 13 subjects did 
not answer consistently on the delayed gain task, 9 subjects did not answer consistently 
on the delayed loss task, and 6 subjects did not answer consistently on the risky gain task.   
 
Results 
 
Levels of Discounting 
 For each subject, we calculated hyperbolic discount rates for four magnitudes of 
delayed gain, four magnitudes of delayed loss, and four magnitudes of risky gain.  In a 
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large number of cases, however, we were not able to calculate hyperbolic discount rates, 
because immediate or certainty equivalents for incentives of a specific magnitude were 
identical at all delays or probabilities of the incentive.  Three average discount rates (i.e. 
for delayed gain, delayed loss, and risky gain) were created by averaging the four 
magnitude specific discount rates for that type of discounting, and were only created for 
subjects who had calculable discount rates for all four magnitudes of that type.  For 
median values of discounting, number of subjects with calculable discount rates, and 
indices of fit for hyperbolic discount rates, see Table 16.  Because all discount rates were 
largely positively skewed, the median and the interquartile range (range) were used to 
describe the distribution of discount rates rather than the median and standard deviation.  
The median discount rates averaged across magnitudes for delayed gains, delayed losses, 
and risky gains were .030 (range = .013 - .056), .026 (range = .008 - .059), and 1.220 
(range = .903 - 1.792), respectively.  For a visual representation of median averaged 
hyperbolic discount rates and of median subjective valuation of the delayed or risky 
incentives (i.e. immediate or certainty equivalents) averaged across magnitudes, see 
Figure 13. 
While we were able to fit hyperbolic discount functions to most individuals’ risky 
gain data (N= 211), we were not able to fit hyperbolic discount functions to a large 
number of individuals’ delayed gain or delayed loss data.  Of the subjects who answered 
consistently on the task, we were only able to calculate hyperbolic discount rates for all 
magnitudes of delayed gains for 73.6% of subjects (N = 156) and for all magnitudes of 
delayed losses for 51.9% of subjects (N= 112).  This indicates that many subjects had 
immediate equivalents for delayed incentives that did not vary as a function of delay.  
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Furthermore, across subjects whose data was fit by hyperbolic delay discount functions, 
the fit was often quite poor.  Median R
2
 averaged across magnitudes for delayed gains 
and losses were .347 and -.024, respectively (See Table 16).  These poor model fits reveal 
that a number of subjects did not exhibit hyperbolic delay discounting.  This was 
especially common when delayed options were losses, consistent with past research 
showing that standard hyperbolic discounting equations provide poor fits to some 
individuals’ intertemporal choices involving losses (Murphy et al., 2001).  In contrast to 
the poor model fits to our delayed gain and loss data, risky gain data were well fit by 
hyperbolic discount functions (Median R
2
 averaged across magnitudes = .843). 
 
Table 16: Median Hyperbolic Discount Rates and Hyperbolic model fit. 
 Magnitude of Delayed or Risky Incentive 
 $2.50 $5.00 $7.50 $10.00 Average 
Delayed Gain      
Median k .032 .023 .019 .015 .030 
(range for k)          (.011 - .060) (.008 - .049) (.008 - .052) (.007 - .052) (.013 - .056) 
Median R
2
 .704 .687 .593 .783 .347 
(range for R
2
)        (.063-.817) (-.428 - .850) (-1.383 - 
.884) 
(-.574 - .922) (-2.084 - .764) 
N  187 179 173 173 156 
Delayed Loss      
Median k .022 .018  .018  .014 .026 
(range for k)          (.007 - .043) (.006 - .053) (.006 - .053) (.005 - .045) (.008 - .059) 
Median R
2
 .470  .459 .310 .591 -.024 
(range for R
2
)        (-.970 - .780) (-1.387 - 
.788) 
(-3.216 - 
.801) 
(-1.614 - 
.849) 
(-4.213 - .620) 
N  138 139 136 139 112 
Risky Gain      
Median k 1.112 1.181  1.129 1.050 1.220 
(range for k)          (.836 - 
1.821) 
(.933 - 1.983) (.831 - 1.692) (.811 - 
1.722) 
(.903 - 1.792) 
Median R
2
 .864 .848 .884 .894 .843 
(range for R
2
)        (.646 - .943) (.572 - .963) (.624 - .957) (.583 - .980) (.242 - .919) 
N  217 215 214 216 211 
Range = Interquartile range.  R
2
 = Shrunken R
2 
index of model fit (note this could be less 
than 0).  N = Number of subjects whose preferences were modeled by corresponding 
hyperbolic functions.   
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Figure 13: Median Hyperbolic Discounting of Incentives.  Curves show the immediate 
value of incentives of average magnitude as a function of delay (A-B) or show the certain 
value of rewards of average magnitude as a function of odds against reward (C).  
Hyperbolic curves in figure created from median values of the discount rate averaged 
across magnitudes.  Dots represent median values of the immediate equivalent averaged 
across magnitudes for delayed gains (A) or for delayed losses (B), or median values of 
the certainty equivalent averaged across magnitudes for risky gains (C). 
   
 
 
A B 
C 
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Because data for a large number of subjects were not adequately fit using 
hyperbolic equations, we also assessed discounting by calculating AUC (i.e. the 
normalized area under each individual’s indifference curve).  Calculating AUC allowed 
us to calculate values of discounting for all subjects, since it did not require any 
assumptions of how individuals discounted delayed or risky incentives.  We calculated 
separate AUC values for each magnitude of delayed gain, delayed loss, and risky gain, 
and calculated 3 average discount rates by averaging across magnitudes (i.e. one for each 
type of discounting).   
In contrast to hyperbolic discount rates for which greater discounting is associated 
with larger discount rate values (i.e. k or h), greater discounting as assessed using AUC is 
associated with lower AUC values.  While no discounting is associated with an AUC 
value of 1, complete discounting (i.e. immediate or certainty equivalents equal to 0) is 
associated with an AUC value of 0.  However, in the current study subjects could not 
have these extreme values.  Due to the design of our indifference point task, certainty and 
immediate equivalents always had to be less than the risky or delayed incentive they were 
associated with by one to seven cents and always greater than zero by one to seven cents 
(exact amounts depended on the magnitude of the risky or delayed incentive).  Because 
of this, individuals who exhibited no discounting would have had AUC values of 
approximately .99 and those who exhibited complete discounting would have had AUC 
values of approximately .13 for delayed incentives and AUC values of approximately .06 
for risky gains.  For the median AUC values and the number of subjects used to calculate 
each median, see Table 17.  The median averaged AUC values for delayed gains, delayed 
losses, and risky gains were .690 (range = .529 - .866), .827 (range = .592 - .980), and 
179 
 
.670 (range = .585 - .724), respectively.  For a visual representation of the distribution of 
AUC values, see Figure 14.   
Since we had AUC values for many more subjects than we had hyperbolic 
discount rates for, all further analyses were computed with AUC values.  This allowed us 
to look for relationships across types of discounting and impulsivity that might not have 
been captured if we had excluded subjects whose choices were not fit by a hyperbolic 
discount function.   
 
Table 17: Median AUC Values. 
 Magnitude of Delayed or Risky Incentive 
 $2.50 $5.00 $7.50 $10.00 Average 
Delayed Gain      
Median AUC  .595  .695  .725  .759   .690 
(k range) (.469 - .820) (.520 - .871) (.506 - .896) (.536 - .900) (.529 - .866) 
N 212 212 212  212  212 
Delayed Loss      
Median AUC  .829  .835   .831  .835   .827 
(k range) (.593 - .997) (.567 - .995) (.596 - .993) (.589 - .994) (.592 - .980) 
N 216  216  216 216 216 
Risky Gain      
Median AUC  .689   .670  .676   .690  .670 
(k range) (.577 - .747) (.568 - .730) (.594 - .734) (.587 - .735) (.585 - .724) 
N 219  219 219  219 219 
Range = Interquartile range.  N = Number of subjects. 
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Figure 14: Boxplots of AUC values averaged across magnitudes.  Edges of box 
indicate interquartile range of averaged AUC values.  Whiskers indicate minimum and 
maximum of averaged AUC values.  Horizontal line in middle of each box is median of 
averaged AUC.  AUC of 1 represents no discounting, while AUC of 0 represents 
complete discounting (i.e. delayed option’s immediate equivalent or risky option’s 
certainty equivalent is 0).   
 
 
 
Relationships between Discounting and Impulsivity 
 
To examine relationships between each type of discounting and impulsivity, we 
computed Spearman correlations between AUC values averaged across magnitude of 
each type of discounting and the five facets of impulsivity as measured on the UPPS-P.  
Spearman correlations were used, because averaged AUC values were non-normal (all 
Shapiro-Wilk p < .05).  Averaged AUC values for delayed losses were negatively 
correlated with the Positive Urgency factor of the UPPS-P (r = -.150, p = .029), 
indicating that individuals with higher levels of Positive Urgency discounted the value of 
delayed losses more.  However, we note that this correlation was no longer significant 
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after correcting for multiple comparisons.  No other correlations were significant.  For a 
full list of correlations, see Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Correlations between Averaged AUC values and facets of the UPPS-P. 
Impulsivity 
Facet 
Mean SD Future Gain 
AUC 
Future Loss 
AUC 
Risky 
Gain AUC 
NU 2.130 .523 -.056 -.073  .016 
LPrem 1.984 .486 -.027  .017 -.012 
LPers 1.810 .455 -.027 -.048  .058 
SS 3.022 .580  .035 -.014  .046 
PU 1.770 .573 -.123 -.150*  .115 
N for all correlations between all facets (except PU) and Future Gain AUC, Future Loss 
AUC, and Risky Gain, are 211, 215, and 218, respectively (while N is one less for all 
correlations with PU). * = p < .05.  For meanings of impulsivity abbreviations, see 
Methods.  N for descriptive statistics of all Impulsivity facets is 224, except PU (N = 
223). 
 
 
Since more than 10% of subjects were missing complete data on the UPPS-P, it 
was possible that the observed relationships with Positive Urgency on the UPPS-P were 
dependent upon the values we imputed for missing responses on the questionnaire.  To 
investigate whether this was the case, we redid all correlation analyses on the subset of 
participants who had complete UPPS-P data.  No relationships were significant.  
However, consistent with the analyses performed over the entire sample, there was a 
trend for averaged AUC values for delayed losses to be negatively correlated with 
Positive Urgency (r = -.131, p = .071).   
 
Relationships between Types of Discounting 
We looked at relationships between each type of discounting, by computing 
Spearman correlations between the three averaged AUC values.  This revealed that all 
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types of discounting were significantly positively related (all p <.01), suggesting some 
shared trait or underlying mechanism associated with discounting across domains.  The 
relationship between delayed gain and loss discounting was particularly high (r = .620, p 
<.001), while those between each type of delay discounting and probability discounting 
of gains were lower (with delayed gain: r = .298, p <.001, with delayed loss: r= .212, p = 
.002).  The greater correlation between different types of delay discounting than between 
delay and probability discounting suggests that the underlying mechanisms, or traits, of 
different types of delay discounting are partially distinct from those that underlie 
probability discounting. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests comparing averaged levels of discounting revealed 
that individuals discounted delayed gains more than delayed losses (Z = -6.561, p <.001).  
We did not assess differences between probability and delay discounting, because AUC 
values across tasks were not comparable, given that the values of the different 
independent variables used to normalize the data (i.e. of odds against receiving rewards 
and the delays to incentives) were different. 
In order to examine whether there were relationships between the magnitude of 
incentives and levels of discounting, we used GEE models to predict AUC values as a 
function of the magnitude of the incentive (i.e. $2.50, $5.00, $7.50, or $10.00).  This was 
done separately for each type of discounting.  Analyses revealed that greater magnitudes 
of incentives predicted greater averaged AUC values for delayed gains (i.e. greater 
magnitudes predicted less delay discounting) (B = .007, p < .001).  In contrast, the 
magnitude of incentives did not predict levels of discounting for delayed losses or risky 
gains (p = .455 and p = .474, respectively).  
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Discussion 
 
We did not find evidence supporting our hypothesis that scores on the Lack of 
Premeditation facet of the UPPS-P would show divergent relationships between delay 
and probability discounting.  No correlations between impulsivity measures on this facet 
and levels of discounting were significant.  Only one impulsivity facet, Positive Urgency, 
was significantly correlated with any measure of discounting; higher scores on this facet 
were positively associated with greater delay discounting of losses, but were not 
associated with other types of discounting.  Although we did not find that a single facet 
of impulsivity was significantly correlated with different types of discounting, we found 
that all three types of discounting were significantly positively correlated with each other, 
with correlations between delayed gains and losses being particularly strong.  This 
reveals that a single facet of impulsivity on the UPPS-P is unable to account for the 
relationships between different types of discounting.  
We found that greater levels of delay discounting of losses as measured by AUC 
scores were associated with higher scores on the Positive Urgency factor of the UPPS-P.   
In contrast, levels of probability discounting and delay discounting of gains were not 
significantly related to scores on this facet.  At first glance, it may seem strange that 
Positive Urgency only showed a significant relationship with discounting in the loss 
domain.  The facet of Positive Urgency assesses how much someone endorses taking 
impulsive actions when they are in positive mood states (Cyders & Smith, 2007).  Given 
the relationship between this impulsivity facet and positive mood, one might expect this 
impulsivity facet to be particularly related to choices in the gain domain.  However, a 
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close look at the items that make up this scale reveals that a number of them assess the 
tendency to engage in actions while in a positive mood that may have bad consequences.  
One reason people may engage in actions that could have bad consequences is because 
they discount the value of delayed losses and other delayed aversive outcomes.  This 
potential relationship could explain why Positive Urgency was only significantly 
correlated with levels of discounting in the loss domain.  This facet may tap into 
discounting in the gain domain as well, but our nonsignificant relationships with other 
forms of discounting suggest that if it does so, then it is only to a minor extent. 
In contrast to our predictions, we did not find that any types of discounting were 
related to the Lack of Premeditation Facet on the UPPS-P.  One prior study with a similar 
sample size to ours found that higher scores on this facet were associated with greater 
levels of delay discounting (Lynam & Miller, 2004).  Given that this facet of impulsivity 
reflects “the tendency to think and reflect on the consequences of an act before engaging 
in that act” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 685), the results of Lynam and Miller (2004) 
suggest that individuals may discount delayed monetary gains because they choose 
immediate options without considering the benefits of delayed options.  While there may 
be a relationship between Lack of Premeditation and levels of delay discounting, our 
inability to find relationships with this scale indicate that if present they are very small.   
Importantly, our findings reveal that behavior on self-report scales of impulsivity 
has little relationship with behavior on tasks that measure levels of monetary discounting.  
Neither delay discounting of gains nor probability discounting of gains was significantly 
correlated with any facet of impulsivity on the UPPS-P.  Although delay discounting of 
losses was correlated with one facet, Positive Urgency, the size of the correlation 
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coefficient was small, revealing that there was little shared variance between scores on 
the two measures. This suggests that self-report measures of impulsivity and monetary 
choice tasks measure different underlying traits, and that both the tendency to choose a 
better immediate, but worse long-term monetary option and the tendency to choose a 
potentially larger, but riskier monetary option have little or no relationship with 
psychometric measures of impulsivity.  Investigators should be careful when using the 
term impulsivity or impulsive choice to describe behavior on intertemporal or risky 
choice tasks because it may lead others to attribute relationships between psychometric 
measures of impulsivity and behavior that do not exist.   
Alternatively, our inability to find relationships between most forms of 
discounting and impulsivity could have been due to characteristics of the UPPS-P, rather 
than a limitation of self-report impulsivity measures in general.  Self-report measures of 
impulsivity might be able to tap into monetary discounting behavior if they assessed 
impulsivity in the economic domain.  Impulsivity could be domain specific, and a trait 
that leads individuals to discount the value of delayed or risky economic incentives might 
only be tapped by a measure that contains items involving economic behavior.  This is a 
possible explanation for our findings, as no items on the UPPS-P assess behavior in the 
economic domain.  Researchers should consider examining whether levels of monetary 
discounting are related to behavior on the DOSPERT (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), 
which assesses risk taking across multiple domains, and should consider devising new 
self-report measures to tap into facets of impulsivity, such as lack of premeditation or 
positive urgency, with items in the economic domain.  
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We replicated past findings of positive correlations between delay discounting of 
gains and both delay discounting of losses (Murphy et al., 2001) and probability 
discounting of gains (Mitchell, 1999; Myerson et al., 2003; Richards et al., 1999).  In our 
study, the strength of the positive correlations between these forms of discounting was 
also similar to those seen in past research.  Myerson and colleagues (2003) observed 
positive correlations of .17 and of .26 between delay discounting of gains and probability 
discounting of gains in two samples of over 100 individuals; these correlations are of 
similar magnitude to our correlation of .298.   Although other studies have found higher 
positive correlations between these two types of discounting (r between .40 and .75), 
these numbers are less likely to reflect the relationship between the two types of 
discounting in the general population due to the small sample sizes of the studies (40 and 
24, respectively) (Mitchell, 1999; Richards et al., 1999).  The strength of our positive 
correlation between discounting of delayed gains and losses (i.e. r = .620) was 
remarkably similar to that seen in a previous study (i.e. r = .570) (Murphy et al., 2001).  
Together with past findings, our results suggest that there is a greater positive correlation 
between delay discounting of gains and delay discounting of losses than there is between 
delay discounting of gains and probability discounting of gains.  Importantly, we know of 
no other studies that have looked at both of these relationships in the same individuals.   
We also extend findings of past studies by showing that delay discounting of 
losses is positively correlated with probability discounting of gains.  The magnitude of 
the correlation between these two types of discounting was similar to the magnitude of 
the correlation between delay discounting of gains and probability discounting of gains.  
Thus, we found that delay discounting of gains and delay discounting of losses were 
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more strongly correlated with each other than either of them were with probability 
discounting of gains.  This suggests that there may be greater similarities between the 
traits and neural processes that lead to delay discounting of different valenced incentives, 
than there are between those that lead to discounting of delayed and risky incentives.  
However, there are also likely to be similar processes that lead to discounting of delayed 
gains, delayed losses, and risky gains.  This is because all forms of discounting were 
positively correlated with each other in our sample.  Our data indicate, however, that 
measures of impulsivity do not account for the shared processes underlying different 
types of discounting, as no impulsivity facets were significantly correlated with multiple 
types of discounting.    
 We replicated prior findings by showing that individuals discounted the value of 
delayed gains more than they discounted the value of delayed losses (Baker et al., 2003; 
Benzion et al., 1989; Estle et al., 2006; Frederick et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2001).  
Additionally, we replicated the results of prior studies by showing that the level of delay 
discounting decreased as the magnitude of the delayed gain increased (Benzion et al., 
1989; Estle et al., 2006; Green et al., 1997; Green et al., 1999; Kirby, 1997; Kirby et al., 
1999; Thaler, 1991).   In the current study, there were, however, no effects of magnitude 
on discounting of either delayed losses or risky gains.  The relationship with delay 
discounting of losses is in line with that of other studies that have shown that the 
magnitude of an outcome has less of an effect on levels of delay discounting for losses 
than for gains (Baker et al., 2003; Estle et al., 2006).  In contrast to our findings, 
however, prior studies have shown that the level of probability discounting increases as 
the magnitude of the gain increases (Christensen et al., 1998; Estle et al., 2006; Myerson 
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et al., 2003).  One potential reason for our inability to find magnitude effects in the 
domain of risk is that we used monetary gains of small magnitude, in contrast to the large 
magnitude gains used in other studies (Estle et al., 2006; Myerson et al., 2003).  All of 
our monetary amounts were relatively small, and were never greater than $10.  We used 
such small amounts because it allowed us to have subjects make choices for real 
incentives.  However, it may have prevented us from seeing magnitude effects on levels 
of probability discounting.  Prior research has shown that the effect of magnitude on the 
level of probability discounting is smaller when different risky reward magnitudes are 
both relatively small (i.e. $1 and $10) than when one of them is large (i.e. $10 and 
$10,000) (Christensen et al., 1998).   
The intertemporal choice data of many of our subjects was not fit by hyperbolic 
discount functions.  For approximately 50% of subjects, we were not able to model their 
preferences for at least one magnitude of delayed monetary loss with a hyperbolic 
discount function.  For preferences involving delayed gains, this figure was 
approximately 25%.  Some evidence suggests that for some individuals, standard 
hyperbolic delay discount functions provide poor fits to choice data, but more so in the 
loss than in the gain domain (Murphy et al., 2001).  The reason that many preferences in 
our study could not be modeled with hyperbolic discount functions was because subjects 
often responded identically regardless of delay (i.e. immediate equivalents were the same 
across delays).  That is, many subjects either did not discount delayed incentives at all, or 
discounted all delayed incentives by the same amount regardless of the delay.  For 
subjects who did have intertemporal choice data that could be fit by hyperbolic equations, 
the fit was often extremely poor, indicating that many subjects’ intertemporal choice 
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preferences were not explained by hyperbolic discounting.  Model fit was worse for 
losses, which had a median fit index of less than zero.  In contrast to the poor fits of 
hyperbolic delay discount functions, for over 95% of subjects, all of their risky gain data 
could be modeled by hyperbolic discount functions, and hyperbolic fits were relatively 
good.   
While at first glance our data suggest the possibility that the subjective value of 
delayed incentives are modeled more poorly with hyperbolic discount functions than are 
the subjective value of risky incentives, a closer look at the details of our task reveals that 
the poor fits may have been due to the stimuli used to model discounting.  The amount of 
data points used to fit hyperbolic functions in our study was small.  While each curve was 
only constructed from preferences at three points (i.e. for three delays or probabilities), it 
is common to use five or more points (Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Madden et al., 1997; 
Mitchell, 1999; Murphy et al., 2001; Myerson & Green, 1995; Petry, 2001, 2002).  This 
may have explained the poor fits, but still does not explain why many subjects responded 
similarly across time points.  The lack of variability in immediate equivalents across 
delays may have been partially due to our small range of delays.  We did not use any long 
delays in our study, as delays ranged from 2 weeks to only 8 weeks.  In contrast, in other 
studies it is typical to have some delays as long as 6 months, with some studies even 
including some longer delays on the order of years (Madden et al., 1997; Murphy et al., 
2001; Myerson & Green, 1995; Petry, 2001, 2002).  Perhaps if we had used longer 
delays, individuals would have shown more variability in their preferences with respect 
to time.  Although many individuals’ immediate equivalents did not vary as a function of 
time, most individuals’ certainty equivalents did vary as a function of probability.  The 
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greater variability seen in certainty equivalents may have been because we used stimuli 
whose attributes varied over a larger range.  On the indifference point task for risky 
rewards, the range of probabilities was not small, and ranged from 50% to 90%.   
Levels of delay discounting may have been fit better by a more complex equation, 
such as a quasi-hyperbolic function that contained two free parameters (Myerson et al., 
2003).  However, a more complex function still would not have fit the data of the large 
number of subjects who exhibited no variability in their responses as a function of time.  
Because of this, we believed the best way to measure levels of discounting was to 
calculate the area under the subject’s discounting curves (AUC).  This model-free 
approach allowed us to examine levels of discounting in all subjects, because it could be 
computed even for those subjects who had identical immediate equivalents for delayed 
incentives at all levels of delay.  It also revealed that subjects tended to discount the 
values of delayed gains, delayed losses, and risky gains, as expected.  
We examined relationships between impulsivity and three different types of 
monetary discounting (i.e. delayed gain, delayed loss, risky gain) with a larger sample 
than has been used in most prior studies.  Although levels of discounting were positively 
correlated across all three types of discounting measured, no facet of impulsivity had a 
similar relationship with each type of discounting.  One facet of impulsivity, Positive 
Urgency, was positively correlated with greater delay discounting of losses, but the 
magnitude of this correlation was low.  In contrast, no facets of impulsivity were 
significantly correlated with delay discounting of gains or probability discounting of 
gains.  The positive correlations seen across different types of discounting suggest that a 
common trait underlies the tendencies to discount different types of incentives, but our 
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results reveal that it is not related to impulsivity constructs as measured by the UPPS-P 
Impulsive Behavior scale.  Many of the relationships seen between behavioral measures 
of monetary discounting and self-report measures of impulsivity in past research may 
have been due to the small sample sizes of the studies.   
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Chapter V 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In the remaining part of this dissertation a number of broad questions related to 
intertemporal and risky choice are addressed.  The questions build off of the findings of 
the experiments that were performed.  Specific attention is drawn to the roles played by 
the DLPFC and PPC in economic choices.  Some limitations of the experiments are also 
described, including the limitations of the subject population enlisted and of the 
inferences that can be drawn from rTMS.  This chapter concludes with an overall 
summary of the key findings of this dissertation.  
 
Questions Concerning Choice 
 
What are the roles of the DLPFC and PPC in intertemporal and risky choice? 
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the DLPFC is involved in 
valuation of delayed and risky incentives rather than in cognitive control functions during 
economic choice tasks.  Disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS led to general shifts in 
choice preferences across the entire range of values on the Intertemporal Choice Task 
(Experiment 1) and across the entire range of values on the more risky trials of the Risky 
Choice Task (Experiment 2), suggesting that valuation of incentives changed in both 
tasks.  Compared to individuals who received sham stimulation, individuals who received 
real rTMS were more likely to choose better immediate, but worse long-term incentives 
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(Experiment 1) and were more likely to choose risky incentives (Experiment 2).  If 
cognitive control functions of the DLPFC helped individuals choose better long-term, but 
worse immediate options and less risky options, then one would expect that such control 
would be increasingly needed to select these options as the motivational drive to select 
other options became more prepotent (i.e. as the values of immediate or risky options 
increased with respect to those of delayed or certain options, respectively).  Disruption of 
the DLPFC, however, did not lead to greater changes in choice as the relative value of the 
immediate or risky options increased, suggesting that the DLPFC is not involved in 
cognitive control functions that help individuals make better long-term intertemporal 
choices and less risky choices.    
The shifts in choice seen in Experiments 1 and 2 following real rTMS suggest that 
the DLPFC evaluates the desirability of incentives on risky and intertemporal choice 
tasks differently than do other brain regions.  The results, however, do not support the 
conjecture that DLPFC functions are necessary to evaluate incentives and make 
economic decisions.  This is because following disruption of the DLPFC in both 
Experiments 1 and 2, individuals were still sensitive to differences in the previously 
established subjective values of the two options.  Like individuals who received sham 
stimulation, individuals who received real rTMS were more likely to make choices for 
options as their relative values increased, indicating that they could evaluate the 
desirability of the two options.  This pattern of results suggests that the DLPFC is only 
one brain region that evaluates incentives, and that when valuation processes of the 
DLPFC are disrupted, choice follows directly from valuations performed by other brain 
regions.   
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The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the PPC is involved in cognitive control 
functions, rather than valuation, during economic choice tasks.  In contrast to the effects 
seen following disruption of the DLPFC, disruption of the right PPC did not lead to 
general shifts in preference relative to sham stimulation.  When the value of the 
immediate option was low, disruption of the right PPC did not affect choice.  However, 
as the relative value of the immediate option increased, individuals who received real 
rTMS became increasingly more likely than individuals who received sham rTMS to 
choose options with a better immediate, but worse long-term value.  This evidence 
supports a cognitive control account of the PPC because cognitive control should be 
increasingly needed to choose the better long-term option as the value of the immediate 
option increases.  Although the data of Experiment 1 do not indicate which particular 
cognitive control function the PPC could be involved in during economic choice, one 
might expect that it would be involved in the control function of top-down attention, 
since this is a key function of the region (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
 
What do the studies performed tell us about how economic choices are made? 
There are two key processes that typically come into play while making an 
economic choice.  First, an individual evaluates the desirability of each option.  Once 
choice options are ascribed values, a person compares the value of each option so that the 
more highly valued option can be selected.  The results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide 
important information about the first of these processes: valuation. 
Importantly, the results suggest that a multiple valuation model of choice is more 
tenable than a single-valuation model.  The key difference between these models is in the 
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number of different valuation systems that are involved in making a choice.  A single-
valuation model holds that one region or a set of regions in the brain computes subjective 
value of options in a similar way and that a choice is made as a result of subjective value 
coding in this system (Glimcher, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2009).  In contrast, a multiple 
valuation model of choice holds that different regions of the brain compute different 
subjective values for different options, by responding differently as a function of choice 
parameters, and that these divergent valuation signals are summated in some way to 
arrive at a decision (Glimcher, 2009; McClure et al., 2004).  
For intertemporal choices, an influential multiple valuation model has held that a 
“patient system” which includes the DLPFC discounts the value of delayed options 
relative to that of immediate options less steeply than does a set of other brain regions 
(McClure et al., 2004).  The data of Experiment 1 support this idea and those of 
Experiment 2 build upon it by suggesting that there are multiple valuation processes that 
ascribe value to risky choice options as well.  The results of these two experiments 
suggest that there are at least two valuation systems that respond differently to choice 
options as a function of risk level, and at least two valuation systems that respond 
differently to choice options as a function of delay.  There may also be divergent systems 
that respond to only the subjective values of choice options involving losses or gains.  
However, in the DLPFC, one system appears to evaluate the desirability of both positive 
and negative incentives during intertemporal choice.    
An important question is how information from different valuation systems 
influences choice.  Valuation signals from each valuation system might be integrated 
with each other to arrive at a decision, or conversely, each system might act in parallel 
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and compete with the other in determining a decision.  These possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive, as some signals from each system might be integrated, while others 
might compete.  Additionally, in some regions of the brain, both of these processes could 
occur. 
In Chapters II and III, I suggested that valuation signals from the DLPFC might 
be integrated with valuation signals in the MPFC, based on evidence showing functional 
connectivity between the DLPFC and this region during choice (Hare et al., 2009).  
While there may be integration of value signals here, other findings suggest that the 
striatum might have a more central role in the integration of values and ultimately 
determining what choices an individual makes.  Like the MPFC, the striatum is 
responsive to the subjective value of options on intertemporal and risky choice tasks 
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Levy et al., 2010; Peters & Buchel, 2009, 2010).  
However, findings suggest that the striatum is more sensitive than the MPFC to many 
other value related signals.  As discussed in Chapter I, the region that is most consistently 
activated in humans to predictions of value and its components is the striatum, not the 
MPFC.  The striatum is responsive to predictions of positive and negative value, and to 
parameters of value, including the expected value, magnitude, and probability of rewards.  
The greater tendency to respond to value related signals in the striatum make it a more 
plausible candidate than the MPFC for integration of values. 
The connectivity of the striatum with other regions makes it a good candidate for 
both integration of value and selection of options.  Other regions involved in valuation, 
including the MPFC (both dorsal and ventral), OFC, DLPFC, and the dopaminergic 
midbrain all project to the striatum (Haber & Knutson, 2010).  Although neurons from 
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the DLPFC mostly project to more dorsal regions of the striatum than neurons from 
regions of the MPFC, some neurons from both the DLPFC and MPFC project to common 
regions of the striatum (Haber, Kim, Mailly, & Calzavara, 2006).  Some neurons in these 
striatal regions could integrate valuation signals from different valuation systems.  
Alternatively, competitive interactions between signals from different valuation systems 
could occur in these common regions.  For instance, some neurons in these regions might 
only be influenced by signals from one valuation system at any time; which valuation 
system influences them could be determined by the relative strength of signals from 
different valuation systems.  
Other value signals from different regions of the striatum might be integrated with 
each other or might interact in more indirect ways, through loops of connections between 
the striatum and midbrain dopamine neurons.  Through these connections, striatal 
neurons that are located more ventrally are able to influence those that are located more 
dorsally (Haber, Fudge, & McFarland, 2000).  These connections also give a possible 
mechanism linking valuation with choice.  Value signals from more ventral striatal 
regions may be able to bias behavior towards actions to choose specific items by 
indirectly influencing activity in the dorsal striatum, a region important for motor 
behavior (Alexander, Delong, & Strick, 1986; Haber, 2003).  All of these properties make 
the striatum a good candidate for where values are compared and decisions are made.   
If future research confirms that there are multiple valuation systems that each 
differentially influence what choices are made, it will be important to examine what 
factors might change the relative weight of information from each valuation system in the 
choice process.  Cognitive control processes might have such a role, and the results of 
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Experiment 1 suggest that the PPC might be a key region in cognitive control processes 
during choice.  Given the many reciprocal connections between the PPC and DLPFC, 
control functions of the PPC would be in a good position to alter valuation functions of 
the DLPFC. 
   
Could the PPC be involved in valuation rather than cognitive control during choice? 
The significant interactions seen between Stimulation Type and Immediate 
Relative Value on choice following rTMS to the right PPC in Experiment 1 are 
supportive of the proposal that this region is involved in cognitive control functions that 
help individuals choose in line with goals to select options with the best long-term value.  
Following disruption of the right PPC, subjects were increasingly more likely than sham 
subjects to choose the better immediate option as the relative value of the immediate 
option increased.     
However, there is another way to interpret these interactions that does not rely on 
the assumption that individuals have specific goals to choose options with the best long-
term value during intertemporal choice tasks.  The right PPC could be involved in a 
valuation process during intertemporal choice that places greater relative weight on the 
value of delayed vs. immediate incentives than do other regions responsive to value, but 
only under some circumstances.  The right PPC does not appear to place more weight in 
general on the value of delayed incentives than do other regions, because if it did one 
would have expected to see a general shift in the choice curves following disruption of 
this region, similar to what was seen following disruption of the right DLPFC in 
Experiment 1.  However, the right PPC could evaluate delayed vs. immediate incentives 
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differently than do other regions as a function of the magnitudes of the incentives.  Other 
regions responsive to value might be more responsive to changes in the magnitude of 
immediate incentives than to changes in the magnitude of delayed incentives; the value 
attributed to incentives might increase at a greater rate as the magnitude of immediate 
incentives increases than as the magnitude of delayed incentives increases.  In contrast, 
the right PPC might be more similarly responsive to changes in the magnitude of both 
immediate and delayed incentives.  If so, then valuation processes of the right PPC would 
be expected to diverge more from those of other regions as the relative magnitude of an 
immediate incentive increases with respect to that of a delayed incentive; as the relative 
magnitude of an immediate incentive increases, the right PPC would be expected to place 
greater relative weight on the value of delayed vs. immediate incentives than do other 
regions of the brain.  This suggestion would be consistent with the effects on choice seen 
following disruption of the right PPC.  Individuals who had real rTMS to this region 
became increasingly more likely than sham subjects to choose the better immediate 
option as the relative value of the immediate option increased.    
Thus, the data of Experiment 1 are consistent with a suggestion that both the right 
DLPFC and right PPC are involved in more “patient” valuation processes that place 
greater relative weight on the value of delayed vs. immediate incentives than do other 
regions of the brain.  However, the different effects seen following disruption of each 
region suggest that if both regions are involved in valuation processes, then they do not 
evaluate options similarly.  Unlike the purported valuation processes of the right DLPFC, 
those of the right PPC might only ascribe more relative weight to delayed vs. immediate 
incentives than do other regions when the magnitude of an immediate incentive on an 
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intertemporal choice task reaches a certain level with respect to the magnitude of a 
delayed incentive.  Despite this conjecture, I believe it is more likely that the right PPC is 
involved in a cognitive control function than a valuation function during intertemporal 
choice.  This is because that activation in the PPC does not typically scale with the 
subjective value of items on choice tasks or bidding tasks, or to the components of value 
prediction (see Chapter I).   
 
Does the PPC perform a cognitive control function in Risky Choice? 
An important question is whether the PPC has a role in cognitive control in risky 
choice.  In Chapter I of this dissertation, I postulated that cognitive control might help an 
individual choose a certain reward instead of a potentially larger, but potentially worse 
risky reward, just as it might help an individual choose a better long-term, but worse 
immediate intertemporal choice option.  This assumes that in risky choice tasks cognitive 
control would be needed to override a prepotent urge to choose a potentially larger risky 
reward and in intertemporal choice tasks cognitive control would be needed to override a 
prepotent urge to choose the best immediate reward.   
There are, however, some reasons to suggest that prepotent urges might generally 
lead to selection of certain options, rather than of risky options, in risky choice tasks. 
Individuals tend to devalue both risky and delayed rewards with respect to certain 
immediate ones (Frederick et al., 2004; Myerson et al., 2003; Rachlin et al., 1991).  
Additionally, BOLD signal tends to decrease in many brain regions, as does firing of 
midbrain dopamine neurons, as both delay to reward increases and probability of 
receiving a reward decreases (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Peters 
201 
 
& Buchel, 2009; Tobler et al., 2005).  These similarities between processing immediacy 
and certainty suggest that motivational drives to choose certain and immediate options 
might often be prepotent with respect to those to choose risky and delayed ones, 
respectively.  If so, then cognitive control may help one override a prepotent urge to 
choose a better immediate option in order to select a better long-term option on an 
intertemporal choice task, yet help one override a prepotent urge to choose a less risky 
option in order to select a riskier option with a higher expected value on a risky choice 
task. 
However, this is only a conjecture.  In order to test whether the PPC has such a 
role in cognitive control during risky choice, one could administer rTMS to the PPC and 
have individuals perform a risky choice task afterwards.  If it was found that disruption of 
the PPC led to changes in choice that were dependent on the relative values of the options 
in a manner that was similar to what was found following disruption of the right PPC in 
Experiment 1 (i.e. if disruption of the PPC led to greater choice of certain options, and 
this effect increased as the certain value increased), then it would suggest that the PPC 
has a role in cognitive control during both risky and intertemporal choice.  If it did not 
lead to any changes, then it might suggest that individuals did not attempt to use 
cognitive control on the risky choice task.  Alternatively, it could indicate that there is 
something specific about intertemporal choices that engage control, or other, functions of 
the PPC. 
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Does a single valuation process in the DLPFC both devalue risky rewards more than 
other brain regions and value delayed incentives more than other brain regions? 
 
It is not intuitive that a single valuation process of the DLPFC both devalues risky 
incentives more than valuation processes of other regions, yet values delayed incentives 
more than valuation processes of other regions.  Delays are somewhat risky, and thus one 
might expect a process that devalues risky incentives more than the processes of other 
regions to devalue delayed incentives more than the processes of other regions as well.  
Yet, the perception of risk of delayed options is likely to be highly dependent upon the 
context of the decision.  The amount of risk that an individual believes is associated with 
a delayed reward may be so low that risk valuation processes of the DLPFC do not 
evaluate the risk of the reward differently than do other risk valuation processes in the 
brain.  This could be the case, given that the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the 
DLPFC might not evaluate low levels of risk differently than do other brain regions.  
One way to investigate whether the same brain processes in the DLPFC are 
involved in evaluating both the risk level of incentives and the delay to receiving them is 
to see whether the same neurons in the DLPFC are responsive to both the levels of risk 
and delay of incentives.  Importantly, one would want to search for responses to different 
levels of risk and delay that were different in the DLPFC than in other regions responsive 
to these parameters, since the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that valuation 
processes of the DLPFC evaluate these parameters differently than do those of other 
regions.  One could search for neurons in the DLPFC that have a larger decrement in 
response as the risk level of rewards increases (i.e. greater devaluation of risky rewards) 
and a smaller decrement in response as delay to rewards increases (i.e. greater valuation 
of delayed rewards) than neurons in other regions of the brain responsive to valuation.   
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Are the functions of the DLPFC and PPC similar in risky choices 
involving losses and in risky choices involving gains? 
 
An important finding of Experiment 1 was that disruption of either the right 
DLPFC or the right PPC affected choices similarly in both choices involving gains and in 
choices involving losses.  In both circumstances, disruption led to a greater preference for 
options with a better immediate, but worse long-term value, highlighting a role for these 
regions in optimization of long-term vs. immediate value.  An important question is 
whether disruption of these regions with rTMS would lead to parallel effects for both 
gains and losses in choices involving risk as well. 
Because gains become more risky as they become less probable (i.e. less likely to 
lead to a positive outcome), but losses become more risky as they become more probable, 
using the term “level of risk” can lead to confusion across the gain and loss domains.  To 
simplify discussion, here I will use the term “level of probability” rather than level of 
risk.   Importantly, the construct “level of probability” leads to unique hypotheses of the 
function of the DLPFC across the gain and loss domains.   
One might expect a valuation function, such as has been proposed for the DLPFC,  
that encourages risk aversion for gains by lowering the positive value of rewards as they 
become less probable (i.e. devalues them), to encourage risk seeking for losses by 
lowering the negative value of losses as they become less probable (i.e. they would 
become less negative).  This idea assumes that the DLPFC gives options less overall 
value (i.e. they are valued as less positive or less negative) than do other regions involved 
in valuation as the probability level decreases. The appeal of this model is that it suggests 
that the DLPFC has a role in leading to the pattern of risk preferences that people 
typically have in the gain and loss domains.  Individuals tend to be risk averse with gains, 
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but risk seeking with losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) (although as noted below, this 
pattern is different when options lead to losses or gains with low probability).  If the 
DLPFC ascribes losses with less overall negative value as they become less probable than 
do other brain regions, then disruption of the DLPFC would be expected to cause greater 
risk aversion, rather than greater risk seeking, in choices involving only losses.   
How disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS affects risky choices in just the loss 
domain is a critical question that should be investigated in future studies.  As with gains, 
specific changes in risk taking may be dependent upon the probability level of risky 
options.  Probability level should be modified parametrically to see how disruption of the 
DLPFC affects risk preference for losses over a large range of probabilities.  Crucially, 
this needs to be done for risky choices involving only gains as well, since it is not known 
how disruption of the DLPFC affects risk preferences for gains as the probability of the 
risky option is varied over a large range.  Effects on risk preference might be expected to 
scale in an opposite manner with the probability of gains and with the probability of 
losses.  Such a proposal is not unlikely given that individuals tend to be risk averse with 
high probability gains and risk seeking with low probability gains, yet tend to show 
opposite risk preferences with high and low probability losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992); functions of the DLPFC could underlie these different patterns of risk preference.      
 
What do correlations among different types of choice preferences 
suggest about brain function? 
 
The positive correlations seen in Experiment 3 among the tendencies to discount 
the value of delayed gains, of delayed losses, and of risky gains suggest that some shared 
neural process or trait may lead to discounting these three types of incentives.  An 
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intriguing possibility is that individual differences in functions of regions of the brain 
such as the striatum and MPFC, which have activation which positively scales with the 
subjective value of risky and delayed rewards, might be related to individual differences 
in all three types of discounting (Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Levy et al., 2010; Peters 
& Buchel, 2009, 2010).  Individuals who have lower levels of probability and delay 
discounting could have value related responses in these regions that diminish less as 
probability decreases and delay increases, than do individuals with higher levels of 
discounting.  One limitation, however, to this proposal is that it is unclear how the 
subjective value of risky and delayed losses would scale with brain activity on choice 
tasks, as no prior studies have investigated this.    
It is unlikely, however, that processes of the DLPFC underlie the common 
tendencies to discount delayed gains, delayed losses, and risky gains.  If they did, one 
would expect that all three of these types of discounting would change in the same 
direction following disruption of the DLPFC (i.e. all increase or decrease).  Instead, in 
Experiments 1 and 2 there were divergent effects on discounting of incentives in the 
delayed and risky domains following real rTMS: discounting of delayed incentives 
increased, while discounting of risky incentives decreased.  This makes it unlikely that 
the neural substrates leading to the covariation of delay and probability discounting are 
related to DLPFC processes, and instead, suggests that DLPFC processes may actually 
limit the degree of correlation between delay and probability discounting. 
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What are limitations of the inferences that can be drawn from rTMS? 
 If functioning is altered following rTMS, then one can infer that the brain 
structures affected by rTMS had a role in that function.  However, one cannot necessarily 
infer that the targeted brain region is essential for that function.  This is because rTMS 
not only affects the brain region over which it is applied, but also has indirect effects on 
brain regions connected to the targeted region (Eisenegger, Treyer, Fehr, & Knoch, 
2008).  I have claimed roles for the DLPFC and PPC in economic choices based on the 
results of Experiments 1 and 2 since rTMS targeting these regions altered choice 
behavior.  However, the changes in choice patterns seen following rTMS may have been 
due to disruption of functions in regions connected to the DLPFC and PPC, rather than 
(or in addition to) disruption of functions in the DLPFC and PPC.   
Previous findings show that changes in regional cerebral blood flow following 
low frequency rTMS administered to the DLPFC occur in both the DLPFC and ipsilateral 
VLPFC (Eisenegger et al., 2008).  This raises the possibility that changes in choice 
patterns seen in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to disruption of functions of the VLPFC, 
rather than the DLPFC.  In intertemporal choice studies, it has been shown that the 
VLPFC exhibits similar activation patterns to the DLPFC, and has been claimed to be 
part of the “patient system” that helps individuals choose better long-term incentives 
(McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004).  Thus there is some reason to believe that 
disruption of this region might have led to the changes in choice patterns seen in 
Experiment 1.  In the future, it will be important to try to tease apart the roles of the 
DLPFC and VLPFC in both intertemporal and risky choice.   
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   Even though the data from Experiments 1 and 2 are not supportive of a cognitive 
control account of DLPFC functioning during choice, this does not mean that the DLPFC 
is not involved in such a function during intertemporal and risky choice tasks.  TMS does 
not disrupt all functioning in a region equally, as the effects of TMS depend on the 
orientation of neurons in the target region with respect to the orientation of the coil 
(Wagner, Rushmore, Eden, & Valero-Cabre, 2009).  Thus even though functions in a 
region are disrupted following TMS, not all functions will be disrupted equally, and some 
might not be disrupted at all.  It is thus possible that some of the key functions of the 
DLPFC and PPC that are involved in making economic choices were not disrupted by 
rTMS.  This limitation reveals the importance of using a variety of different 
neuroscientific approaches when studying the relationships between the brain and 
behavior.  
 
Do the inclusion criteria of the experiments limit the generalizability of the findings? 
 All three of the experiments limited inclusion to individuals with specific risk or 
time preferences.  Subjects were excluded from Experiment 1 if they did not discount 
delayed losses because inclusion of these subjects would not have allowed us to always 
have individuals make a choice between a small immediate loss and a larger delayed loss.  
Having this reason for exclusion was essential in testing a self-control account of 
intertemporal choice, since individuals should not be motivated to use cognitive control 
processes to choose an immediate loss that is larger than a delayed loss.  Subjects who 
were in Experiment 2 were excluded if they were risk seeking.  This was done to increase 
statistical power, under the assumption that if the DLPFC modulates risk aversion and 
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prevents risk-seeking behavior, disruption of this region might not have effects or might 
have smaller effects on individuals who were already risk seeking.  Some subjects in 
Experiment 3 were excluded for each of the reasons subjects were excluded in the other 
experiments, since individuals in Experiment 3 were consented to participate in 
Experiments 1 or 2.   Because of the inclusion criteria, the findings from all three 
experiments might not generalize to individuals with different types of preferences.   
Effects on choice following disruption of cognitive control functions might be 
expected to differ across individuals with different preferences, because cognitive control 
might be used to accomplish different choice goals across individuals.  Similarly, effects 
on choice following disruption of valuation functions might differ across individuals, 
because valuation functions might normally respond differently to different choice 
parameters (i.e. risk or time) in individuals with different preferences.   
The results of one fMRI study suggest that valuation processes in the PFC 
respond differently to risk level in those with different risk preferences.  Tobler and 
colleagues (2009) observed that the relationship between activation in the right lateral 
frontal pole and risk level (as defined as spread of reward outcomes) depended on risk 
preferences.  Individuals who were risk seeking had greater activation in this region for a 
high risk than a low risk option, while those who were risk averse had greater activation 
for the low risk option.  Even though they found activation in a different region of PFC 
than I targeted with rTMS in Experiment 2 of this dissertation, it does raise the possibility 
that the purported valuation functions that were affected with rTMS respond differently 
to the level of risk in individuals with different risk preferences.   
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How do people solve intertemporal choice or risky choice problems? 
One difficulty in determining the neural mechanisms of intertemporal and risky 
choices is that there are many different ways a person could make economic choices.  
Different people may make choices in different ways, or the same person might make 
choices in different ways at different times.   To illustrate, people may make choices 
based on subjective values that are determined automatically.  Alternatively, they could 
utilize cognitive operations to manipulate values in working memory and make a choice 
based on manipulated values.  The cognitive operations performed could differ depending 
on an individual’s goals and task rules.  For example, in risky choices some individuals 
may compute expected values, while in intertemporal choices some people may multiply 
future values by a discount rate.  People could also hold online different decision rules, 
such as criteria that if one option dominates another by a certain level of a parameter, 
they will choose it.  How much attention is given to various attributes could differ as 
well, and this could be a function of goals or task rules.  An additional factor in 
intertemporal choice is that some individuals may use prospection to imagine the 
desirability of future outcomes. 
All of these different factors reveal the complexity of determining the brain 
regions involved in making intertemporal and risky choices.  If different individuals are 
approaching these choices in different ways, then the brain functions used to make 
choices will differ as well.  Future intertemporal and risky choice studies would benefit 
by asking individuals to report how they are making their decisions.   This could reveal 
patterns between levels of delay and probability discounting and the ways individuals 
make choices.  From a clinical point of view, it could help identify methods to guide 
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individuals in decision making.  One limitation to this approach, however, is that 
individuals may not be able to accurately report how they are making decisions on 
economic choice tasks, as they might not remember or be aware of how they are making 
decisions.    
In future neuroimaging studies, investigators could ask individuals to perform 
choices in different ways, to see how the neural mechanisms of choice differ with respect 
to the different cognitive operations used.  A good example of such an approach has 
recently shown that the brain processes which respond to the subjective value of 
intertemporal choice options differ when prospection is used at the time of decision 
making (Peters & Buchel, 2010).  When performing such studies, investigators should 
keep in mind that there may be multiple valuation systems in the brain that respond 
differently to choice parameters and that the relative levels of activity in different brain 
regions responsive to valuation may vary as a function of the operations used.    
  Brain processes involved in cognitive control would be predicted to have 
different effects on choice depending on the task rules or goals that an individual has 
while performing a choice task, since individuals can use cognitive control to make 
choices in line with their intentions.  The different effects on choice might arise due to 
different effects of cognitive control functions on valuation systems.  More specifically, 
valuation signals in multiple regions of the brain may be modulated differently by control 
functions as a result of a person’s goals.  Future behavioral and neuroeconomic studies 
could benefit by trying to uncover what cognitive control is being used for.  This could be 
roughly assessed by asking individuals to report what their goals or strategies are during 
choice tasks.   
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Under what circumstances are the left vs. the right DLPFC important in choice? 
 Disruption of either side of the DLPFC affected choices involving risk, yet only 
disruption of the right DLPFC affected intertemporal choices.  Other low frequency 
rTMS studies of risky or intertemporal choices have found different patterns of effects 
across side of the DLPFC (Figner et al., 2010; Knoch et al., 2006).  An important 
question is what accounted for these different effects of side of stimulation across studies.  
The relative involvement of each side of the DLPFC in valuation processes may depend 
on the components of the tasks used, such as task difficulty.  Alternatively it might 
depend on individual differences in lateralization of brain functions. 
 Although it has been proposed that the two sides of the frontal lobe have different 
roles in approach and avoidance behavior (Davidson, 1992), the findings of Experiment 1 
suggest that the relative involvement of the left vs. right DLPFC in economic choice is 
not dependent on whether choices involve approach vs. avoidance.  Disruption of the 
right DLPFC led to similar changes for both intertemporal choices involving gains and 
losses, while disruption of the left DLPFC did not significantly affect either type of 
intertemporal choice.  This is not the pattern one would expect to see if one side of the 
DLPFC had a larger role in approach and the other side had a larger role in avoidance.  
This is because choices involving gains would be expected to engage systems involved in 
approach behavior more than do choices involving losses, while choices involving losses 
would be expected to engage systems involved in avoidance behavior more than do 
choices involving gains.  
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What are the implications regarding the relationship between  
self-report impulsivity measures and choice preferences? 
 
Although a number of scientists have labeled intertemporal choices for options 
with a better immediate, but worse long-term value than alternatives as impulsive choices 
(Cardinal, 2006; Deluty, 1978; Figner et al., 2010; Logue, 1988; Madden et al., 1997; 
Pine et al., 2009), the results of Experiment 3 reveal that the relationships between the 
tendency to make “impulsive choices” and other constructs of impulsivity are at most 
very modest.  Levels of impulsivity derived from self-report scales do not adequately tap 
into either levels of delay or probability discounting.  Because of this, scientists should be 
careful in using the term “impulsive choice” to describe behavior on choice tasks, as it 
might lead others to assume that there are relationships between choice behavior and 
measurements of impulsivity on self-report scales that do not exist.   
The lack of strong relationships between impulsivity and choice preferences 
suggest that choice preference tasks measure an important component of behavior that is 
not captured by self-report impulsivity scales.  Assessing levels of delay and probability 
discounting in the laboratory might actually provide a better indicator of the likelihood of 
engaging in unhealthy choices in everyday life than do self-report scales.  Many problem 
behaviors such as eating unhealthy foods, using substances, or deciding not to receive an 
immunization involve tradeoffs between immediate vs. long-term value.  Other problem 
behaviors such as engaging in unprotected sex or gambling involve assessments of risk.  
Levels of delay and probability discounting might tap into the tendencies to engage in 
such unhealthy behaviors better than do other types of measures, because the decision 
processes engaged during choice tasks may more closely approximate those engaged in 
outside the laboratory that lead to unhealthy behaviors.   
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The experiments of this dissertation have expanded our knowledge of the neural 
mechanisms of intertemporal choice and choice involving risk.  They have also provided 
important information on the relationships between different choice preferences, and 
between choice preferences and impulsivity.  In Experiment 1, it was shown that 
disruption of the right DLPFC led to increased choice of options for monetary gain and 
for monetary loss that had a better immediate, but worse long-term value than 
alternatives.  Disruption of the right PPC was also shown to lead to increased choice for 
these options, but this effect was dependent on the relative value of the two options, 
suggesting a role for the PPC in cognitive control.  In Experiment 2, disruption of either 
side of the DLPFC led to increased choice of options for potentially larger risky monetary 
gains, an effect that was dependent on the probability level of the risky option.  The 
pattern of results following disruption of the DLPFC in both Experiments 1 and 2 
suggests that the DLPFC has an important role in valuation during both risky and 
intertemporal choices.  In Experiment 3, there were positive correlations between levels 
of three types of monetary discounting – i.e. delayed gains, delayed losses, and risky 
gains.  However, there were no strong relationships between any forms of monetary 
discounting and impulsivity.  Together this suggests that a shared trait may be related to 
preferences across choice domains, and that this trait has little relationship with 
impulsivity as measured on self-report scales.  
Understanding the neural mechanisms of economic choices will help reveal how 
consumers make economic decisions.  But more importantly, it will help reveal how 
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humans and other animals make all kinds of choices, because the processes that make up 
an economic choice, valuation and value comparison, are important components for any 
choice between potentially rewarding or potentially aversive options.     
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